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

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Geotherapy

Russia's Neuroses, and Ours

Stephen Sestanovich

An ambition, inordinate and immense, one of those ambitions which could only possibly spring in the bosoms of the oppressed, and could only find nourishment in the miseries of a whole nation, ferments in the heart of the Russian people. That nation, essentially aggressive, greedy under the influence of privation, expiates beforehand, by a debasing submission, the design of exercising a tyranny over other nations: the glory, the riches which it hopes for, consoles it for the disgrace to which it submits. To purify himself from the foul and impious sacrifice of all public and personal liberty, the slave, upon his knees, dreams of the conquest of the world.

—The Marquis de Custine, *Russia in 1839*

DURING THE Cold War, Americans by and large forgot Custine, perhaps the grumpiest tourist and most scathing vilifier of Russia who ever wrote. Locked in conflict with a totalitarian state, we thought that the main reason the Soviet Union made trouble for us, and for the world at large, was that it was not a democracy. Take away Bolshevik ideology, the command economy, and the power of the Politburo, and you'd be a long way toward normalcy. Dissolve the Warsaw Pact, slash military spending, give the non-Russian republics their independence, and it would be hard to see what we might fight about. Adopt a constitution, end censorship, respect religious freedom, hold elections, then hold more elections: Could a country that did all these things really be a threat?

Apparently, yes. Political institutions, we are now told, solve much less than was once imagined. They do not address deep psychic and socio-cultural torments, and legions of new Custines have begun to argue that for Russians no torment is deeper than that of being a fallen superpower—unless perhaps it is that of being a fallen superpower while also undergoing the transition to a market economy. In any case, the pain is excruciating and is said to be relieved only by an increasingly belligerent foreign policy, ideally by re-establishment of the Soviet Empire. As for other countries, they need to understand the deep roots of this affliction, while resisting any thought that the tools of modern medicine can ameliorate it. Foreign policy, says one authority, is not a realm of "psychological engineering." Russia, says another, is not our "patient."[1] (These authorities, it will be seen, do not always follow their own advice.)

Stephen Sestanovich is vice president for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He was a member of the National Security Council staff under President Reagan.

[1]Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad", *Newsweek*, June 17, 1996, pp. 41-43; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Russia: Neither our partner nor patient", *Washington Times*, December 22, 1995.

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Nations do have neuroses. If an unhappy past is one of the causes, Russia must have at least its share of them, and probably more. But for all its pseudo-historical depth, the current psychiatric school of analyzing Russia's politics and policies tells us very little about what is going on there. As a result, it cannot be a proper basis for formulating policies of our own.

The Diagnosis

AN EXCEPTIONALLY diverse group of analysts and political commentators subscribes to some version of the diagnosis just set forth. It is embraced by those who were the most ardent critics of the Soviet order and those who are trying their best to restore it, by lowly working journalists and eminent former officials. Despite their differences, they agree on this: Russian imperial consciousness is not dead. To the contrary, writes Richard Pipes, perhaps our greatest historian of Russia, the loss of empire "has produced bewilderment and anguish."

> [N]othing so much troubles many Russians today, not even the decline in their living standards or the prevalence of crime, and nothing so lowers in their eyes the prestige of their government, as the precipitous loss of great-power status.[2]

Anatoly Lukyanov (once one of Gorbachev's principal lieutenants, then one of his principal betrayers, and now a leader of the revived Russian Communist Party) seconds this view. "We communists", he has said (this is an admission he would hardly have made in the old days, when good communists despised bourgeois liberties), "always understood perfectly well that the Soviet man, the citizen of Russia, had fewer political rights than a European. But that shortfall was compensated for by the sense of belonging to a great nation, a great state." Yeltsin undid this formula, thereby making Russian democracy vulnerable to a communist revanche.

> He took away that sense of world importance. Any party which takes advantage of this today will be on top. That is why the communists have so many patriotic slogans, slogans of statehood, of nationhood.[3]

The reason that popular government does not mean peace, in short, is that the people don't necessarily want peace; they want to be on top again. As Henry Kissinger has put it, "[W]hat passes for Russian democracy too often encourages an expansionist foreign policy." Yeltsin can hardly let the Communists be the only ones to tap the people's mood, so he ends up taking positions that "differ only in degree from those urged by Zyuganov", his Communist challenger in the June presidential race. As one measure of how domestic political pressures work, Russia is now inclined "to conduct adventurous policies in Asia for no other purpose than to augment its prestige."

For Kissinger, this mad preoccupation with "ancient glories" is no mere election-season phenomenon, but something more durable—and more dangerous. "Foreign policy", he announces, "has emerged as the *deus ex machina* for Russia's elite to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past."

A *deus ex machina*, of course, always transforms the story of which it is a part, and Russia will be no exception. Chrystia Freeland, who writes from Moscow for the *Financial Times*, worries that what she calls Yeltsin's "shift to the nationalist camp" will prove to be "a dangerous watershed in Russian history." It means nothing less than that he has "abandoned the effort to forge a new post-communist and post-imperial iden-

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[2]"Russia's Past, Russia's Future", *Commentary* (June 1996), p. 35.

[3]Lukyanov, quoted in the *Financial Times*, May 29, 1996, p. 2.

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tity." Instead of endlessly pretending that their past was so great, she feels, Russians should "undergo a process of national repentance." This self-examination is the only way back to political health: "[B]efore they can construct a new, democratic national myth, Russians must confront their murderous communist past."

For Zbigniew Brzezinski, Russia's need to take "a hard look in the mirror" is more than a mere scholarly conclusion. It should be the core of U.S. policy. After all, "democracy and modernization begin with self-education." Unfortunately, what he sees in Russia today, even among its democratic leaders, is a "self-deluding obsession with power and status." Getting the Russians to listen won't be easy, he acknowledges, but we have an obligation to tell them—"calmly, frankly, and firmly"—the truth about what ails them and about what it will take to recover.

Toward a Second Opinion

IT IS DIFFICULT to think of a time when so much distinguished pundit-power has been devoted to putting an entire country on the couch. Consider the psychiatric vocabulary that runs through the discussion. There is "anguish", "loss of status", "identity" and a "sense of belonging", "repentance", and "self-deluding obsession."[4] Russia, once a country that needed a revolution, now seems to need something even more profound: professional help. It's not enough to be free, you also have to be cured.

The mere fact that our leading foreign-policy commentators have started to talk like therapists does not, of course, prove that they are wrong. But the mode of analysis is, to say the least, a little unusual—not least because it is so often combined with a vehement insistence that U.S. policy toward Russia must not be, as Henry Kissinger himself put it years ago, "a subdivision of psychiatry." Let us therefore try to verify the diagnosis.

The geotherapists assert the following four propositions. First, that public opinion creates irresistible pressures, to which Russian leaders have to respond, for an expansionist foreign policy. Second, that the Russian elite retains a strong imperial mindset and, in particular, is determined to regain control of the old Soviet Union. Third, that Russian leaders are dangerously preoccupied with questions of prestige and status, and believe that in the past these were their country's proudest asset. And fourth, that the indulgent attitude of the West, and above all the United States, toward Russia, even when it defies us, is making all these pathologies worse. (There are, it has to be said, some differences among the various commentators who argue this case. Some feel more strongly about one proposition than another. But we will be in a better position to decide how seriously to take these little nuances once we see whether even one of the propositions stands up.)

Evaluating these four claims should not be hard. A patient in such terrible shape is going to give daily proof of how much is wrong with him. If Russia really were as sick as this, we should find useful evidence everywhere we look—in domestic struggles for political power, in the conduct of foreign policy, in the strategic concepts embraced by officialdom and the intelligentsia. Do we?

The Traumatized Public

THE RUSSIAN political system lacks legitimacy; it can't deliver bread, only imperial circuses; expansionism, and

[4]Perhaps the single most astonishing case of such analysis is Kissinger's suggestion that the reason Yeltsin scheduled a visit to China last April, right after Clinton's visit to Moscow, was "to escape the stifling solicitude" of American interest in the Russian reform process ("Moscow and Beijing: A Declaration of Independence", *Washington Post*, May 14, 1996). In this account, post-Cold War diplomacy acquires the interpersonal antics of a Woody Allen movie (Boris Yeltsin to the stiflingly solicitous president of the United States: "Bill, I just need a little space!").

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expansionism alone, diverts the popular mind from its misery. For symptoms of this problem, we can start with the recent presidential campaign—a political event that in many countries does bring neuroses to the surface. Boris Yeltsin, it should be remembered, ran for reelection on the basis of a dual strategy, and it was often a quite unedifying sight. On those issues where the Communists had him on the defensive, he pandered and dissembled. Hence his promises to pay all back wages and to end the war in Chechnya. At the same time, on those issues where he had *them* on the defensive, Yeltsin turned up the pressure. Hence his lurid evocations of the Communist past and policy initiatives, like his decree on private land ownership, that were meant to frame the election as a choice between politicians who accept the new order and those who don't.

Now, where did imperial nostalgia fit into this strategy? Leave aside for the moment the fact that those candidates who put nationalist themes at the center of their campaign lost badly, and that exit polls put the number of voters who were swayed by foreign policy at only 2 percent.[5] If the geotherapists were right about the country's mental state, we should have seen Yeltsin scrambling to prove that he is part of the revisionist patriotic consensus. Instead, we saw him use foreign policy as a tool to demonstrate the differences between himself and the Communists, and to remind voters of what they *don't* want to retrieve from their "glorious" past.

The issue was not simply a matter of rhetoric and mood, but of conflict between the legislature and the executive. On March 15, 1996, the Russian parliament passed two Communist-sponsored resolutions annulling the acts under which the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991. It declared that the agreement to create a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in place of the USSR "did not and does not have legal force", and charged that the officials who had "prepared, signed, and ratified" this decision had "flagrantly violated the wish of Russia's people to preserve the USSR."

With this bold move, the opposition clearly thought that they had Yeltsin trapped. On the one hand, he could hardly endorse a resolution that personally denounced him. On the other, opposing it would put him on the wrong side of a supposedly supercharged issue. As things turned out, however, the Duma's action proved to be the moment when Yeltsin's campaign got on a winning track for good. It gave the president and his allies their first, best opportunity to persuade voters that the Communists really were bent on restoring the old order. Yeltsin called the resolution "scandalous" and, showing that he had no fear of seeming too attentive to foreign opinion, immediately instructed Russian diplomats to tell other governments that the vote would have no effect.

There is a Moscow witticism that goes: Anyone who does not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union has no heart; anyone who wants to restore it has no brain. The Communists bet that people did not really believe this; they lost the bet. The March 15th resolution and its aftermath certainly put a question mark over the idea that the loss of empire has left Russians in a state of "bewilderment and anguish." But it is, admittedly, only a single incident. Perhaps the Duma's action was too bald, with too many overtones of restoring communism intact? Perhaps for this reason the Russian people weren't quite able to respond to it as they might have liked, with honest imperial relish?

Fortunately, there is other evidence to work with. In the course of the election campaign, Yeltsin *did* pander on some foreign policy issues. Even before the Duma's March 15th resolutions, his advisers openly acknowledged that he intended to respond in some fashion to the electorate's presumed unhappiness with the state of rela-

[5]A hefty 20 percent said they were influenced by the war in Chechnya, but these were presumably people voting *against* empire (*New York Times*, June 17, 1996.) The poll was conducted jointly by an American and a Russian firm.

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tions among the former republics of the USSR. These initiatives, they said, would keep the Communists from monopolizing popular discontent. And sure enough, at the end of March and beginning of April, Yeltsin unveiled new agreements with three of these states: a quadrilateral "Treaty on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Spheres", signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and a bilateral treaty between Russia and Belarus, which created "a qualitatively new phase in relations" between them. The closer one looks, however, the less these agreements, and the public response to them, seem like proof of a growing appetite for empire. As they scrutinize the menu, Russians appear quite undecided about how hungry they really are, and eager to make sure they don't overeat.

Both integration agreements were replete with commitments to advance this or that concrete interest, such as increased trade and investment, joint efforts in science and technology, coordination of education policy and veterans benefits, etcetera. The quadrilateral treaty, in particular, was precisely the kind of diplomatic "breakthrough" that Russians long ago learned not to take seriously. As for the "union of the two" with Belarus, the real question was whether the agreement marked the first big break in Russia's reluctance to cooperate too closely, on the grounds that it would be too expensive and slow down Russia's own economic stabilization program. There was, in fact, some reason to see the agreement as something new: Russia had for the first time agreed to a monetary and a customs union. And yet the conditions for implementing the agreement remained extremely stiff. For "integration" to take effect, Belarus has to bring its economic reforms and policies fully into line with Russia's—and this is virtually inconceivable.

There was perhaps no better confirmation (even if indirect) of Russian skepticism about the new relationship than the speech given by the president of Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, at the treaty signing ceremony in Moscow. Sensing that this was his best chance to speak to the Russian people about the agreement, he devoted the bulk of his remarks to refuting the idea that only Belarus would benefit from it, at Russia's expense. ("That is not so. It is a lie, to say the least", he fulminated. "Belarus has never been dependent on anyone and has never been a parasite.")

Lukashenka did not seem aware that the Russian soul is possessed by demons that drive the country toward integration whether it will benefit or not. He appeared to believe that he actually had to defend the treaty on the humdrum ground of interest. Accordingly, he spoke of all the goods that Belarus produces for the Russian market, of the revenues it used to supply to the Soviet treasury, of the value of coordinated national policies on such matters as "finding employment, health care, acquisition of property, housing construction, and so on."

After the April agreements were signed, there was a typical bit of Moscow squabbling about who deserved the real credit for this gigantic achievement. Was it the Duma, as the Communists insisted, that had pushed Yeltsin in this direction? Or had the president, as his aides rebutted, been deeply committed to integration for a long time? This was precisely the sort of struggle for political advantage that could bolster the geotherapists' case. Except for one thing: The controversy seemed to evoke no public interest. It lost its fizz almost immediately, and the politicians turned to other issues, where it really mattered who got the credit.

An Imperial Elite?

THE FACT THAT reconstituting the Soviet Union has been a bust politically makes it hard to defend the first of the geotherapists' propositions. There is no identifiable pressure from jingoist public opinion that radicalizes all policies until they "differ only in degree." But we can hardly be

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certain that Russia has sworn off empire just because its people are not imperialists. The elite may have its own, very different aspirations, and lack of popular support will not necessarily keep them from being realized.

This second proposition is a bit harder to put under the microscope. The Russian ruling class is far more diverse than ever before—politically, economically, regionally, generationally, ethnically, and in other ways as well. It is therefore quite artificial to speak of what *the* elite thinks. (This was beginning to be true even in the last years of the Soviet era.) All the same, there are many organizations purporting to express what they claim is a hard-boiled centrist consensus, and none does so more convincingly than the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP). The group is a self-styled analog to our own Council on Foreign Relations in its heyday, a comparison made credible by the former's success in bringing together corporate leaders and experts on international affairs. Its members—among whom ambitious insiders, trimmers, and climbers are very well represented—know exactly what is respectable and what is not.

Last winter and spring, the CFDP conducted a series of meetings to discuss a draft report—"theses", they were called—on the issue of integration. The document went through three versions, was greatly expanded, heavily revised, and published in May under the signature of forty-four bankers, industrialists, journalists, and policy wonks. In its final form (bearing the title, "Will a Union be Reborn?"), it represents the most revealing statement to date of elite opinion about Russia's relations with the other former Soviet states.[6]

The most arresting passage in the CFDP "theses" is the repudiation of the idea of recreating the USSR, which is labeled "an extremely reactionary utopia." Pursuing it, says the report, will only weaken Russia and cause much bloodshed.

> However humiliated the national consciousness of the Russians may be, today Russian society is absolutely unprepared to pay the price of a lot of blood to make up for geopolitical losses.

To be against a restored communist imperium and against bloodshed is not, of course, to be against re-building Russian power. The CFDP believes that the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with much less international influence, and it proposes to try to increase it. But how? Bloodshed, it turns out, is just one constraint among many; so is cost.

> The new Russian political and economic elites are oriented more toward economic rather than military-political domination in the territories of the former USSR (the latter is more troublesome and more costly).[7]

"Economic domination", it should be said, doesn't mean a readiness to subsidize poor countries; Russia had its fill of "donorship" in the old days. For the CFDP, the main way to make Russia a "magnet" for the rest of the CIS is through "the successful development of Russia itself, the continuation of democratic and market reforms, and the beginning of an active policy of economic growth."

The CFDP prides itself on being hard-headed and unsentimental, just like the "establishment" (a current Russian vogue word) that it claims to represent. Accordingly, while it favors the goal of "rapprochement and integration", it can't help

[6]The full text is reprinted in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 23, 1996.

[7]This is not just the preference of the Moscow elite. Anatol Lieven reports the comment of a Russian military officer serving in Chechnya: "These days, who'd be an officer if you could work in a bank?" See his excellent article, "Russia's Military Nadir", *The National Interest* (Summer 1996), p. 2.

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pointing out the emptiness and stupidity of many proposals for achieving this goal. Russia's relations with the rest of the former Soviet states, for example, should not be over-institutionalized: grand designs are silly. The CFDP "theses" propose instead

> to shift the center of gravity of activities in the space of the former USSR away from the highest level—the establishment of superstructures, the signing of treaties and agreements and the like—to support for specific projects of interaction in the cultural, social and above all economic spheres: the exchange of debt for ownership, the creation of financial-industrial groups, the facilitation of financial transactions, the establishment of joint banks, and so forth.

When it comes to achieving "economic domination", what these hard-headed, unsentimental folks say they want is "a common market for goods and services", and their reasons have a distinctly familiar, unimperial ring. "Openness of markets", they note, "helps to create jobs in all states, alleviating the political and psychological consequences of the disintegration of the USSR."

To be sure, there is also a strong military side to the program. The CFDP definitely supports defense cooperation with CIS states. But it opposes the reflexive broadening of Russia's ambitions and commitments just because it sounds tough and because some neighboring states (for reasons that may not serve Russian interests at all) are willing to cooperate. The "theses" specifically object to creating "a system of collective defense" for the CIS.

> It is one thing to organize specific cooperation in several areas (air defense, ABM defense, border service, training of officer cadres, supply, etcetera), but it is another thing to create an alliance costly for Russia that will be perceived by many neighbors as a threat and not only not increase but rather decrease Russia's defensive possibilities.

So, a multilateral alliance seems to be out. And even bilateral ties—no matter how close the state's historic connection to Russia is—may not make good strategic sense:

> [U]nder present conditions a military alliance with Belarus may be used by the adherents of a very rapid expansion of NATO, an alliance with Armenia may harm Russia's interests in Azerbaijan, and an alliance with Kazakhstan may cause a certain amount of concern in China. For this reason it is advisable to build alliance relations "from the bottom up" under conditions of maximum possible transparency and in dialogue with neighboring countries.

The core judgment of the CFDP's report is that, over the long term, closer relations between Russia and the former Soviet states are probably inevitable. But its core recommendation is that Russia should aspire to "leadership, instead of control." Trying to accelerate the process will accomplish nothing, and may even slow things down.

It used to be said of U.S. policy in the Western hemisphere that Americans would do almost anything for Latin America except hear about it. The Russian elite spends so much time talking about its former Soviet neighbors—and the discussion is so full of cautions, hesitations, and fine print—that one is tempted to ask: Is there anything Russia will do for the "near abroad" *except* hear about it?

The Matter of Pride

LET US TURN to the third element of Russia's allegedly neurotic politics—the preoccupation of its leaders with their country's international status. Brzezinski sees them as "obsessed by the notion that Russia be hailed a great power." And Kissinger, in describing the consequences of Russia's "almost paranoid

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sense of insecurity", speaks of "adventurous" policies that he claims have no other purpose than "prestige."[8]

In ordinary Russian discourse on foreign policy, the question of prestige does come up in a way that is, at first sight, quite different from what one encounters in an American context. A bureaucratic document produced for President Clinton by the staff of the National Security Council, for example, would not ordinarily speak of protecting the prestige of the United States as a major national interest. Yet last spring *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* devoted three full pages to the publication of just such a document, "The National Security Policy of the Russian Federation, 1996-2000", prepared by the staff of Yeltsin's Security Council. It declared, among other things, that securing and protecting Russia's "international status" were right at the top of its foreign policy goals:

> Russia's most important national interest at a global level is its active and full participation in building a system of international relations in which Russia is assigned a place corresponding in the highest degree to its *potential* political, economic and intellectual significance and its military-political and foreign-economic potential and needs. [emphasis added]

This effort was said to be all the more important because other countries are bent on taking Russia down a peg. For this reason, "maximum efforts must be made to elaborate and use means of effectively countering attempts to weaken [Russia's] international positions and prestige."

How kooky is this? Brzezinski argues that it is extremely destructive. These fits of self-glorification allow Russia to ignore how far it has fallen behind economically. Worse, the inevitable emphasis on past greatness, the nostalgia for a time when the Soviet Union could compete on equal terms with the United States—all this implicitly "legitimizes the Communist Party" and postpones "genuine democratization."

Perhaps. But it is worth looking more closely at the "National Security" document just quoted, for taken as a whole it lends all this talk of prestige a different, indeed opposite, meaning. Brzezinski himself could not ask for a blunter description of Russian reality than one finds here—in, of all places, a public document released on the eve of the presidential election. Far from diverting attention from economic backwardness, Yeltsin's national security staff warns that "it will take several generations before we can compare ourselves with the United States, Japan, Germany, Sweden, France, and so forth." Far from pining for lost superpower equality, the document explicitly "renounces the principle of military-strategic parity with the United States." And far from encouraging the confrontational outlook of old, it says something that will surprise those who know of these matters only what the geotherapists tell them: "Russian citizens must mobilize state structures, the public, the family, and schools to mold a non-aggressive type of individual and a secure society and state." Given all the work that has to be done, Russia's foreign policy bottom-line is a very simple one: It needs to be able to direct its resources to the successful completion of massive internal tasks.

Russians have no trouble understanding the fix they're in, because—unlike us—*they're in it*. They can barely think of anything else. In these circumstances, a "policy of prestige" has the function that Hans Morgenthau had in mind when he described it as the effort to impress others with "the power one's own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants other nations to believe,

[8]Kissinger is more tolerant of prideful motives in other cases. He has written understandingly of China's tendency "to react with neuralgia to any perceived slight to its dignity." And he strongly criticized U.S. policy as "insensitive to the psychological problems" of postwar France. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), p. 106.

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it possesses." Strictly speaking, wrote Morgenthau, when your power is not in fact as great as you want others to think, it should be called a "policy of bluff."[9] But the purpose is the same—to discourage them from taking advantage of you in the way that they might if they knew how weak you really were.

Looked at in this light, concerns for prestige should actually seem completely familiar to Americans—and not in the least neurotic. Wasn't the Nixon administration's determination to keep the war in Vietnam from damaging America's international role—the rejection of "peace now" in favor of "peace with honor"—based on exactly the same insight? Certainly anyone who says that the confusion of U.S. policy after South Vietnam's collapse emboldened the Soviet Union is describing the same phenomenon.[10]

Russia's "obsession" with prestige is at bottom an admission of weakness. Recall that Yeltsin's "National Security" document, quoted earlier, speaks of the importance of winning an international role based not on Russia's power, but on its *potential*. The determination to protect the country's prestige is not a demand for "adventures" that will show strength, but a hope to get by without being put to the test. Prestige is not a means of dodging the necessary work of democratization, but—if it works—of dodging unnecessary defeats while this work goes on. (In this sense, the war in Chechnya represents a conspicuous self-inflicted failure of the policy: the Russians have called their own bluff.)

The way Russians talk about NATO expansion supports this view of what they mean by prestige. What is most vexing to them about the Western plan to bring the Atlantic Alliance into Eastern Europe is that it dramatizes Russia's loss of standing. It shows Russia to be isolated, without the ability to affect events, without "standing" in the juridical sense—that is, without the right to have a grievance heard in court. Two prominent Russian specialists on America, Aleksei Bogaturov and Viktor Kremeniuk, wrote recently that NATO expansion shows America's complete "disregard for [Russia's] opinion." Russians may be pained by this, they said, but the truth is that Washington "does not have even a shadow of fear over Moscow's possible reaction."[11]

"Coddling" and its Consequences

SINCE THE END of the Cold War, American presidents—first Bush and now Clinton—have treated Russian leaders with exceptional personal courtesy, and with the diplomatic hyperbole embodied in the term "strategic partnership." Russians see this. Bogaturov and Kremeniuk acknowledge "a measure of humanism" in U.S. policy toward their country. The West does not want to "unduly hurt Russia", they say, and will even "spare Russia's self-esteem to the extent possible."

Now the geotherapists are not against politeness as such. What bothers them—and this is their fourth proposition—is the thought that the United States might go beyond cordiality, and actually reshape Western policy to take account of Russian objections (or worse yet, Russian excuses about their domestic political situation). Kissinger scorns "the assumption that Yeltsin must be coddled." Treating him "as if he were some tender shoot", he writes,

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[9]Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 68, 77.

[10]For an analysis that respects the importance of prestige without using the term, consider the conclusions of the report issued in July 1996 by the "Commission on America's National Interests", co-chaired by Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, and numbering among its members Sam Nunn and Brent Scowcroft. Among "vital national interests" (ones immediately linked to national survival), the report lists "credibility" and the preservation of something it calls "singular U.S. leadership."

[11]"It's the Americans Who Will Never Stop", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 28, 1996, p. 6.

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only encourages more assertive nationalism. Brzezinski sees the same risk in the slow pace of NATO expansion. Delay—which he calls a "disgrace"—"has simply encouraged the current Russian rulers to compete with the extremists."[12] Russia, he insists, is not actually helped by "one-sided deference." What it needs most is a dose of the reality therapy that we gave the Japanese and Germans after the Second World War, which obliged them to make a "clear-cut break" with the past.

This argument is wrong on two separate counts: first, about the course of Russian policy and, second, about the way in which the United States has dealt with defeated or declining powers in the past. Far from "competing" with the Communists in his opposition to NATO expansion, for example, Yeltsin used the pause that the Clinton administration promised him during his re-election campaign to explore possible compromises. The new Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, began to say publicly that Russia simply sought assurances that, if NATO took in new members, there would be no extension eastward of the alliance's military structures—in particular, no deployment of its forces or of nuclear weapons. These were precisely the formulas for which his predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, was routinely denounced as a traitor. So far, no one has called for Primakov's head on a pike. Whatever may explain this latest turn in the story (and the affair is far from over), the one thing that has not happened, in response to American "indulgence", is the radicalization of Russian policy.

As for the issue that most agitates Kissinger—"whether Russia can be made to accept [its current, post-Soviet] borders"—the five-year record shows a huge transformation. When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, both Russian and Western analysts identified a series of possible revisionist goals that might appear on the Russian policy agenda at some point—and many people said it would be sooner rather than later. These goals included recovery of Crimea from Ukraine, detaching and absorbing Russian territories from northern Kazakhstan or eastern Ukraine, acquiring some sort of protectorate over Russian communities in Estonia, and so on. What has happened? *Every single one of these issues is less charged, and less urgent, than it was five years ago.* Apart from the occasional Foreign Ministry statement protesting, say, Estonian education policy, it is clearly Russia's aim to downplay all of them. Yet Kissinger continues to argue that the United States has naively encouraged more "assertive" Russian policies.[13] His claims have escalated; Russian policy has not.

A closer look at U.S. policy toward Germany and Japan after 1945 also takes some of the air out of outraged claims that we must not "coddle" Russia. Yes, it was American policy to crush Nazism and Japanese militarism and to prevent their reappearance. But the United States also aimed to build up both countries as allies, and this goal shaped policy toward each of them from the very start of the postwar period. Kissinger's insistence, for example, that the most important test of Russian policy involves acceptance of its borders contrasts sharply with U.S. policy toward

[12]"Running Out of Illusions", *Washington Times*, February 4, 1996. See also "A Plan for Europe", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995), p. 27.

[13]Richard Pipes, who, unlike most of the others cited in this article, remains basically optimistic about Russia, nevertheless holds that its adjustment to the loss of empire has been slower and more difficult than for France, Portugal, and other European colonial powers. In fact, this particular comparison makes Russia's adjustment look almost easy: France and Portugal each fought at least two protracted overseas wars after 1945 rather than accept the loss of major colonies.

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Germany during most of the Cold War. West Germany, let us remember, contested the postwar borders of Europe for decades—and with U.S. support. It was only in 1970, a quarter of a century after the war ended, that German claims to a large part of Polish territory were renounced. Throughout this period, moreover, American leaders were properly indignant at the Soviet suggestion that the only reason West Germany would not waive its claims to Poland was that it had not abandoned its Hitlerian dreams.[14]

U.S. policy toward Japan after the Second World War involved similar choices. Was there a risk in leaving the emperor in place? Clearly. But the possible political—*and* psychological—impact of toppling him seemed even riskier. Far better, then, to settle for his admission that he was not a demigod.

Fill This Prescription

THE GEOTHERAPISTS' case is very, very weak. But, in putting aside their diagnosis, there are good reasons to resurrect their appeal, even if they do not heed it themselves, for a less "psychiatric" way of conducting foreign policy. It is simply not good enough to say that what we don't like, or don't understand, is crazy. Obviously we would all be better off if American diplomacy after the Cold War had been more like American diplomacy after the Second World War. The reason, however, is not that one of them involved too much "coddling" (a concept that barely rises to the level of psychiatry) and the other did not. It is that one of them was based on a far-sighted strategic choice, and the other was not.

After 1945 it was the highest priority of the United States to create an international system in which the defeated powers found a place that they—their leaders and their publics alike—could clearly see served their interests. Doing so served *our* interests, and decades later we are still benefiting from the choice. Why, this time around, should we choose differently? □

[14]Because of the importance of preserving West Germany's Western orientation, the United States was prepared to accept the judgment of its leaders about German domestic politics. Adenauer, as Kissinger has written, had taken on the responsibility of "restoring self-respect to his occupied, demoralized and divided society"—and the United States could hardly undercut him. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 502.

Harpo, Chico, and Groucho

Post-cold-war politicians are more ignorant of the outside world than the World War II veterans who preceded them and are highly parochial, determined to put "America first." One new member of the Senate, Ron Wyden of Oregon, identified Africa when asked by a television interviewer to locate Bosnia on a globe. When a journalist from the satirical magazine *Spy* posed as a radio interviewer and asked some congressmen for their views on "the ethnic cleansing in Freedonia", a frightening number expressed firm opinions about the fictional nation in the Marx Brothers movie *Duck Soup*. "It's coming to the point now that a blind eye to it for the next 10 years is not the answer", argued Washington Democrat Jay Inslee. "I think anything we can do to use the good offices of the U.S. government to assist stopping the killing over there, we should do", said Republican James Talent of Missouri.

—Peter Wilson, *The Australian* (Sydney), May 18-19, 1996

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Warnings of a Parting Friend

Patrick J. Garrity

EXACTLY TWO HUNDRED years ago, on September 19, 1796, readers of the *American Daily Advertiser* in Philadelphia discovered that one of their number had formed the resolution to "decline being considered" as a candidate for the upcoming election "of a Citizen, to Administer the Executive government of the United States." In a lengthy written address to his "Friends, and Fellow Citizens", George Washington then went beyond this announcement of political retirement to offer some "disinterested warnings of a parting friend." These warnings, Washington wrote, had resulted from "much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all important to the permanence of your felicity as a People."

The result was, of course, Washington's famous Farewell Address, one of the classic expressions of American foreign policy—indeed, of the entire American political tradition. Shortly after its publication, John Quincy Adams, the greatest American diplomat of the day, expressed his hope that the American people "may not only impress all its admonitions upon their hearts, but that it may serve as the foundation upon which the whole system of their future policy may rise, to the admiration and example of future time." Daniel Webster, on the centennial of Washington's birth in 1832, said that the Address was "full of truths important at all times", and he called for "a renewed and wide diffusion of the admirable paper, and an earnest invitation to every man in the country to reperuse and consider it." Even Woodrow Wilson, whose views on foreign policy might be thought poles apart from those expressed in the Farewell Address, took great care to offer his views on alliances "as an interpretation of the meaning of that great man."

This effusive praise for what became known as Washington's Legacy stands in stark contrast to the popular and scholarly neglect of the Address over the past several decades—ironically, at a time when Washington's general reputation has risen sharply among historians. The reason is fairly clear: the Address is most closely associated with Washington's "great rule of conduct"—that "in extending our commercial relations" with foreign nations, "to have with them as little political connection as possible." Washington went on to argue:

> Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it

Patrick J. Garrity is a staff member with the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and co-author of *Sacred Union of Citizens: Washington's Farewell Address and the American Character* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Laboratory or the Department of Energy.

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must be unwise to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities. . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humour, or Caprice?

This is the stuff of isolationism. At least so it seemed to President Harry Truman and most of the other architects of American foreign policy after World War II. In his memoirs, Truman recalled the strong grip that isolationism had held over the country after World War I, with near-disastrous consequences for American and international freedom. "Throughout my years in the Senate I listened each year as one of the senators would read Washington's Farewell Address", Truman wrote. "It served little purpose to point out to the isolationists that Washington had advised a method suitable under the conditions of his day to achieve the great end of preserving the nation." Unfortunately, "for the isolationists this address was like a biblical text. The America First Organization of 1940-41, the Ku Klux Klan, Pelley and his Silver Shirts—they all quoted the first President in support of their assorted aims."

In the wake of victory in World War II, Truman was determined that America would step forward to lead what he called the Free World. But Truman observed, "I knew that George Washington's spirit would be invoked against me, and Henry Clay and all the patron saints of the isolationists." For this reason, Truman—and his fellow internationalists—looked to sources other than Washington for political inspiration and strategic guidance. Truman wrote of the activist, outward-looking doctrine that was later to bear his name, "I was convinced that the policy I was about to proclaim was indeed as much required by the conditions of my day as was Washington's by the situation in his era and Monroe's doctrine by the circumstances which he then faced."

Given the success of Truman's doctrine, what reason might we have to revisit the Farewell Address two hundred years after its publication? It is this: The end of the Cold War has made it necessary for Americans to re-think their role in the world, to look for guidance in dealing with new strategic conditions. The Farewell Address harkens to an older, but not necessarily contradictory, tradition of American foreign policy that might provide some such guidance. Historians such as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Felix Gilbert have long appreciated that the Farewell Address should not be read only, or even primarily, as an isolationist tract. Most important, George Washington best represents that part of the American founding concerned with what is now popularly called "civic virtue." The search for a common good—for public and private virtue—is an issue very much on the minds of Americans today, as it was for those in 1796. For Washington, this search had a strong and a necessary foreign policy component.

Two Challenges

BEFORE TURNING TO the substance of the Farewell Address, we need first to establish the document's bona fides as a deliberate, rather than an accidental, contribution to the American political tradition. Two challenges to the Address on this score have emerged. First, those impressed by the sophistication of the Address have concluded that it must have been ghost written for Washington by Alexander Hamilton. However brilliant Hamilton might have been, American foreign policy since the 1790s has followed much more the line of his great rival, Thomas Jefferson. If the Farewell Address is pure Hamilton, then we would have reason to question how much significance we should attribute to it. Second, and relatedly, critics at the time and later have argued that the Address was in fact a partisan document—one not intended for the ages, but merely to

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influence the upcoming presidential campaign between Jefferson and John Adams.

On the point of authorship, Hamilton undeniably played a major role in the Address' final composition. It was standard practice for Washington, during the Revolution and his presidency, to turn to able colleagues and subordinates for help in drafting correspondence and public papers. But Washington clearly dictated the themes of the Address when he sent Hamilton a complete first draft in May 1796—including some language that James Madison had provided four years earlier—with the instructions that any revisions be "predicated upon the Sentiments contained in the enclosed paper."

To be sure, Hamilton accepted Washington's charge to recast the president's initial 1796 draft if he thought it advisable (which Hamilton did). And Hamilton's hand can clearly be seen throughout the document. For instance, the Address warns about the dangers of "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachments for others." This echoed language that Hamilton had used in a 1792 letter to Edward Carrington, where Hamilton had accused Jefferson and Madison of having "a womanish attachment to France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain." But all in all, Hamilton tried faithfully to follow Washington's guidance, knowing from experience that Washington's modesty about his own intellectual capabilities did not extend to endorsing something that he did not understand or believe.

In subsequent correspondence and redrafting, Washington carefully edited Hamilton's version of the Address, including removing and adding to the text proposed by his former aide de camp and secretary of the treasury. For example, Washington preferred to rely upon "temporary" rather than "occasional" alliances, as proposed in Hamilton's draft. Hamilton had suggested: "Permanent alliance, intimate connection with any part of the foreign world is to be avoided." Washington changed this to read: "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Here Washington deliberately invoked the spirit of the Revolution, as many Americans would recall an almost identical phrase from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense.*

Most telling on the point of authorship is that virtually all of the important ideas that appeared in the published version of the Address had been expressed by Washington in previous other public and private writings. Hamilton, who had access to many of these sources, undoubtedly drew upon and expanded them in a good faith effort to articulate Washington's mature views—with which Hamilton was in essential, if not complete, agreement. And Washington, in turn, had undoubtedly learned much from his close association with Hamilton over the years, and from Hamilton's anonymous newspaper essays on foreign policy, which Washington had read carefully and approvingly.

What, then, about the alleged partisanship of the Address? Many followers of Jefferson immediately criticized Washington's legacy on these grounds. Washington's advice to steer clear of foreign connections was widely read as an attack on the French alliance (with which Jefferson's Republicans were identified). His criticism of factions was interpreted as an attack on the emerging Jeffersonian party.

The Farewell Address was indeed issued in the midst of great political debate over the proper American attitude toward the ongoing war in Europe. The conflict between France and Great Britain, which began in February 1793, constantly threatened to drag the United States into war over the right of America to trade with the belligerents. Most Americans agreed that it was in their interest to stay out of the war, if this could be done honorably. But following this course raised problems for the United States not only of foreign policy—that is, how to steer a path between the two superpowers of the day—but, more critically, of domestic politics.

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Distinct pro-British and pro-French factions had rapidly developed. The virulent debate between these factions went to the question of the type of government and society that the United States should have, with Britain and France serving as models (or anti-models). As a result, the country seemed on the verge of civil war or anarchy. Washington wrote to Jefferson in 1796, "until the last year or two, I had no conception that Parties would, or even could, go to the length I have been witness to."

In the context of this foreign and domestic turmoil, Washington frequently expressed his determination to prevent political parties from coming into existence, or if he could not do that, to reconcile them. He succeeded in keeping the United States out of the war by adopting a policy of strict neutrality, a policy that he had cobbled together in 1793 out of the Cabinet debates between Hamilton and Jefferson. Circumstances and choice, however, led Washington to move toward what became the Federalist or Hamiltonian position, particularly after Jefferson left office as secretary of state at the end of that year. This was especially true of Washington's decision to accept the Jay Treaty, which Republicans regarded both as unnecessary appeasement of the British and as a step toward bringing monarchical government to America.[1] Washington's initial view of the controversial treaty—"not favorable"—gave way to his eventual judgment that this was the best way to keep America out of the European conflict.

But Washington's decision only served to inflame passions at home. For the first time as president, Washington himself took the brunt of public attacks on his policies and character. In a notorious broadside in 1796, Thomas Paine accused Washington of being "treacherous in private friendship . . . and a hypocrite in public life", and added that, "the world will be puzzled to decide, whether you are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any." It seemed clear that Washington had failed in his immediate task of domestic reconciliation.

Washington was nonetheless determined to provide in speech what his statesmanship apparently failed to accomplish in practice. The Farewell Address represented his best attempt to articulate the basis on which all Americans genuinely interested in the national welfare could be rallied. The Farewell Address was intended to be a guide to the true and enduring middle ground of American politics and foreign policy. This is not to say that Washington sought consensus for consensus' sake, or would accept the lowest common denominator between competing factions. Instead, he appealed to the highest possible grounds of agreement, in hopes that it would endure beyond the political passions of the moment.

Seen from two centuries' hindsight, the Address is striking not for what was new and original about it, but for what was even then familiar and common to all Americans, Republican as well as Federalist. Taken out of their immediate context, many of Washington's arguments could easily have been expressed by a Republican of that period. Indeed, the basic sentiment of the Farewell Address was to be restated most memorably in Jefferson's First Inaugural of 1801: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." The fact that the expression "entangling alliances" is often mistakenly attributed to Washington and the Farewell Address is an indication of how well Washington articulated the consensus about foreign policy that actually existed among Americans. To be sure, Jefferson and his

[1]Jay's Treaty, signed in 1794 and ratified in 1795, resolved several outstanding issues between Britain and the United States left over from the Treaty of Peace—most importantly, a British commitment to evacuate the Western frontier posts. But the treaty accomplished little else to American benefit and, by agreeing to forego discrimination against the ships and goods of another nation, Jay denied the Republicans their favorite weapon against the British.

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later followers would interpret the Address in their own way, not necessarily embracing all of Washington's advice. But Washington did clearly define and capture the high ground, precisely as he had intended.

National Character and True Independence

THE MAIN BODY of the Farewell Address covers six topics: first, a statement of the necessity and importance of national union; second, a defense of the Constitution and the rule of law; third, an expression of Washington's strong reservations concerning political parties; fourth, a lengthy consideration of the proper habits and dispositions of the people; fifth, warnings against foreign influence in domestic affairs; and sixth, Washington's reflections on international relations proper, covering foreign alliances, commercial policy, and neutrality.

For those interested in the foreign policy recommendations of the Address, the last two categories would seem to cover the subject. But that is not so; Washington's views about America's proper relationship with the rest of the world permeate the entire document.

Throughout the Address, Washington attempted to outline the material and moral grounds for a Union—a political community—that could realize the promise of the American Revolution. For Washington and his contemporaries, this meant "true independence", not merely the formal recognition of nationhood provided by the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. Shortly after that treaty had been signed, Washington insisted publicly that unless a strong Union were formed, the individual states would become "the sport of European politics, which may play one State against another to prevent their growing importance, and to serve [Europe's] interested purposes." This same concern had led Washington to support efforts to reform and strengthen the central government during the 1780s, culminating in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, and in Washington's subsequent acceptance of the presidency. Union, as Washington expressed it in the Address, required "unity of government."

But a strong central government that adhered to republican principles would be impossible without a common public understanding of what held the Union together. In the Address, Washington went to great lengths to persuade, or remind, his countrymen that the security and prosperity of the various sections and economic interests were interdependent. On the matter of security, he maintained that the greater strength and greater resources provided by the Union meant "proportionately greater security against external danger, a less frequent interruption of their Peace by foreign nations." Washington rehearsed the complementary resources and enterprises of the various sections (North, South, East, and West) that provided the whole with important advantages in foreign commerce. For this reason, Washington argued, it was neither desirable nor necessary that the interest of one section or group be sacrificed for the benefit of other sections or groups. He specifically pointed out how Western demands to navigate the Mississippi had been satisfied through the recently ratified Pinckney and Jay Treaties, despite earlier fears that this right would be abandoned by the East in order to appease the Spanish or the British.

Washington often referred to such common and complementary material interests as the "cement" of the Union. "Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the Union", he wrote in the Address. But interest alone would not assure political harmony. For Washington, the essential national interest was the establishment and preservation of a certain type of national character that was at once American (thus his defense of Union) and republican (thus his defense of the Constitution). Washington's concept of the national interest, of "true independence", was oriented first to a good domestic order, and only then to America's relationship to the outside world.

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Washington believed that nations, as well as individuals, were defined by certain moral attributes. In the case of republican America, Washington typically described the preferred characteristics as sobriety, industry, and virtue. But above all, for Washington, there was the importance of justice, which he defined largely (but by no means exclusively) in economic terms: meeting one's obligations to others. As Washington wrote to an English correspondent in 1793: "To administer justice to, and receive it from every power with whom they are connected will, I hope, be always found the most prominent feature in the Administration of this Country."

Because Americans had a peculiar genius for commerce, especially foreign commerce, as well as for individual liberty, it was crucial that the United States deal justly with other nations and peoples, and have the reputation for doing so. The Constitution, and constitutional government, were required to ensure justice at home and with other nations. Under the weak Articles of Confederation of the 1780s, America had not met its just obligations either to foreign powers or to its own citizens. In Washington's defense of the Constitution in the Address, he insisted that Americans collectively must act toward the world as they did individually toward each other, in a way that would strengthen, not debase, the national character and sense of justice. In his discussion of the proper dispositions and habits of the people and their government, Washington wrote that "religion and morality are indispensable supports." When later discussing the proper disposition of America toward the world—"observe good faith and justice towards all nations"—Washington again invokes "religion and morality" to substantiate his case, adding: "Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue?" For Washington there was a close, indeed inseparable, tie between domestic and foreign affairs.

This necessary intertwining of internal and external interests presented a real danger, however, for it opened the regime to what the Address termed "one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government": "foreign influence." Washington expressed his belief that domestic faction—the domination of particular and partial interests adverse to the common good—"opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passion." Thus, Washington reminded his fellow citizens, "the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. . . . Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter."

To put the United States in such a condition of foreign influence and dependence was for Washington the negation, or antithesis, of "true independence." The corruption of the American character would initially manifest itself by "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachment for others." Such indulgences of excessive fondness or hatred would render America "in some degree a slave." It would be a "slave to its animosity or its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and interest." Antipathy toward a particular nation, he explained, led to a national character that was more readily disposed "to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes and umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur." This excessive sensitivity would result in "frequent collisions, obstinate envenomed and bloody contests." Public opinion that was prompted by such ill will and resentment could drive the government into war, "contrary to the best calculations of policy"; it would adopt "through passion what reason would reject." The nation thereby would become "subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambitions, and sinister and pernicious motives."

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The Limit of Trust

WASHINGTON'S general remedy for keeping America on an even keel was to stress the proper role of *interest* in foreign policy. He insisted in the Address that "there can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon real favours from Nations." Washington had long held the conviction, as he had written to Henry Laurens in 1778, that "no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it." But the Address argued that America's pursuit of its legitimate national interests in the world—especially when it came to questions of war or peace—ought to be "guided by our justice." Washington did not act according to the modern dichotomy between "realism" and "idealism" in the formulation of foreign policy. He agreed both with Hamilton (the supposed realist) that nations act solely out of their own interest; and with Jefferson (the supposed idealist) that there is but one standard of morality for men and for nations.

Was Washington confused or deceived when he said that interest could be guided by justice, or, more ambitiously, that interest and justice could be reconciled and comprehended? Part of the answer lies in the particulars of Washington's foreign policy in the 1790s, which will be discussed below. But at a more fundamental level, Washington thought that a just foreign policy must begin with, and not depart from, the defense and advancement of particular American interests—especially those related to the nation's security and prosperity. Essentially, Washington believed that although the *standards* of justice were the same at home and abroad, their *application* necessarily differed.

To the extent that America was a true political community, self-sacrifice and gratitude (friendship) among its citizens was possible. But such "disinterested friendship", as Washington called it, was not possible among nations. Justice in foreign affairs essentially meant making and keeping agreements faithfully, but it did not require sacrificing one's essential interests for those of other nations. Nor should the United States expect others to sacrifice themselves on its behalf. Differently put, Washington believed in the Socratic definition of justice: minding one's own business, but minding it well. As he wrote to a correspondent in 1795:

> For in politics, as in religion my tenets are few and simple: the leading one of which, and indeed that which embraces most others, is to be honest and just ourselves, and to exact it from others; meddling as little as possible in their affairs where our own is not involved. If this maxim was generally adopted wars would cease. . . .

By not meddling in the affairs of others, especially their internal affairs, the United States would strengthen its case against outside meddling in American politics, and thereby lessen the chances of war.

Washington's perspective on seeking "our interest, guided by our justice" led him to recommend in the Farewell Address that America's orientation toward all nations be one of "peace and harmony." Peace, not war; commerce, not conquest—these were the natural ends of American policy. To be sure, Washington fully understood European realpolitik and the workings of the balance of power. The United States had achieved its independence through armed conflict—in large part through alliance with France, and by exploiting the long-standing rivalry between London and Paris. Washington and the other Founders certainly did not neglect other opportunities to promote American security and commerce that might come about through Europe's distresses. Witness, for example, Pinckney's Treaty, signed with Spain in 1795, which granted America its long-standing demand to export goods through the Mississippi and acknowledged American territorial claims. The Spanish had long resisted these terms, but rumors of Jay's Treaty caused

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Madrid to concede to the Americans rather than risk closer British-American ties that could work against Spain's position in the New World.

Nevertheless, the Farewell Address implicitly rejected reliance upon the European balance of power as the essential guarantor of American security. Washington had earlier written to Jefferson: "In whatever manner the Nations of Europe shall endeavor to keep up their prowess in war and their balance of power in peace, it will be our policy to cultivate tranquillity at home and abroad; and extend our agriculture and commerce as far as possible." Of course, Washington was neither a pacifist nor a utopian. In his mind, American policy should aim at strengthening the material and moral forces of union and constitutional government to the point where foreign powers had neither the opportunity nor interest to threaten American security. When this situation of strength had been achieved, America could then strive to meet its greater purpose in the world—for America at its best was not to be purely or narrowly self-interested.

Washington yielded to none of his contemporaries in enthusiasm for the American experiment in self-government, and the promise that this experiment held for the rest of mankind. As he had stated in his First Inaugural Address, "the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican mode of government, are justly considered as *deeply*, and perhaps as *finally*, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people." And in 1793, while the war in Europe raged, Washington wrote: "It should be the highest ambition of every American to extend his views beyond himself, and to bear in mind that his conduct will not only affect himself, his country, and his immediate posterity; but that its influence may be coextensive with the world, and stamp political happiness or misery on ages yet unborn."

The Farewell Address set out two specific ways in which the United States could meet this calling. First, by showing that the happiness of the American people could be achieved under the auspices of liberty and self-rule, the American people "would acquire to them the glory of recommending" republican government "to the applause, the affection, and the adoption of every nation yet a stranger to it." Second, Washington's equivalent ambition for America in foreign affairs was "for a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great Nation, to give mankind the too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence." Washington mused, "Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a Nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?"

America, then, must do its part in leading by example in foreign as well as domestic affairs. The international part of the great American experiment would further elevate and extend the American character, by giving a moral content to American interests with respect to other nations and peoples.

Buying Time

WASHINGTON WAS at bottom a man of practice and action, not of theory. We can best appreciate his understanding of how America could seek its interest, guided by justice, from some of the more particular recommendations of the Farewell Address—especially as they shed light on Washington's own policies in office.

The central foreign policy advice of the Farewell Address was not that of isolation or non-entanglement. Rather, as Samuel Flagg Bemis argued, Washington sought a foreign policy of *independence.* Specifically, Washington wrote:

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> With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

Washington's "great rule of conduct"—to have as little political connection as possible with the European powers—was intended to buy time for American political institutions, and a distinctive American character, to mature. In his correspondence, and in an early draft of the Address, Washington estimated this period of probation, as he called it, to be twenty years. After this time, Washington believed that a strong, self-sufficient America would be in a position to dictate its future political, strategic, and economic relationship with the European powers, rather than the other way around. In the meantime, and perhaps thereafter, the United States could rely on temporary alliances to see them through emergencies. Further, Washington's warning against becoming unnecessarily entangled in the ordinary course of Europe's politics and quarrels implicitly did not preclude common action in extraordinary circumstances.

Even then, however, America would still be bound by the dictates of justice; America must be a respectable and great nation. For example, interest and justice both counseled that America would be unwise to try to play one European power off against another to gain security, but rather should establish independent grounds for American safety and prosperity. This indicated to Washington that the proper connection between America and Europe was commercial rather than political. (By a political connection, Washington meant agreements that would directly obligate or indirectly lead the United States into war as an ally of a European power.) For Washington, commercial relations between nations were much more susceptible to considerations of justice than were political ties, and less likely to import foreign quarrels into American politics. Washington had observed to Jefferson in 1788 that if the United States could "keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics and Wars" it could adopt a policy to "administer to their [European] wants" through commerce, "without being engaged in their quarrels."

In the Farewell Address, Washington considered the commercial aspects of American foreign policy in considerable detail. He told his readers that "harmony, liberal intercourse with all Nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest." Writing to Lafayette in the 1780s about his desire to improve commercial ties with France, Washington had observed that "nations are not influenced, as individuals may be, by disinterested friendships; but, when their interest is to live in amity, we have little reason to apprehend any rupture." But to foster this pacifying effect—to create an interest in living in amity—American commercial policy, according to the Farewell Address, "should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favours or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of Commerce, but forcing nothing."

Although he opposed the United States entering into new and binding political agreements, Washington supported commercial agreements with other willing nations. He wrote in the Farewell Address that these agreements would "give to trade a stable course", by defining the rights of American merchants and enabling the government to support them. Washington indicated that such commercial agreements could follow conventional rules of trade—"the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate." He was certain that the lack of a political connection to particular European powers was critical not only to preventing, or managing, factional politics at home, but also to allow-

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ing international commerce to take its natural and advantageous course. Washington also shared, though without the crusading zeal displayed by hotter heads, the belief espoused by the French *philosophes*—and adopted with enthusiasm by Paine in *Common Sense*—that free trade was a revolutionary dagger aimed against the "war system" of mercantilism.

Antipathies and Attachments

WE RECALL in this context Washington's warning against "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachment for others." Was this a specific warning against the French connection, and a recommendation of favoritism toward Britain, as the Republicans alleged? Washington in effect went out of his way in the Address to deny this charge. In obvious reference to the existing American treaty of alliance with France, negotiated during the Revolution, he wrote, "So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled, with perfect good faith." Washington also refused to name names in the Address—he does not explicitly put France in the category of excessive attachment, or Britain in the category of unreasonable hatred.

In a 1795 letter to Patrick Henry, Washington had insisted on his even-handedness: "by becoming the partizans of Great Britain or France", Americans would "create dissensions, disturb the public tranquillity, and destroy, perhaps for ever the cement which binds the Union." Washington thought it essential that citizens should "advocate their own cause instead of that of any other Nation under the sun; that is instead of being Frenchmen or Englishmen, in Politics, they would be Americans." In short, Washington asserted, "I want an *American* character, that the powers of Europe may be convinced we act for *ourselves* and not for *others*."

Washington's insistence in the Farewell Address on even-handedness with respect to foreign powers must be qualified in some important respects. He was in fact quite concerned with the specific impact of excessive hatred of Britain on American politics. Washington was determined that the American regime be defined in positive rather than negative terms. The people's understandable hostility to the British, their former colonial master and recent adversary, must not become a defining feature of the American character, or the basis of the nation's political cohesion. At best, anti-British phobia would result in a stunted or limited national character. Washington wrote to Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia shortly after the end of the war that the American opposition to Great Britain and the achievement of independence would be "to very little purpose, if we cannot conquer our own prejudices."

Washington himself shared much of the popular dislike of Britain. He certainly was not pro-British. But he was careful in public not to display these views. This would have been the easy way for Washington to retain his popularity, but he believed that an overtly anti-British policy would be unsustainable and dangerous. Like Hamilton, and unlike Jefferson and Madison, Washington assessed the current power relationship between America and Britain as decisively favoring the latter—irrespective of the justice of America's complaints against London. Washington did not assume, as did Jefferson and Madison, that America possessed the means to coerce Britain through threats of commercial retaliation. Given this relative weakness, America would be driven to war or humiliation if it engaged in a trade war with Britain; and in the event of conflict with the British, the United States would inevitably be driven to seek to redress this imbalance—as it had done during the Revolution—through closer ties with France. In the political climate of the times, excessive hatred of Britain would invariably lead to the opposite vice—too much affection for France.

That vice was not only a dangerous attachment to France, but also to the cause of the French Revolution. Washington, like virtually all Americans, strongly approved of the early moves toward self-government in France. But

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Washington, like those who became identified as Federalists, grew increasingly concerned at the radical and violent turn of events in that country. And he certainly resisted those who argued for joining a world-wide revolution under French auspices for liberty, fraternity, and equality. Washington rejected the close connection that Jefferson made at the time between the fate of the French and American causes, and believed that allegiance to the French transnational cause would divide, not unite, the American political community.

Still, Washington's public pronouncements on the French Revolution are few, moderate, and largely supportive; and he is silent on the subject in the Address itself. Washington wrote to the French minister in 1796 that "my anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes are irresistibly excited, whensoever in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of Freedom." Washington considered this sentiment a necessary and healthy part of the American political character. But Washington wished to teach his fellow citizens that their passion for the universal cause of human liberty must not be unreflective. Washington acknowledged that the French, and every other people, had a right to decide the form of their own government, through whatever process that might entail. His implicit criticism of the French Revolution went to the means, not the end, of achieving liberty, and to France's determination to spread its cause by the force of arms. Citizen Genet's efforts to recruit American citizens into acts of war were certainly fresh in the president's mind; and the French minister in Philadelphia, Pierre Adet, was even then scheming to influence the upcoming election in the Republicans' favor. Adet, under the orders of the French Directory, announced publicly in August 1796 that the forthcoming vote would determine whether America would remain in friendship with France, or whether there would be a quarrel, and probably war. Washington (who had not yet announced his retirement) "must go."

Accordingly, Washington was determined to insulate the American character from the consequences of the French Revolution, to the extent that he considered those consequences to be unhealthy to the American body politic. Specifically, the United States must draw a line between what the French did for and to themselves—which was their own business—and French efforts to universalize their revolution by meddling in the domestic affairs of others, including the United States.

In speaking of the French Revolution to the Marquis de Lafayette, Washington had observed that "men are very apt to run to extremes", and this reflected his larger understanding of an underlying cause of factionalism in American politics. The task of Washington's statesmanship, particularly after 1793, was to fight the tendency toward extremism in both foreign and domestic policy (the two being practically inseparable). Washington rejected the adoption of extremist policies of his own to combat extremism of another sort. But to bring about such moderation, Washington was prepared to lean against the prevailing current if necessary, even at the risk of his popularity.

All this supported the logic of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, which he called in the Farewell Address the "index to my plan" toward the war in Europe. Strict neutrality kept the United States out of the war, and eventually kept the war out of American domestic politics. Later in his second term, Washington concluded that the circumstances of the moment required him to reach an accommodation with the British—culminating in the unpopular Jay Treaty—as long as American honor, and its legal obligations to France, were not sacrificed in the process. Washington relied on his personal prestige, on the public's assurance that his object was neither alliance with Britain nor adoption of British forms of government, to win the day for the treaty. But in doing so, he was undoubtedly aware that the strongly pro-French sentiment of the public might drive the Federalists to become dangerously attached to Britain in response. Thus there are good grounds for

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believing that Washington's warning against the consequences of excessive attachments was indeed meant to apply equally to the Federalists and Britain. One extreme was not to be used to justify another.

A few months after the Farewell Address appeared, Jefferson would write in the same spirit: "Our countrymen have divided themselves by such strong affections, to the French and the English, that nothing will secure us internally but a divorce from both nations; and this must be the object of every American." Albert Gallatin, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, agreed in 1798 that "to detach ourselves from any connection with European politics, will tend to reconcile parties", so that "our own united efforts may then prove not altogether unsuccessful in promoting the happiness of America, and conciliating the affections of every part of the Union." Washington himself could not have said it better.

Two Hundred Years Later

IT IS TEMPTING to seek direct guidance from the Farewell Address for the present—to decide, for example, whether we should enlarge NATO, or how we should deal with the trade imbalance with Japan. But a literal application of Washington's legacy runs the risk that we will confuse his specific advice, appropriate to a particular time and circumstance, with the larger "truths important at all times" spoken of by Daniel Webster. This confusion was fatal to the isolationists of the 1930s, who overlooked the spirit of the Address in favor of its letter.

The spirit of the Address—indeed, of Washington's entire public career—was directed at creating and strengthening an independent political community with a distinctive American, and republican, character. By his actions and rhetoric, culminating in the Farewell Address, Washington sought to identify and combat the extremes toward which the people of his time were inclined. At the same time, he understood that these extremes often reflected natural, if dangerously exaggerated, facets of the American character. Reconciliation—not mere compromise—became Washington's object: to articulate a moderate, sustainable, and higher political ground upon which the American character could develop and flourish. With this accomplished, the United States could effectively pursue its interests, and give and exact justice toward the world; and the American experiment could exert its true and proper influence on the rest of mankind.

Today there are again two extremes in foreign policy worth noting, moderating, and reconciling. The first is the tendency to turn sharply inward, which, taken to an extreme, leads to a xenophobic, bad-tempered nationalism that spites America's optimism and its larger sense of national purpose. This extreme also neglects the continued need for the United States to "command its own fortunes" in a strategic environment that remains—as always and even at the best of times—harsh and potentially dangerous. It ignores the fact that our ability to enter into political relations with other powers without dangerous entanglements is enhanced not only by American power, but by the fact that many of these powers are now democracies. This opens up possibilities for fruitful cooperation among nations in a way not available in Washington's day—possibilities created in no small part by America's defense of its own and other democratic societies during this century. The United States rightly takes pride in its historical role as exemplar and, where necessary and appropriate, defender of civil and religious freedom.

Today's inward-directed pressure would not have troubled Washington so long as its aims were just and its expression moderate. The need felt by Americans to re-define their public and private character in more positive terms, after an extraordinary period during which foreign policy assumed an exceptional priority in their affairs, is true to the spirit of the Farewell Address, in which Washington specifically sought to prevent the pressures of

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the outside world from defining American politics. So is the need to attend to the urgent problems that now beset our society. The current revived public discourse on government, civil society, and civic virtue is, it may be hoped, the beginning of an effort to build a new consensus on the nation's future purpose and character. Central to Washington's view was that justice and virtue know no sharp dividing line between the nation's conduct at home and abroad. If that is the conclusion to which America's domestic self-absorption is leaning, who could oppose it?

At the same time, the case for the compatibility of domestic political reform and foreign policy should not rest on the other extreme to which some Americans are inclined. This is the assumption that relations among nations have now become so interdependent that nothing short of a "proactive" foreign policy is either feasible or desirable; and that, indeed, the United States, acting not simply in its own interests but on behalf of the international community, must take the lead in the reform of the world if it is successfully to reform itself.

Certainly, to be true to themselves, Americans cannot ignore the safety and happiness of other nations and peoples. We must continue to have "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." But certain, too, is it that Americans will not be true to themselves if they allow the pursuit of virtue to justify behavior on their own part that in others they would readily recognize as imperialistic or hegemonic, and if they define American interests in such a way as to demand the nation's intervention virtually everywhere and in all matters. It is worth bearing in mind that while this is the bicentennial of the Farewell Address, it is only a few years since the bicentennial of the French Revolution, an event whose impact on international politics should serve as a standing reminder of the danger of embarking on a crusade, even—or especially—one undertaken in the name of the best democratic and republican principles.

We now come full circle: As the Farewell Address argued, American foreign policy rightly begins with efforts to secure the country's basic material interests of security and prosperity. But these interests should be defined, or formed, through a domestic political process that has "our justice" as its end. Washington's advice to pursue American interests, guided by America's sense of justice, in order to command the nation's fortune in the world, remains sound. This formula, rightly understood, provides the United States with the right reasons for overcoming both excessive inwardness and immoderate activism. □

The Perils of Ambition

Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our *own*. I must fairly say, I dread our *own* power and our *own* ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. . . . It is ridiculous to say we are not men, and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves in some way or other . . . we may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin.

—Edmund Burke

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The Broken Tradition

James Turner Johnson

IN THE ONGOING argument between foreign policy realists and idealists, the just-war tradition of moral reasoning about the use of force has played a crucial mediating role for centuries. Rooted in the conviction that all human action—even in the distinctive field of international affairs, and even in the extremity of war—is susceptible to moral scrutiny and judgment, the just-war tradition has insisted that moralists take a realistic account of politics as an arena of conflict in which the quest for justice and peace is inevitably fraught with ambiguity and disagreement. Its mediation has also enabled statesmen to maintain an accepted role for moral judgment in the very domain—that of war—farthest from the regular application of human compassion, law, and comity. Just-war theory has, in short, been a civilized and civilizing agent in the darkest corners of the human social endeavor, and it has kept the church from straying too far from the realm of this world.

The ancient question—How can the use of force serve just ends?—that has been the centerpiece of Christian reflection on just war from the fifth century has lost none of its urgency today. Indeed, post-Cold War international politics offers a fertile field for reflection by moral philosophers and statesmen alike, as the world stands on the edge of the third millennium of the common era. With the fear of and focus on superpower nuclear tensions now subsided, world politics offers situation after situation in which one can imagine the use of proportionate and discriminate force serving just and prudential ends.

Yet, as in other disciplines and sub-disciplines that treat such matters, just-war theorists often find themselves at sea today. The reason, however, has less to do with the confusions of the post-Cold War world or the classic canons of just-war thinking than with the intellectual deterioration of that theory itself in influential quarters. Precisely when statesmen might well look to just-war theory for guidance on the always-tangled questions of relating appropriate means to desirable ends, many contemporary just-war theorists are engaged in a process of self-marginalization. Pressed by the experience of two world wars and the special circumstances of the nuclear age, and tempted by secular ideological notions, these theorists have altered the very ground on which the theory itself has stood for more than a thousand years. While the core of just-war tradition is based on opposition to injustice, the recent metathesis is based instead on a "presumption against war"—a very different matter indeed.

The burden of this essay is to trace briefly the essential elements and philosophical bedrock of just-war theory, and to show how it has changed over the last century—and especially over the past three decades. I

James Turner Johnson is professor of religion at Rutgers University. This essay was originally prepared for a conference sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC.

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argue that recent changes reflect contingent judgments on the nature of modern war that do not match the character of contemporary armed conflicts. I conclude by suggesting that, in its original form, just-war theory remains relevant to the challenges faced by statesmen today. I illustrate this relevance by identifying several contemporary policy implications that follow from understanding the just-war idea as aimed against injustice rather than against the use of force itself.

The Classic Just-War Idea

THE JUST-WAR tradition addresses two issues regarding the morality of the use of force: when it is right to resort to armed force, and what it is right to do when using force—*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, respectively. While these two issues are related, the question of permissibility has priority, for absent the determination that a use of force is morally justified, even the most strictly delimited means are, in terms of the just-war tradition, unjust.

The requirements of *jus ad bellum* are clear in the theory, especially as developed by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Above all, the resort to force must have a just cause. It must also be authorized by a competent authority, and it must be motivated by the right intention. And it must pass four prudential tests: that it be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil; that it have a reasonable chance of success; that it be a last resort; and that its expected outcome establish peace. Some commentators add that a just war must also be formally declared, but most agree that the first three requirements subsume this one as well.

The requirements of *jus in bello* are also clear. The use of force must be discriminate (it must distinguish the guilty from the innocent), and it must be proportional (it must distinguish necessary force from gratuitous force).

A study of the just-war tradition suggests that, above all, the first requirement of *jus ad bellum*—that it have a just cause as a response to injustice—is the font of the entire tradition. This becomes obvious if we examine several benchmark figures in the evolution of just-war theory.

The origins of a specifically Christian tradition on just war are to be found in the thought of Augustine and his mentor, Ambrose of Milan, in the fourth and fifth centuries. They inherited—and did not challenge—a Christian consensus that the example and teaching of Jesus required that Christians not defend themselves when attacked but should instead turn the other cheek when confronted with violence. But first Ambrose and then Augustine reasoned that the prohibition of self-defense did not imply that a Christian might not defend his *neighbor* when attacked. On the contrary, they argued, it is a duty of Christian love to defend the innocent in such circumstances. Not providing such defense is itself morally wrong: as Ambrose wrote in first advancing his insight, "He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who causes it." Augustine concurred and expanded the point.

Clearly, Ambrose and Augustine began with the duty of love to protect the innocent, not with a presumption against doing harm, even to an enemy. They reasoned that the duty to protect the innocent permitted use of force against the wrongful attacker up to the level needed to prevent the attack from succeeding, though it must not exceed this level, since the evildoer is himself considered to be someone for whom Christ died. Thus the consideration of restraint in the use of force arises only *after* the duty to use force is recognized, and restraint follows not from a presumption against harm but from the same duty of love directed toward the evildoer.

The logic of this position was in turn developed by the medieval heirs of these early figures, beginning with Gratian and

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other canonists in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But in retrospect, the position of Thomas Aquinas looms as especially important, both because of his general influence on later Catholic thought and because of his dependence on Augustine himself in the matter of just-war theory.

In order for a war to be just, Thomas Aquinas wrote, three things are necessary, namely: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention. Since we are particularly interested in the conditions that justify resort to force, it is useful to look first at how Thomas (citing Augustine) defined just cause:

> [J]ust cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says: A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what has been seized unjustly.

This focus is also clear in Thomas' discussion of the requirement of sovereign authority for a just war. Defining this requirement he cites a text frequently quoted in medieval writing on the ethics of war, Romans 13:4: "The sovereign beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." Thomas continues, "so too, it is [a sovereign's] business to have recourse to the sword in defending the common weal against external enemies."

That the resort to force in itself is not the moral problem here is all the more clear when Thomas turns to the requirement of right intention for a just war, again quoting Augustine:

> True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.

What is morally condemnable in war, Thomas continues, is not force itself but the use of force with the wrong intention, namely "[t]he passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things." As for the argument that prudential considerations may overrule the presence of just cause, Thomas leaves judgment to the sovereign; it is not a matter for the Church to determine, and certainly not to determine in advance for all war.

Moving forward from the medieval base into the modern period, two other benchmark figures, Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), illustrate the essential continuity of this conception of just war. They did, however, introduce two changes made necessary by the modern period. In medieval times, the just-war tradition applied only to wars between Christians, not between Christians and non-Christians (notably Muslims), and, theologically speaking, Western Christianity was still monolithic. With the Spanish expansion into the new world there arose the question of the propriety of colonial wars against non-Christian peoples, and then came the dilemmas occasioned by the Protestant Reformation. The first change introduced by Vitoria and solidified by Grotius was to locate the justifying causes for war squarely within natural law and the law of nations, thereby ruling out appeals to religion (or other ideological causes) as justifying resort to war. The second was the recognition that in a given conflict both sides might appear to have just cause.

In the context of the first development, these theorists regarded war as provided for by both nature and the law of nations as a means of settling otherwise intractable disputes. As to the second issue, one might guess, on the face of it, that if both sides in a conflict appear to have just cause, then the tradition would enjoin them not to fight; that is, it would see ambiguity itself as a restriction on *jus ad bellum*, the very right to go to war. Certainly, if there were a pre-

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sumption against war within the core of the tradition, it would have been most likely to present itself here. But neither Vitoria nor Grotius reasoned this way. Rather, accepting war as a last-resort means of settling disputes, they focused instead on the idea of simultaneous ostensible justice—the perception of justice on both sides at once—as the base for more attention to restraint in war, thus feeding the development of the *jus in bello*, the rules limiting the conduct of war. Also, both of these early modern just-war theorists give explicit attention to the purpose of just use of force to right injustices, as for example Vitoria's contemporary-sounding argument for the use of force to oppose pillage, rape, and indiscriminate killing.

Clearly, the development of Christian just-war tradition follows a line of reasoning focused on the rightness of the resort to force to combat the evil of injustice, and that development did not construe at any point the use of force to be a moral problem in itself. In classic just-war theory the use of force is morally problematical only when it is the source of injustice. But even then, wrong uses of force do not call force itself into question, but instead justify the resort to force to set matters right. What Christian just-war doctrine is about, as classically defined, is the use of the authority and force of the rightly ordered political community (and its sovereign authority as minister of God) to prevent, punish, and rectify injustice. There is, simply put, no presumption against war in it at all.

The Evolution of an Idea

IF THE IDEA of a "presumption against war" cannot be traced to the theorists who gave Christian just-war theory its classical form, then where does it come from? The answer, I suggest, is that it has developed out of a particular response to the phenomenon of modern war, a response that understands the nature of war today necessarily to threaten human values, not to provide a means of protecting them. This understanding depicts war in its contemporary form as inherently suspect. A widely known rendering of this view is in Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory*: Modern war is senseless, out of control, massively destructive of human values and life values, leaving behind harmful consequences that linger long after the shooting is done.[1]

Since the idea of a "presumption against war" as informing just-war theory has been explicitly adopted by the American Catholic bishops in their 1983 pastoral, *The Challenge of Peace*, it is instructive to follow the evolution in Catholic thought of the perception of modern war as inherently destructive of value. Here, as in other religious criticism of modern war, we encounter additional themes: negative judgments on the purposes of modern secular states, references to the growth of "militarism", and a conception of modern weapons as inherently too destructive to serve value. It is important to note that this negative perception of war is not simply a reaction to the age of nuclear weapons. It was well established long before the nuclear age. Fussell traces this conception of war to the terrible experience in the trenches of 1914-18, but for Catholic thought it begins at least as early as 1870, when a formal position paper, or *Postulatum*, was presented to Vatican Council I, challenging the justice of the form of war practiced by modern states.

Reflecting the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of that same year, and perhaps also the American Civil War that had ended five years earlier, this *Postulatum* explicitly cited the venal motivations of states and the danger of large standing national armies as a special evil. It argued that such armies fostered a spirit of militarism, tended to foment wars in order to

[1]Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

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finance themselves through conquest, and led to conflicts so destructive as to be "hideous massacres" that the church could not regard as just. So far as the *jus ad bellum* was concerned, the argument of the *Postulatum* precluded the possibility of a first use of force being just, no matter what its aim—and after the grotesque slaughter of the First World War some forty-five years later, the argument could only have seemed more self-evident than ever. The document did, however, admit the right of second use of force in defense against attack. Together, this undercutting of the first use of force along with the acceptance of second use (defined as defense) was to become an element not only for later Catholic thought but also for twentieth-century international law.

Following the Great War and reflecting the experience of that conflict, a gathering of prominent theologians at the 1931 Conventus of Fribourg thus distinguished between defense, which they regarded as lawful, and the argument for war from national "necessity", which they declared not lawful. In the context of the provisions for arbitration of disputes established by the League of Nations, and the renunciation of first use of force established for the signatories to the Pact of Paris, the Conventus took the position that it was wrong to initiate any resort to arms to settle a dispute without first recourse to arbitration.

These two documents set the terms for a critique of war that ends as a "presumption against war." Since the Second World War various official and nonofficial statements have called into question whether, given the nature of modern war, even the just cause of defense can legitimize resort to armed force. Statements of the various popes to this effect are especially interesting because of their authoritative force, even though they represent only a fraction of the full range of recent Catholic thought on war.

Pope Pius XII, whose papacy (1939-58) extended through the Second World War and the beginning of the nuclear age, in effect forbade "all wars of aggression, whether just or unjust", as John Courtney Murray put it.[2] For this pope a "war of aggression", Murray notes, was identified with any offensive use of force, whatever the justifying reason. Defensive war, on the other hand, was acceptable—though Pius hedged this allowance more tightly than earlier just-war writers. His reasoning on first and second resort to force came together in his 1956 Christmas message, which reflected the context of the Hungarian revolution and its repression by Soviet military power. This statement is interesting as an example of the refashioning of traditional just-war concepts into a somewhat different doctrine from that defined by the classic theorists. In a particularly vivid passage Pius wrote:

> There is no further room for doubt about the purposes and methods that lie behind tanks when they crash resoundingly across frontiers. . . . When all the possible stages of negotiation and mediation are by-passed, and when the threat is made to use atomic arms to obtain concrete demands, *whether these are justified or not*, it becomes clear that . . . there may come into existence in a nation a situation in which all hope of averting war becomes vain. In this situation a war of efficacious self-defense against unjust attacks, which is undertaken with hope of success, cannot be considered illicit. [emphasis added]

In context, this was a pointed condemnation of the Soviet invasion alongside a somewhat lukewarm acceptance of the Hungarian resistance. Pius used just-war language, but his priorities were impor-

[2]John Courtney Murray, *Morality and Modern War* (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1959), p. 9.

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tantly different from those of classic just-war theory. There, as we have seen, the classical focus was on three concerns: the justice of the cause for resort to force, the existence of authority to do so, and the intention with which it would be used. Pius, however, focused elsewhere: on the evil of first resort to force itself (tanks crashing "resoundingly across frontiers") and the requirement of last resort (the threat of further force without making use of "negotiation" and "mediation"). While he allowed defensive use of force, he subjected it to further limits: only self-defense against "*unjust* attacks" is allowed; "reasonable hope of success" (the classic criterion) has been refashioned into "*efficacious* self-defense . . . undertaken with hope of success" (emphasis added in both cases); and the defensive resort to force is not explicitly just, but only "cannot be considered illicit."

Pius' reasoning here expressed a "presumption against war" without employing the term. While his reference to atomic arms introduced a new element in the context of resort to force, Pius' focus in this passage was clearly not that *these particular weapons* are especially evil and to be avoided but that *the use of force* is especially evil and to be avoided. His negative attitude toward resort to force was thus not a particular result of the atomic age; rather it was of a piece with the distrust of arms, armies, and the use of force expressed earlier in Catholic thought, in the denunciation of large standing armies and militarism in 1870, and the emphasis on arbitration in 1931.

Giving his own weight to this new emphasis, Pope John XXIII, in the *Pacem in Terris* encyclical of 1963, called for the banning of nuclear weapons, a general reduction of other arms, and the development of an international regime based on common consent that would resolve disputes short of war. In a widely discussed passage he wrote:

> [I]n this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice.

Catholic pacifists of our day have argued that this statement not only condemned all war in the nuclear age, but rejected just-war theory as well.[3] By contrast, Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey understood John XXIII as working within the just-war framework, but ruling out two of the three classical just causes for resort to force—recovery of something wrongly taken and punishment of evil—while leaving only defense as justified.[4] Even if Ramsey's less radical interpretation is correct, much has been given up in this statement for, after all, to repair the violation of justice was precisely what classic just-war doctrine was about.

As these examples show, twenty years into the nuclear age it was clear that Catholic (and not only Catholic) thought on just war had shifted focus to a concern that the first resort to force under *any* circumstances held great potential for injustice and that, accordingly, such resort must be avoided. The defensive use of arms remained a moral possibility, although an increasingly questioned one. In Pope Paul VI's 1965 address to the United Nations General Assembly, this evolving line of reasoning about just war reached for a new resolution. While issuing the ringing challenge, "[N]ever again war, war never again!", Paul also admitted that so long as man remains "weak, changeable, and wicked", "defensive arms will, alas! be necessary." But he stopped short of explicitly saying that it is morally allowable to use such arms. In the context of prevailing Cold War strategies, this statement suggested support for deterrence but not for active defense should deterrence fail. Hence, his point was to draw a double distinction: between the possession of offensive arms, which he regarded as morally evil, and defensive ones, whose possession he permitted; and between the possession of and use of the latter.

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[3]Ronald G. Musto, *The Catholic Peace Tradition* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), p. 190.

[4]Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: Scribner's, 1968), pp. 190-210.

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It was no great distance from these distinctions to what amounted to a position of nearly unconditional pacifism—the basic rejection of just-war logic altogether with the new understanding that, for Catholics at least, religion mandates a "presumption against war." The logic of the paradigm was spelled out vividly in the 1983 pastoral letter of the American Catholic bishops, *The Challenge of Peace.* Its starting point is not the problem of preventing injustice, but its insistence that:

> Catholic teaching begins *in every case* with a presumption against war and for peaceful settlement of disputes. In exceptional cases, determined by the moral principles of the just-war tradition, some uses of force are permitted.[5] [emphasis added]

The definition of exceptional cases is suggested by two statements that follow the above. The first defines self-defense against aggression as a right and duty of every nation, and the second rejects offensive war as morally unjustifiable whatever the circumstances. Later, in the text of the letter itself, these themes are elaborated and linked to earlier Catholic tradition, as well as to the effort in international law to outlaw wars of aggression and, ultimately, to eliminate war altogether by international common consent. The right to resort to force, however, as defined in the bishops' letter, is more stringent than that understood in international law because it imposes further limitations: that resort to force must be subject to prudential tests, including the requirements of last resort, probability of success, and overall proportionality.

Defined thusly, the implication of the presumption against war is to push just-war theory close to outright rejection of any resort to force. While *The Challenge of Peace* focused specifically on nuclear weapons, it clearly nurtured the more general inclination that, in the present age, the use of any military force is morally questionable because it could escalate into nuclear force. Hence, the words of John XXIII—that in the present age war may no longer be employed to remedy the violation of justice—and hence the trajectory of recent Catholic teaching on war, which seems to leave no doubt that the intent is to avoid all resort to force.

The idea that just-war tradition is rooted in a "presumption against war" is clearly an innovation; the question is whether it is a justified innovation. I think not. Indeed, this sort of thinking should be a cause for concern not only to Catholics, but to anyone who believes that moral reasoning has a place in the affairs of statecraft. This is so for two reasons: first, because "presumption against war" thinking effectively destroys the logic of just-war theory by putting *jus in bello* above *jus ad bellum*, and by putting lesser, prudential considerations within *jus ad bellum* above major ones; and, second, because the assumptions about the nature of war on which it is based are flawed.

The Logical Problem

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE of pure moral argument, the problem with the "presumption against war" idea is not only that it is radically at odds with the classical idea of just war, but that the nature of the judgment upon which the claim is made is inadequate. Rather than flowing from a deontological moral principle (a "categorical imperative", as Kant put it), the "presumption against war" is a product of prudential judgments about the nature of modern war.

The problem with prudential judgments such as those incorporated into the presumption against war logic is not only

[5]National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1983), iii; cf. 22.

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that they are prudential, but that they are contingent. In other words, they are not based on an unchangeable moral principle, but on a condition in the world that is not only subject to change but fated to change. Pure moral reasoning about justice and injustice lives in the realm of absolutes, of deontological reasoning: One obeys a moral principle not because of the consequences of obeying it, but because it is right. Moral judgments—*applied* moral reasoning—obviously must *assess* contingent conditions, but such judgments must not be *guided* by them. It is precisely for this reason that medieval and early modern just-war theory placed responsibility for the four lesser prudential concerns included in *jus ad bellum*—that it produce a preponderance of good over evil, have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort, and that its expected outcome be peace—on the competent authority who determines whether to resort to armed force.

In other words, these lesser but still very important concerns pertain to the function of statecraft, not moral analysis. The role of the moralist is to insist on the application of the three essential, noncontingent elements of *jus ad bellum*—just cause, competent authority, right intention—and to specify that the prudential elements be taken into account. But the moralist is not to usurp the role of statecraft by specifying how they are to apply or what they mean for specific instances or periods of time. The "presumption against war" view, by reversing the weight of essential and contingent considerations, would vitiate statecraft and presume to tell sovereigns how to conduct their affairs—a most worldly and untraditional presumption at that. From the perspective of moral reasoning, too, it gives pride of place to judgments about contingent conditions over obligations inherent in moral duty.

The Practical Problem

TO THE EXTENT that it is taken seriously, "presumption against war" thinking also has clear implications for the shape of public policy on the use of force. For if war is always presumptively wrong, the moral frame for policy debate over the use of force is reduced to the arena of those very limited exceptional circumstances that may override this presumption. What the 1983 pastoral letter meant for policy on nuclear weapons, relating both to deterrence and to possible use, was well-examined at the time the letter appeared: It was, politically, an attempt to advance the campaign for a nuclear freeze, and it was justified largely on the basis of the claim that neither the demands of discrimination nor proportionality could possibly be met in any use of nuclear weapons.

One can still argue such matters today, for the chances of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia (or China) are not completely nil. But in the contemporary environment, policy questions relating to very different forms of the national use of force and occasions for such use are at center stage. The types of forces involved are different, the justifications entered into debate are different, and the authority for employment of force is different. The key issues now relate to conventional, not nuclear arms; they involve low-intensity conflict and various forms of interventionary uses of military force, not superpower deterrence or war; the goals served are often defined by broadly held international values, not national interests narrowly construed; and the question of the rightness of the use of force encompasses not only cases in which unilateral action by the United States is at issue, but also cases in which the United States is a participant in groups of nations ranging from ad hoc coalitions (such as that against Iraq in the Gulf War), to regional alliances (like NATO or the OAS), to the United Nations.

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Restoring Justice to Just-War Reasoning

DESPITE THE EXISTENCE of such variable circumstances, some modern just-war theorists have marginalized themselves to the point where they can barely speak to such matters. It is hard to see how, from a posture defined by the "presumption against war", uses of force can be justified for reasons of national interest other than resistance to a direct attack in progress (and perhaps not then, if the prudential tests are not met), even in the face of serious threat to national security or for international order purposes. Yet these kinds of cases provide the context for debate over the use of force today: threats to national interest take such forms as terrorist attack and the drug trade; recent international order concerns include rolling back aggression (the Gulf War), promoting human rights and democracy (Haiti), and ending an indiscriminately destructive civil war (Bosnia). Just-war theory, if brought back to its real roots, can be relevant to all these contingencies. The way to do this is to restore the centrality of the idea of justice to reasoning about the use of force.

There is no question that classic just-war theorists were motivated in their thinking about the use of force by the desire to prevent, punish, and remedy injustice, and *even to do so at risk to oneself*—as per Ambrose and Augustine. The purpose of statecraft followed from this: The role of the sovereign was to act as minister of God to police injustice. So, unless it is granted in advance that the resort to force *always* produces the greatest injustice, the matter remains open to case by case, or class by class, investigation. If one undertakes such an investigation, it becomes clear that the uses of military force typical of the present day do not justify the judgments underlying "presumption against war" arguments. In those arguments, it will be recalled, two themes stand out: first, that the moral possibility of national purpose has been subverted by the militarism imposed by large military establishments, for which the only cure is disarmament; and second, that the destructiveness of modern weapons, especially nuclear weapons, severely restricts and perhaps removes the possibility of their use as instruments of moral purpose.

Neither of these themes holds up as a general descriptive statement of the nature of contemporary states and statecraft as such, or of the actuality of war once begun. Both are particularly outmoded in the post-Cold War context. In the first place, the wars that have occurred since the end of the Cold War do not exemplify a destructiveness inexorably beyond human control, or aims that far outrun the ends of politics, but rather a reality shaped by human decision-making and expressive of rational political purposes—however wrong we may judge such purposes to be in discrete cases. These conflicts have all been limited in significant ways; none has ushered in a global holocaust or escalated to all-out use of conventional military might. Nor is this only a post-Cold War phenomenon. In truth, the face of armed conflict since the end of the Second World War suggests that modern war is characterized by localized and limited, though sharp, conflicts in which ethnic or religious differences or local political disputes provide the proximate causes, rather than totalistic clashes on the model of the two world wars or the feared global nuclear showdown.

Indeed, while the reality of recent conflicts has been terrible enough, the rape of Kuwait, the starvation of civilians in Somalia, the ethnic massacres of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have not shown a destructiveness different in essence from what was known by Vitoria, Grotius, or their predecessors. (Grotius, after all, lived during the Thirty Years' War, still arguably the most devastating conflict Europe has ever experienced.) All these conflicts have been condemned by the international community, and each has, in different ways, occasioned action to relieve suffering and bring the conflict to an end. In these responses the military means

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of the great powers have been brought to bear in limited rather than totalistic ways and with varying degrees of success. None of these forms of action is consistent with the view of modern war described by the "presumption against war" perspective.

Three general lessons may be deduced from the experience of these recent conflicts. The first is that the perception of the nature of war underlying the "presumption against war" idea is seriously at odds with reality, and that the reality of recent conflicts fits very closely the perception of war found in classic just-war theory. The second is that the recent conflicts cited have helped define the limits of what individual states and groups of states can do to prevent or mitigate war. The United Nations has had success (and failure) at peacekeeping, but other international coalitions have been necessary where peace does not exist or exists only tenuously, as in the cases of the Gulf War and the current NATO intervention in Bosnia. The third lesson is that the major powers have employed their military forces in these conflicts in ways that have gone substantially beyond a narrow definition of their national interests to include humanitarian and international order concerns. This is just the opposite of what they were expected to do on the model of the state in modern Catholic just-war thinking that emphasizes their militarism, national chauvinism, and venality.

Just Cause and Right Authority

THESE THREE LESSONS suggest that the approach to war found in classic just-war reasoning remains relevant to contemporary conflict. At the same time the tradition of such reasoning needs to recognize the particulars of the contemporary international context, especially the specific violations of justice likely to occur, and the variable notion of authority for the use of force that has emerged in responses to recent conflicts. Together these developments point the way to new applications of just-war thought.

The truth is that the classic just-war concept defines the issues in ways that correspond closely to the conditions under which contemporary policy on uses of force must be shaped. There is a place, in just-war terms, for the employment of military force in the contemporary world: not only for defense of national interests—which is, after all, maintained in papal teaching, positive international law, international custom, and realist doctrine—but also for purposes the classic just-war theorists called the punishment of evil and the recovery of something wrongly taken. These latter uses are often, but not always, interventionary in character, and they are often, though not always, undertakings of groups of states operating not only on their own authority but also on that of the United Nations Security Council.

The fundamental policy implication for just-war reasoning, rightly understood, is thus not only that there is a place for the use of force under national authority in resistance to armed attack, but also a place for employment of military means in response to broader kinds of threats to national security, and to the values and structures that define the international order. In the face of such threats force may be the only means likely to produce the desired results: protection of the values at stake (whether this takes the form of preventing starvation, rectifying the criminal looting of civil order, ending indiscriminate warfare against enemy populations, or rolling back interstate aggression). In contemporary context it is well to remember that the conditions of the rightful resort to force to protect these values and end the threat to them is precisely what classic just-war theory aimed to define. Such uses of force for good should not be held hostage to an imagined "presumption against war." □

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Morality and High Technology

A.J. Bacevich

OURS IS AN AGE in which any untoward development becomes a crisis, the slightest departure from the ordinary is immediately tagged as historic, and the mere glimmer of novelty is heralded as revolutionary. Such semantic extravagance is not especially conducive to clear thinking about the real moral and ethical issues posed by change.

By common consent, we live in an era of rapid and momentous change in military affairs. Awareness of this phenomenon fairly burst upon the public consciousness during the Persian Gulf War. It manifested itself above all in the dazzling "systems" that figured prominently—or at least appeared to figure prominently—in securing victory over Iraq: stealth aircraft, antiballistic missiles, an array of "smart" munitions, and above all an integrated architecture of command and control. Embodied in hardware such as surveillance satellites, the Global Positioning System, JSTARS and AWACS aircraft, and Aegis warships, American superiority in C4I2—the product of a concerted effort to tap the military potential of microelectronic information management—provided the key that not only exposed the vulnerabilities of Saddam Hussein's old-style arsenal but rendered it all but irrelevant.[1]

To many observers, these technologies suggested that the United States had achieved a level of military superiority without precedent in modern history. To others, Desert Storm itself was less a demonstration of capabilities fully developed than a trial run that hinted tantalizingly at what was still to come. Extrapolating from the experience of the Persian Gulf, analysts identified four major capabilities that comprise this remarkable advance in military prowess, none of them altogether in hand, but each within reach for a wealthy and technologically advanced nation such as the United States. Those capabilities are:

A. J. Bacevich is executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This essay was originally prepared for a conference on "Just War after the Cold War", sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC.

[1]The process of acronymic enlargement producing C4I2 testifies to the increased attention claimed by this aspect of warfare. During the Vietnam era, the accepted term of art for directing military operations was Command and Control, or C2. In the decades following Vietnam, C2 progressively accumulated exponents and an additional letter to achieve its current formulation: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Information Systems. Yet although C4I2 encompasses additional means and disciplines, its function remains unchanged from that of C2.

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- near perfect, real time intelligence available to commanders at all levels—"a transparent battlefield";
- extremely accurate means of target acquisition, independent of range and immune to countermeasures;
- technologically enhanced methods of command enabling U.S. forces to operate "inside the decision cycle" of their opponent, reacting more quickly than the enemy and rendering his actions meaningless—"information dominance";
- highly lethal munitions capable of hitting targets over extended distances in any conditions while producing minimal collateral damage—"long-range precision strike."

As interpreted by a cadre of imaginative defense experts in the United States and elsewhere, these capabilities suggest the dawn of a radically different era in military history. Hardly had the Gulf War ended than these experts began competing with one another to identify that conflict's most salient "lessons." More vigorously still, they have labored to fit those lessons into a theoretical framework, one worthy of the larger phenomenon it presumes to describe. That these efforts have yet to yield a consensus is suggested by the variety of labels presently in use to describe that phenomenon, among them the Military-Technical Revolution, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and the Revolution in Security Affairs.

Whatever the label, non-expert opinion in the United States has been virtually unanimous in endorsing this "revolution" as a welcome development. Whether viewed as a rightful dividend for the national treasure invested throughout the Cold War, attributed to innate American ingenuity, or interpreted as one more affirmation of divine favor, the spectacular new military dominance enjoyed by the United States has been applauded across the domestic political spectrum and endorsed by confirmed doves no less than by enthusiastic hawks.

A Moral Subtext

WHY THE UNIVERSALLY positive response? There are at least three related reasons.

First, we own the patent to this revolution and there is no one to gainsay our claim. With the Soviet Union now reduced to a bad memory, the United States is without rivals capable in the near term of challenging its monopoly in this new way of war. Seldom doubting our own benevolence, we find it easy to conclude that American possession of that monopoly serves the interests of the world at large.

Second, we have persuaded ourselves that the high-tech combat displayed in the Persian Gulf has restored to force the political utility that it lost in the aftermath of Hiroshima. When it comes to policing the world—restoring order, stemming catastrophe, disciplining rogues and evildoers, rescuing the victims of oppression—the Left no less than the Right now considers the possession of military superiority to be eminently useful.

Third—and least noted though arguably the most significant reason—we see in the military revolution heralded by Desert Storm a means to escape from a moral quandary that has dogged the nation since the onset of the Cold War. Aspiring to be both global hegemon and righteous democracy, the United States has struggled with the dilemma of using the vast power at its disposal while still satisfying self-imposed requirements that it act in a morally defensible manner. In the Persian Gulf, Americans seemed to glimpse a solution to this conundrum.[2]

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[2]Though least noted, this aspect was not entirely unnoticed. One work that specifically emphasized it was *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* by Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), especially chapters 11 and 12.

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In other words, underlying America's delight with the outcome of the Gulf War, and punctuating the widespread certainty that the war marked a decisive turning point in history, was a moral subtext. Desert Storm was satisfying not only because it was a decisive victory won at surprisingly low cost, but also because the enterprise was unbesmirched by ethical ambiguity. "We went halfway around the world", President George Bush assured a joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991, "to do what is moral, just, and right." That assurance was precisely what Americans longed to hear.

In the terms of the just-war tradition that enjoyed a revival in the debates preceding the actual liberation of Kuwait—and despite the contrary predictions of various ethicists and moral theologians—Desert Storm neatly fulfilled the criteria of *jus ad bellum* and of *jus in bello*. That is, in the common sense judgment of most Americans, the decision to use force against Iraq was morally justified and the manner in which American forces fought was morally appropriate.

This latter point is especially important. With military briefers and television analysts celebrating the surgical accuracy and carefully calibrated effects of American weapons, U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf seemed to exceed all previous standards in adhering to the requirements of proportionality and discrimination, the classic *jus in bello* criteria. As a result, Desert Storm proceeded to its happy conclusion with few of the moral controversies that had marred virtually every other large scale use of American force since 1945: collateral damage was kept to a minimum; civilian casualties were few; operations were promptly terminated as soon as military objectives appeared to be within reach.[3]

Thus, besides demonstrating a stunning capacity to project power, the revolutionary new style of warfare heralded by Desert Storm also suggested that the United States had discovered a military-technical solution to the dichotomy implicit in its identity as democratic superpower. This new military revolution—one might call this sanitary war—would enable Americans henceforth to satisfy their yearning to believe themselves virtuous even as they exercised commanding influence across the globe.

Yet this is a dual illusion. Events since the Gulf War have already outlined the limits of U.S. military superiority as an instrument of policy: The promised new world order will come only at enormous cost, if at all. At the moment, the American people show little sustained willingness to pay that cost.

In the moral realm, too, the legacy of the military revolution is problematic. The expectation that Desert Storm has endowed the United States with the capacity to dominate world events without soiling itself in the process only sets Americans up for bewildering and painful disappointments. Given the extent to which policy in a post-Cold War world will be beholden to public opinion, those disappointments will have important political ramifications. For in truth, even a high-tech military offers no easy escape from the moral ambiguities that remain the lot of an imperial democracy.

Sea Changes

AS THE LACK OF consensus regarding a preferred label suggests, little agreement exists on how revolutionary the military revolution of our day really is. Despite all the expert commentary, it remains ill-defined. How deep does change reach? How far does it extend? Has Desert Storm established the paradigm to which warfare in the twenty-first century will adhere? Or was that brief, visually gaudy conflict simply the final triumphant turn of a

[3]As will be noted later in this essay, while this generally accepted picture of a "clean" war was basically true, it was not quite as spotless an affair as some maintain. In addition to the hitting of the bunker in downtown Baghdad, the "highway of death" episode constituted a serious blemish.

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superannuated mode of warfare that is giving way to something radically different, the precursor of a future not yet fully perceived? In other words, do the wondrous technologies displayed in the Gulf War signify a change in the tools of war—a change of means, but not of essence—or, as some contend, are they transforming the very nature of human conflict? Or, a third possibility, is change in the realm of military affairs proceeding as a subset of broader and ultimately more decisive social, political, and scientific developments?

These are preliminary questions that must be considered before drawing any conclusions about the moral implications of the latest advances in military technologies. A brief discussion of what happened in the realm of sea power in the twentieth century—a story of multiple, interrelated revolutions—may help to make the point.

The first of this century's upheavals in naval affairs occurred in 1906. In that year, Great Britain launched the first in a new class of very fast, heavily armored, all big-gun battleships. In the eyes of naval experts then and since, the *Dreadnought* transformed naval warfare. In a single stroke, every other capital ship afloat—including every other battleship in the Royal Navy—was rendered obsolete, consigned to the lowly status of "pre-dreadnought."

Historians routinely cite *Dreadnought* as a prime example of military revolution. But what did this revolution accomplish? Britain's technological innovation added fuel to an existing arms race, with each of the industrialized powers—the United States not least among them—hurrying to acquire dreadnought-type warships for its own navy. Yet *Dreadnought*'s impact on reigning concepts of sea power was negligible. If anything, the powerful new class of warship reinforced the naval orthodoxy of the day: *Dreadnought* seemed the ideal instrument for applying the precepts of sea power developed by the influential American naval officer and publicist Alfred Thayer Mahan, precepts derived from Mahan's study of naval history *in the days of sail*. In that sense, and although marking an impressive advance in naval technology, *Dreadnought* served primarily to affirm rather than to subvert the accepted rules of the game. Since it posed no threat to the recognized conventions of naval warfare, the revolution inspired by *Dreadnought* also had little impact on the definition of what constituted moral or immoral conduct when fighting at sea. From a moral perspective, it was immaterial.

In fact, however, certain of the assumptions underlying those conventions—specifically the Mahanian notion that a dominant battle line of heavily armed surface ships offered the key to both command of the sea and world power—were shaky at best. This became apparent in 1914 when a war of epic proportions engulfed Europe.

In determining that war's outcome, the squadrons of massive dreadnoughts, built at such enormous expense, figured only marginally. In a brutal conflict that lasted over four years, the main British and German fleets met only once in battle, the inconclusive action off Jutland in 1916. For the most part, they sat out the war, warily eyeing each other from anchorages on opposite sides of the North Sea. According to Winston Churchill, the admiral commanding Britain's Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow "was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon."[4] Yet such a back-handed testimonial amounted to tacit acknowledgment of an embarrassing fact that Churchill was loath to admit outright: In the vast and desperate struggle of the First World War, the military instrument into which Britain had poured such treasure, and that epitomized the power of the Empire, remained for all practical purposes on the sidelines. Perhaps through recklessness or miscalculation the commander of the Grand Fleet could lose the war, but all of his mighty dreadnoughts made precious little contribution to winning it.

[4]B.H. Liddell-Hart, *The Real War, 1914-18* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1930), p. 273.

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Having said that, to conclude from the relative inactivity of the main British and German battle fleets that maritime matters as such were unimportant to the conduct of the war would be a great error. On the contrary, both sides understood that the ability of the Allies to sustain their armies in France hinged on the Royal Navy's control of the world's sea lanes. As has so often been the case in the history of warfare, comparative disadvantage served as spur to innovation. Overmatched in the race to build battleships, Germany was compelled to explore unorthodox ways of turning the Allies' maritime flank. This imperative gave birth to a second revolution in naval affairs: undersea warfare.

With the aim of severing the enemy's strategic lines of communications—especially Allied trade with the Americas—Germany revived and radically transformed the tradition of commerce raiding. Both Allies and neutrals such as the United States denounced the U-boat campaign as barbaric. Certainly, in its "unrestricted" form it was ruthless. It was also highly effective—until the Royal Navy (supported from early 1917 onward by the Americans) suspended the further construction of battlewagons and poured resources into the fledgling science of anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Although undertaken reluctantly by the naval establishments involved, this shift in emphasis signified a transformation of naval warfare that cut far deeper than the revolution wrought by *Dreadnought*. Operationally, the U-boat redefined the concept of "battle" at sea. Strategically, it suggested ways of bringing sea power to bear more decisively than through the classic fleet actions envisioned by the disciples of Mahan. Both of these developments also had profound moral implications. In the context of the just-war tradition, submarine warfare posed a particular challenge to the principle of discrimination, in the narrow sense of declaring merchant ships (often carrying non-combatants) to be fair game for unwarned attack, and in the broader sense of enticing military planners to consider the feasibility of campaigns designed to bring the enemy civilian populace slowly "to its knees."

Yet even if farther reaching than *Dreadnought*, the U-boat revolution was itself transitional, superseded in short order by a third even more fundamental transformation in naval affairs. This was the revolution in naval air power.

NO SOONER HAD the First World War ended than the Mahanians attempted to put the undersea genie back in the bottle. The Allies stripped the German navy of its U-boats and by treaty prohibited Germany from acquiring new ones. Old-line officers in the victorious navies scrapped their ASW fleets and directed their energies once again to perfecting the dreadnought, designing a new generation with even larger caliber guns and heavier armor. But most of this was retrograde nonsense, naval nostalgia swathed in armor plate, teak, and gunpowder.

Within the navies of the advanced nations—but especially in the navies of the United States and Imperial Japan—reform-minded officers pursued a new vision that would shatter that nostalgia, ending once and for all the battleship's reign as the standard for measuring maritime power. Their goal was as bold as it was straightforward: to harness air power to naval power in ways that would create a sea-based weapon of unprecedented flexibility and effectiveness.

The immediate product of this vision was the aircraft carrier, wielded with spectacular success by the United States Navy in the next world war. Yet to conceive of this revolution as simply one of developing the techniques of carrier aviation is to understate its true significance. Not content with the Mahanian goal of securing "command of the sea", the architects of this revolution sought to project naval power well beyond the confines of the sea itself. Naval air pioneers aimed to eradicate the boundary between

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war on land and war at sea, between the traditional role of armies on the one hand and of navies on the other. Thus, for example, having broken the back of the Imperial Navy, American naval officers at the end of the Second World War were quick to claim a share in the climactic air campaigns that pummeled the Japanese home islands and the Japanese government into submission—a mission to which U.S. Navy carrier task forces would return in subsequent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.

Yet technological opportunity alone does not suffice to explain the resourcefulness that the United States demonstrated in seizing upon the potential of naval air power. This was a military revolution that had economic, cultural, intellectual, and even psychological roots. In the decades leading up to the Second World War, American society as a whole had evolved a deep-seated predisposition favoring the reliance upon air power.[5] Moreover, the remarkable American capacity for large-scale research and production, for the diffusion of technology on a grand scale, and for what would later be called systems integration all made the United States ideally suited to transform the airplane from new-fangled contraption to pre-eminent instrument for waging war.

The moral implications of this expanded application of naval power were large. Even if not explicitly intended to terrorize civilians, carrier-based attacks against the enemy's "vital centers" inflicted some—at times extensive—injury to civilians and damage to non-military facilities. Whatever the intentions of planners or air crews, such collateral damage was an all but inevitable byproduct of the large-scale use of air power from the 1940s through the 1960s. Perhaps the efforts to exploit the potential of carrier aviation to the fullest did not foster a deliberate disregard for the claims of *jus in bello*. At a minimum, however, they encouraged an insensitivity or indifference to the moral issues implicit in the freewheeling use of the air weapon. One result was the mutilation of the principle of non-combatant immunity to the point that it became nearly unrecognizable.

Yet for all the glamor of carrier operations, the ultimate expression of the naval air revolution—and the initiative posing the largest challenge to the just-war tradition—lay not in manned aircraft but in nuclear-tipped guided missiles. By the late 1950s, U.S. development of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carried the revolution in naval air to its Cold War-driven conclusion: holding Russian cities hostage to guarantee that the United States retained a retaliatory capability that the Soviet Union was powerless to disarm. Beginning with Polaris—and followed later by Poseidon and Trident—the SLBM transformed the meaning of capital ship. The Polaris submarine was the first major naval combatant whose weapons were designed exclusively to attack land targets rather than ships.[6] More importantly, it was an instrument of war explicitly intended to obliterate non-combatants on a massive scale—to go the U-boat one better and bring a nation to its knees virtually in an instant. In the logic of deterrence, the SLBM's indiscriminate destructive power was its primary military virtue. In the context of the just-war tradition, that virtue was a moral nightmare.

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[5]Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Although Sherry focuses chiefly on the development of the long-range bomber, his argument is equally applicable to the evolution of naval air power.

[6]Although the U.S. Navy had developed earlier vessels for the purpose of attacking shore targets—for example, the shallow-draft, rocket-launching craft designed to support amphibious landings in the Second World War—these were categorized as auxiliaries rather than major combatants.

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Caveat Raptor

CONSIDERED IN retrospect, what do these three interlocking naval revolutions suggest concerning the ethical implications of today's ongoing transformation in military affairs? Above all, the naval experience of the century now drawing to a close alerts us to the prospect that the century to come will experience not one military revolution but several. Just as with naval warfare in this century, the product of multiple revolutions will not be moral clarity. It will be deepening moral complexity.

Like Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States at the end of the twentieth is a dominant rule-setting world power with a strong interest in perpetuating that dominance. The existing order—the distribution of wealth and influence, the basic norms governing the conduct of world politics—suits us well and we are committed to its preservation. Like the British a century ago, as an integral part of our strategy to maintain that order, we have invested heavily to create a defense establishment that assures our success in a certain kind of war. Indeed, in our efforts to acquire a decisive military edge, we have spared virtually no expense.[7] Having done so, many Americans—including most serving officers—are loath to entertain any suggestion that the model of warfare forming the conceptual basis of those investments might be of limited utility.

Like Great Britain in 1906, eager to define the naval revolution as beginning and ending with *Dreadnought*, the United States today is thus highly susceptible to self-deception. With a compelling interest in suppressing developments that might undermine the global status quo, Americans are predisposed to define military revolution in terms best suited to sustaining the paradigm of warfare with which we are most comfortable and within which the American lead appears to be least assailable. Indeed, as was the case with *Dreadnought*, the very purpose of a Military *Technical* Revolution is to fend off more radical change likely to subvert the existing order. The Royal Navy conceived of *Dreadnought* with an eye toward ensuring that Britain's next naval war would be fought like Trafalgar—and with an identical outcome. Similarly, for many Americans today, the allure of a military revolution is that it will guarantee that future conflicts are fought like Desert Storm: brief, decisive, successful, and, in terms of American lives lost, relatively cheap.

To be sure, such a narrowly conceived revolution is especially conducive to the application of traditional just-war criteria. Indeed, if the transformation presently underway is merely technical—a change in the means of waging war but not of war's nature—then it may revitalize conventions that have provided the traditional basis for regulating conflict: that wars are properly fought between opposing armies rather than by insurgents, irregulars, or terrorists; that the nation-state retains a monopoly over the means of violence and that the use of force remains illegitimate except when directed by responsible political authority; and that the principle of non-combatant immunity is sacrosanct rather than being waiverable at the convenience of belligerents. Surely, a defense establishment that has mastered the capabilities to which the American military presently aspires—the ability to "see" everything throughout the battlefield, to target with precision, to strike with unprecedented accuracy, great lethality, and minimal collateral damage—is especially well-positioned to adhere to just-war principles such as proportionality and discrimination.

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[7] In 1994, after having had time to adjust to the end of the Cold War, U.S. military expenditures exceeded those of Russia, China, Japan, France, and Great Britain combined. See *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1995* (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996).

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Thus, bringing to maturity the style of warfare presaged by Desert Storm holds the promise of permitting the United States both to sustain its status as reigning superpower and to congratulate itself on wielding its power in a manner consistent with traditional moral teachings. Yet enhanced technological capability may well generate its own headaches. As precision increases, so do expectations, constantly "raising the bar" of acceptable performance. As a result, tolerance for inaccuracy or even human error diminishes. Soldiers in the field may find themselves hard-pressed to satisfy demands for virtually no-fault performance—especially in a media-saturated theater of operations. In such circumstances, the act that in former days was dismissed as "fortunes of war" becomes "immoral." Consider, for example, the brouhaha following the U.S. destruction of the al-Firdos bunker in Baghdad during the Gulf War. Consider in particular the sensitivity of the U.S. military to the criticism it received as a result of the incident: Embarrassed by this ugly exception to what they had portrayed as a virtuoso performance, U.S. commanders of their own volition restricted further attacks on downtown Baghdad.

YET HOWEVER MUCH the United States might seek to define the military revolution in terms to suit itself, future adversaries are unlikely to cooperate.[8] Like the German navy of the First World War—stymied by British superiority in dreadnoughts—those disadvantaged by the existing rules will devise new rules more amenable to their interests. Thus, while Americans dazzle themselves with the latest military application of advanced technologies, America's challengers will seek ways of rendering that technology superfluous. Toward that end, they will have a powerful incentive to undertake a genuine Revolution in *Military* Affairs, recasting the terms of conflict in ways that play to their strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. Alas, as the Vietnam War would suggest, those vulnerabilities are all too apparent.

This prospect of a true Revolution in Military Affairs, driven by those who would challenge U.S. primacy, is not without its moral complications. By jettisoning the established conventions governing armed conflict, such a revolution is likely to move into murky terrain: people's war, subversion, terror, and banditry. In truth, the past is rich with examples that testify to the efficacy of such methods. The brief military history of the post-Cold War era, featuring the likes of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the masked commandantes of Chiapas, and the suicide bombers of HAMAS and the Irish Republican Army, suggests that the continuing relevance of those examples has not been lost on those who reject America's view of how the world should work. Unhampered by the squeamishness or scruples of our own post-Clausewitzian elites, these neo-Clausewitzians are eager to revive old ways of employing force to subvert the status quo, adopting selected new technologies that make it possible for ever smaller groups of perpetrators to inflict ever more mayhem. In the future, such unconventional methods could become more effective still if combined with means drawn from the opposite end of the "spectrum" of warfare: weapons of mass destruction such as portable nuclear devices or highly virulent bacterial agents.

For those who would adhere to the just-war tradition, unconventional warfare—and the countermeasures it invites—has always posed enormous difficulties. Inevitably in such conflicts the distinction between combatants and noncombatants becomes blurred. Force is employed not to achieve standard military

[8]This analysis does not consider adversaries who are either very stupid or who betray a penchant for astonishing miscalculation—those willing to challenge the United States to fight a high-tech, conventional war. As Saddam Hussein reminds us, such adversaries exist. But a bumbling opponent is not an advantage that the United States can count on in all cases.

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objectives such as the destruction of the enemy's army or the capture of key terrain but to intimidate political authorities, capture media attention, or foster an environment of insecurity. As a result, considerations such as discrimination and proportionality quickly go by the board. Often, this is the case not only with those who instigate war using unconventional methods but among the forces defending against such methods.[9]

Unfortunately, when Americans employ the language of morality to disparage unconventional war, their critique does not come across as entirely disinterested. Indeed, it can readily be perceived as self-serving—much as did British criticism of the U-boat campaign while Britain was engaged in a more traditional (and therefore permissible) blockade of German ports. To the world beyond our borders, it may appear that Americans are asserting a double standard, denouncing as reprehensible the bomb placed in a parking garage (to which the United States may be particularly vulnerable), while deeming the disabling of an urban electrical grid by remote missile attack (which the United States is uniquely equipped to launch) to be altogether acceptable. In an era of great upheaval in military affairs, U.S. efforts to assert such moral distinctions are unlikely to be persuasive. Indeed, nothing is more likely to discredit just-war teachings in the eyes of others than the perception that its principles are being employed not to ameliorate the effects of war itself, but as a prop for American hegemony and a salve for the American conscience.

The Fundamental Transformation

OF COURSE, all of this presumes that the military revolution can be "captured", that either the United States or some other state or group of states can determine its shape or direction. It also implicitly assumes that the overall political and social context in which conflict occurs will remain static.

Such assumptions are probably mistaken. To postulate that the military revolution will manifest itself either in terms of the Desert Storm paradigm or as "dirty wars" that arise in reaction to U.S. superiority in high-tech conventional warfare is to disregard evidence of an even more fundamental transformation afoot—much as the attention claimed first by *Dreadnought* and then by the U-boat impeded recognition of the air revolution that would subsume them both. That more fundamental transformation—an incipient Revolution in *Security* Affairs—could well emerge as a result of developments in several quarters: political, economic, and social. Although not strictly military in its origins or content, it would impinge broadly on the conduct of national security affairs.

To hazard a description of this broad-based Revolution in Security Affairs is inevitably to engage in considerable speculation. There are no "cases" to use for illustrative purposes. Nonetheless, certain political, economic, and social trends already in evidence suggest a rough outline.

Political developments pointing toward radical change in security affairs include the following:

- increasing constraints on sovereignty and on the freedom of action enjoyed by the individual nation-state;
- the eclipse of nationalism (crucial as the basis for rallying popular support for war in modern societies) by ethnic, religious, or regional loyalties; among intellectuals, a growing penchant for national self-flagellation, manifested in American intellectual circles as multiculturalism;

[9]The large number of Somali civilian casualties that were a byproduct of U.S. efforts to capture Aidid—an aspect of the story that has gone largely unremarked—suggests that the advent of the latest military technology has not reversed the phenomenon whereby forces designed for conventional war become themselves compromised when obliged to fight unconventionally. Unconventional forces possess a high potential for thrusting conventional forces into morally compromising circumstances.

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- the shift of the world's geopolitical center of gravity from the north Atlantic region to Asia, combined with the extinguishing of the imperial afterglow that has permitted several Western countries to exert influence beyond their means.[10]

Economic developments likely to shape an emerging Revolution in Security Affairs include:

- fierce and relentless economic competition combined with accelerating interdependence, rendering national self-sufficiency an impossibility;
- growing reliance on hugely expensive and fragile network-based infrastructures in advanced societies;
- increasing resentment throughout the underdeveloped world, generating threats of massive and politically explosive migration should demands for the redress of an unequal order continue to go ignored.

Finally, *social and cultural* trends likely to influence the Revolution in Security Affairs would include the following:

- media penetration of all aspects of public affairs, discrediting traditional elites as self-serving and corrupt and stimulating the spread of populism;
- growing sensitivity to the so-called "global agenda", particularly to the imperative of policies protective of the environment and responsive to the demands of women;
- extreme reluctance on the part of low-birthrate nations (notably the United States) to suffer casualties in pursuit of political objectives that are less than existential.

To cite these prospective trends is not to endorse them. To the extent that the foregoing smacks of a prescription for a Global Village directed by debellicized administrators who work for the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, worry excessively about the depletion of the ozone layer, and are burdened with guilt over the sins of Western imperialism, it contains elements that many will find objectionable. Having said that, some such combination of macro-trends falls well within the realm of plausibility. More to the point, in the aggregate such developments would have profound implications for the nature and conduct of warfare.

A Revolution in Security Affairs characterized by the foregoing attitudes and assumptions would in all likelihood see the rise of an altogether new form of conflict: what for want of a better term we might call "virtual war." Such conflicts would be undeclared, continuous, and conducted not by specially empowered and culturally distinctive "warriors" but by computer-wielding technicians. In virtual war, hitherto familiar terms such as "military objectives" or "military targets" would lose much of their meaning. "Battle" as such—the violent collision of opposing military forces—would become counterproductive. Instead, conflict would be all but indistinguishable from and interchangeable with economic competition. The aim of parties undertaking virtual war (not necessarily states but contingent coalitions bound by a momentary convergence of interests rather than common ideology or values) would not be to achieve decisive victory but to secure marginal advantage at minimal cost and minimal risk to the global structure. Rather than massive physical destruction, the preferred means of achieving the purposes of a "campaign" would be the precise disabling stroke—or the threat of such a stroke—that would disrupt high-value networks critical to the smooth functioning of society.

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[10]Although overstated, Samuel P. Huntington's comment that "Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain, and France" ["Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), p. 39] contains a core of truth. But that arrangement is supported less by any substantive claims to power by the latter two nations than by (fading) memories of the days of empire. And it is not sustainable.

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Dangerous Delusions

HOW WOULD the moral criteria embodied in the just-war tradition apply to an era of virtual war? Such conflicts would pose daunting new questions with regard to the application of concepts such as discrimination and proportionality. When conflict no longer pits soldier against soldier, what is the basis for distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants? If force is employed in precisely measured electronic dollops, directed, for example, at briefly disrupting an adversary's financial system—incremental pain for incremental gain—how is it possible to assess whether a proposed action satisfies the criteria of proportionality?

The point of sketching out the prospective implications of such a Revolution in Security Affairs is not to forecast that all future wars will be virtual wars. The world will not see the outright eradication of more traditional forms of combat any time soon, not least because many human societies are decades away from achieving the capability for "virtual" anything. Rather, the point is to suggest that as with naval warfare in the first decades of this century, the dawning of the new millennium is likely to feature not one single military revolution but several, each overlapping with, feeding on, and competing against the others. That is the tangled reality awaiting us.

For Americans to entertain expectations to the contrary—to imagine that the world's only superpower can dictate the legitimacy of one preferred model of military practice while obviating others—is folly. Such expectations are an invitation to smugness and overconfidence; they comprise a recipe for disaster.

Beyond that, such hubris also conceals a profoundly dangerous moral snare: the delusion that technique alone has enabled the United States to liberate itself from the tragic and often horrifying legacy of warfare in this century. That delusion in turn gives rise to a second to which Americans are peculiarly susceptible: that they are uniquely endowed with an obligation and authority to impart their moral values and cultural preferences to the world at large. Many observers of the American scene have noted of late that military prowess alone—no matter how prodigious—cannot compensate for the lack of a coherent strategy. For a people who hunger for rectitude even as they aspire, however furtively, to something like global mastery, neither does military prowess offer a short cut to a clear conscience. That is one fact that no revolution, however radical, can alter. Yet it is a fact that Americans today—gripped by their visions of perpetual military supremacy—seem all too inclined to overlook. □

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Let Iraq Collapse

Daniel Byman

FEBRUARY 28, 1996 marked the fifth anniversary of the U.S.-led coalition's defeat of Iraq, a military triumph that resulted in the liberation of Kuwait and the extension of U.S. power and influence in the Persian Gulf. The following month, however, marked a different anniversary, one less gratifying to American self-esteem. For it was in March 1991 that Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed rebellions by Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a while the American president and other Western leaders passively looked on, out of respect for Iraq's territorial integrity.

The U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq was mistaken then and remains ill-considered now. Opponents of Iraq's dismemberment argue that an intact Iraq is necessary to balance Iran, that a separate Kurdish state would destabilize Iraq's neighbors, and that a new Shi'a entity would tilt toward Tehran. In reality, however, an Iraqi break-up would pose little threat to U.S. allies, including Turkey with its large Kurdish population. Iran's ideological appeal to Iraqi Shi'a is limited at best, and any tilt in the regional balance of conventional forces in favor of Iran could be easily countered by U.S. power. On the positive side of the ledger, the division of Iraq into three entities would eliminate the Iraqi threat to the oil-rich Gulf states, end the Ba'athi quest for nuclear weapons, free the Shi'a and Kurds from oppression, and remove Baghdad from the list of revisionist rogue states. Hence, if the central government in Iraq collapses, the United States should support the division of Iraq into separate Kurdish, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslim entities, rather than try to restore overall authority to a new regime in Baghdad.

This essay argues for just such a shift in policy by first laying out why Iraq has the potential to fragment, and then by describing in more detail why many U.S. policymakers oppose the dismemberment of Iraq. It proceeds to show both why their fears are misplaced and why their sense of opportunity is blunted. The essay concludes by proposing steps the United States could take to capitalize on an Iraqi collapse to bring some semblance of security to the area and some solace to its long-traumatized people.

Daniel Byman is a MacArthur Transnational Security Issues fellow and doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The Fragile Iraqi State

ALTHOUGH FAR FROM certain, the chances that Iraq will collapse are high. The Iraqi state is inherently fragile, having never been able to build up widespread popular legitimacy among its heterogeneous population. Since its creation following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq has wrestled unsuccessfully with the question of how to incorporate the interests of its Shi'a and Kurdish populations

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into a Sunni-dominated political system.[1] Between the formation of the British mandate in 1922 and the 1968 Ba'athi coup, roughly forty local or national uprisings occurred. The main reason is that almost every Sunni-dominated Iraqi regime promulgated a version of Arab nationalism that served as an excuse for preserving the unbalanced communal status quo, and that scorned Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish peoples.[2]

Since the Ba'ath Party came to power in 1968 several cosmetic solutions for the country's divisions have been proposed, but none has worked for long. The Ba'athi regime has faced near constant Kurdish unrest in the north and agitation by Shi'a Islamic leaders in the south. Both have been exacerbated by the pan-Arab ideology of the Ba'ath, which both Kurds and Shi'a consider an alien doctrine. But Ba'ath or no Ba'ath, the pattern of Iraqi domestic politics is plain and consistent: from 1922 until now, each cycle of Shi'a and Kurdish revolt and Sunni repression has been bloodier than the one before.

After Desert Storm, the Ba'athi regime was in utter turmoil, with much of its armed forces shattered and both the Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the south in open revolt. The regime barely survived, abetted by both American actions and inaction. The United States did not recognize (or overlooked) the fact that much of the elite Republican Guard was still intact and loyal to Saddam Hussein. This, combined with an unwillingness to allow rebel Shi'a and Kurds to use arms that coalition forces had captured (while letting the Republican Guard use helicopter gunships to suppress them), helped Hussein cling to power. Superior firepower won the day; later, thousands of Kurdish and Shi'a fighters who survived the regime's onslaught were systematically rounded up and murdered, sometimes along with their entire families.

Although Saddam Hussein has remained in power these last five years, his regime is cracking under the pressures of the U.S.-led sanctions system established after the war. Saddam's legitimacy has virtually vanished as his extended clan-based power and patronage structures have grown increasingly narrow. As is well known, in August 1995 two of Hussein's sons-in-law and members of his inner circle—Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel and Colonel Saddam Kamel, who headed Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and special forces respectively—defected to Jordan, called for Hussein's overthrow, and revealed to Western governments considerable information on Iraq's politics and arms programs. They returned to Iraq in February 1996 and were promptly murdered. In March 1996, former chief of staff General Nizar al-Khazraji joined the ranks of defectors; he now lives in Jordan. Less well known is that earlier in 1995 members of key tribes—particularly the Dulaymi—rebelled against Hussein's regime and were brutally put down. Such defections have led Saddam to rely increasingly on the power base of his own sons, Uday and Qusay, and not merely on the threat but the actual use of brute force to survive. This, in turn, narrows even further what remains of the regime's popular base.

In addition to Saddam's troubles among the Sunnis and his own extended family, the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq has achieved de facto autonomy, protected by allied airpower through Operation Provide Comfort and the tenacity of Kurdish fighters. In the south, the Shi'a revolt has been

[1]Roughly 60 to 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shi'a and 15 to 20 percent is Kurdish. The Shi'a are Arab but profess a heterodox version of Islam; the Kurds are mostly Sunni in religion but they are not Arabs. Their language family, consisting of two main divisions, is an Indo-European rather than a Semitic tongue.

[2]Of the fifty-seven men who held cabinet posts between 1920 and 1936, for example, at most four were Shi'a or Kurds. See Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 68.

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crushed, but the regime rules there by sheer terror alone. Sanctions, despite the recent U.S. decision to ease them slightly, are also leading to widespread popular anger even in the central, Sunni-dominated areas of the country.

Although a post-Saddam, or even post-Ba'athi, regime might restore some semblance of normal rule, "normal" in the Iraqi case still means authoritarian repression based ultimately on the omnipresent threat of brute force. The history of this cobbled-together and sorry entity makes manifest the truth that its basic problem cannot be solved merely by a change in regime in Baghdad. Moreover, the legacy of Ba'athi repression for the better part of the last three decades will make it even harder for a successor regime to incorporate Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds into a unitary and relatively harmonious state. Iraq's historical trajectory is unmistakably aimed toward disintegration.

U.S. Policy: Conservatism at its Worst

IT HAS BEEN said that conservatism at its worst is the habitual resistance to all change, even when the change at issue would benefit those resisting it. If so, then U.S. policy toward Iraq is a perfect example of such conservatism.

The United States remains committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq despite the weakness inherent in the Iraqi state and the various depredations, internal and external, caused by that weakness. After Desert Storm devastated the Iraqi armed forces, the Bush administration sought indirectly to replace Saddam Hussein with another Iraqi strongman committed to holding the country together. U.S. officials preferred a unitary Iraq in order to balance Iran. Washington therefore wanted the Kurdish and Shi'a revolts to succeed to the extent that they would cause Saddam's downfall, but not to the extent that they would lead to national dismemberment. Such fine tuning proved beyond American officials, and, tilting excessively to the side of caution, they succeeded only in undermining the power of the revolts which were to topple Saddam Hussein.

Shortly after taking office, key Clinton administration principals made clear that they endorsed the Bush administration's basic policy approach, a policy supported to this day by an impressive bipartisan consensus. But that alone does not make it right. Because of its commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, the U.S. government is currently caught between two very unpleasant alternatives. On the one hand, the continuation of Saddam Hussein's rule guarantees poor U.S.-Iraqi relations and involves an unpredictable but hardly insignificant degree of danger to every U.S. ally in the region. Hussein has not moderated his attitudes since Desert Storm, and his behavior demonstrates in many ways his eagerness to defy the West and pursue Iraqi hegemony in the region. On the other hand, Hussein's overthrow portends a collapse of order in Iraq, leading to a fragmentation into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'a components—something Washington vigorously opposes. This leaves a policy based on the familiar wishful thinking of a "third way": a unified post-Saddam Iraq under a moderate reformist leader who would bring internal harmony and a responsible regional foreign policy to Baghdad. Such a moderate successor would not only keep Iraq together but, ideally, would support the growing U.S. military presence in the region—or at least not oppose or effectively complain about it.

But this hope for a "third way" is merely that: a hope. The most likely successor to Saddam would emerge either from the Ba'ath Party itself or from the highly-politicized army, neither of which is known for its moderation, respect for human rights, or friendliness toward the West. Moreover, there is history's hangover with which to reckon. Following decades of Sunni sprees of violence and repression, any successor to Saddam would have to deal with seething sectarian and ethnic rage. Iraq's Kurds, in particular, have been victims of some of the most infamous massacres of the century and, as a result, any Kurdish leader who relied on Baghdad would be scorned—if not also butchered—by his own people. Similarly, the Shi'a—whose 1991 revolt was

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crushed by tanks bearing the slogan "No more Shi'a after today"—would hardly be prepared to trust any Ba'athi or post-Ba'athi military successor to Saddam. Thus, even if by some miracle a kinder, gentler successor did emerge, he would face a legacy of blood and suspicion that would make any form of genuine power-sharing untenable.

The only two realistic alternatives in Iraq are disintegration or repression. Force alone can hold the victims and perpetrators of mass killings together in the same state, sharing opposite valences of the same gruesome fate. The unpleasant truth is that U.S. support for Iraqi integrity amounts to a de facto endorsement of continued repression and more than episodic state-sponsored domestic violence.

Four Fears

THE UNITED STATES opposes the break-up of Iraq on account of four basic fears: First, there is the fear of tilting the broad regional balance of power toward Iran; second, fear that the solidification of Kurdish sovereignty in northern Iraq would undermine Turkish sovereignty, security, and pro-Western orientation; third, fear that the creation of an Iranian proxy state on the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders would specifically jeopardize the security of those states as well as that of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates; and fourth and more generally, fear of the regional consequences of questioning the legitimacy of internationally-recognized borders.

These concerns are not whimsical and should not be blithely dismissed. But they are all either exaggerated or simply wrong. Further, while certainly there are risks in the disintegration of the Iraqi state, there are also costs to its continuation and potential benefits in its collapse. Sound analysis must weigh all factors; the analysis underpinning current U.S. policy does not. Let us now consider each of the four fears in turn, starting with the matter of the balance of power.

Between the British withdrawal "east of Suez" in 1971 and the adoption of "dual containment" in 1993, the United States sought to foster a balance of power in the Persian Gulf—attempts that have met with limited success at best. In this twenty-two year period the Gulf experienced two Iraqi-instigated war crises lasting a total of nine years, and a revolutionary upheaval in Iran spread out over another two and half years. In other words, for over half the period, the Gulf was either at war, in turmoil, or just entering or emerging from one or the other.

Nor has the U.S. diplomatic minuet in such matters been particularly graceful. In 1971, the Nixon Doctrine tapped the Shah's Iran as a pillar of regional stability in order to foster a pro-Western climate in the region and to balance radical, pro-Soviet Iraq. But the American embrace was suffocating, preventing the Shah from claiming title to the nationalist credentials he might otherwise have earned from steering OPEC toward its most lucrative era after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. That lucre, in turn, and with no little irony, contributed much to the decay of Pahlavi Iran and the onset of its terminal crisis.

After the Iranian Revolution, the United States moved to support Baghdad against the sudden greater evil of Islamic Iran. That support, however, may have contributed to Iraq's decision to invade Iran in September 1980.

The Reagan administration inherited the accumulated mess. The desultory interlude of the Iran-Contra debacle notwithstanding, U.S. antipathy toward the Iranian mullahs led it generally to help Baghdad even after the military balance had shifted in favor of Iraq and, indeed, well after the Iran-Iraq War was brought to an end in June 1988. This, in turn, may have contributed to Iraq's mistaken belief that it could invade Kuwait with impunity, which it did in August 1990—on the Bush administration's watch.

It would be claiming too much to say that U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf since 1971, with its maladroit manifestations of bobbing and weaving, has been responsible for everything that has gone wrong. But it is certainly reasonable to conclude that U.S. attempts to foster a

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stabilizing balance of power fell considerably short of stellar success. One is justified, therefore, in becoming nervous when listening today to the veterans of U.S. policy of the past twenty years holding forth complacently on the wisdom of a unitary Iraq, all for the sake of the regional balance of power.

Today, both Iran and Iraq are eager to rebuild their militaries, and so we are back to calculations of local balances. If Iraq were weaker (and a fragmented Iraq would be), the argument goes, Iran would have free play in the region and would be able to manipulate the price of oil or use military means to advance its interests. Although there is nothing wrong, and much right, in principle with balance of power arguments, this particular one is misguided. Its key assumption is that an intact Iraq fosters regional stability and enhances the security of the oil-rich Gulf sheikdoms. But clearly, a strong and united Iraq has promoted neither peace nor security in the region in the past. Indeed, Iraq under Saddam Hussein has invaded Iran and Kuwait, maintained a long-standing cold war with Syria, and supported warring factions in Lebanon. Baghdad also tried to lead the anti-Israel and anti-peace coalition and has aided and abetted terrorism of several shapes and sizes for use against Israel, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and possibly Saudi Arabia as well.

It is essential to grasp that this aggressive behavior is not due solely to the special depravities of the Ba'athi regime or to Saddam Hussein personally. Iraq threatened the territorial integrity of Kuwait and fought against Israel well before the Ba'ath took power. The problem is that an Iraq strong enough to balance Iran is also strong enough to dominate the rich but underpopulated Arabian peninsula, unless the United States is there to protect it. There is no way to square this circle: *It is simply impossible to have an Iraq that is strong enough to balance Iran but too weak to threaten the oil-rich Gulf states.*

Moreover, even a united Iraq can do little to prevent the greatest threat to the regional balance of power: Iran's strategic unconventional weapons programs. Indeed, if anything, the existence of a united Iraq is a goad—one of many, admittedly—to Iran's ambitions. If the United States were to allow Iraq to build its own weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, Iraq could, at least theoretically, play a role in deterring Iran, but Washington is committed to preventing this development. Moreover, an Iraqi capability of that sort would only stimulate and accelerate Iranian efforts to match it.

Beyond that, it should be obvious that a united Iraq cannot "balance" Iranian weapons of mass destruction designed for use against Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states, Israel, or other countries. Once the notion of balance is raised to the level of weapons of mass destruction, the operative concept is that of the strategic umbrella, or extended deterrence. But it is senseless to think in these terms about a hypothetical Iraqi strategic force in circumstances where Iraq is roughly as hostile to many of the potential targets of Iranian aggression as is Iran itself.

The whole notion of a need to balance Iran with a bordering state is flawed and outdated. Just as the United States offset Soviet nuclear threats to Western Europe mainly with strategic forces based at sea and in the United States, Washington could itself "balance" a nuclear Iran with forces far from the Persian Gulf. Certainly, a united Iraq is no more help against Iranian weapons of mass destruction than a divided Iraq would be.

THE SECOND argument advanced on behalf of a united Iraq is that its break-up would alarm leaders in neighboring states with large Kurdish populations. Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have such populations.[3] Leaders in these three countries regularly meet to discuss ways to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish entity in the region.

Iran and Syria strongly oppose the cre-

[3]Seventeen percent of Turkey's population is Kurdish, 9 percent of Iran's is Kurdish, and 8.5 percent of Syria's is Kurdish.

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ation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) has bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has prompted Iranian pressure on Iraq and attacks by pro-Iranian proxies. After the Second World War, Iraqi Kurds worked with Iranian Kurds against the central government of Iran. Damascus does not face a Kurdish insurgency, but Hafez al-Assad is not the sort of man to risk one. Acknowledging all of this, if Syria and Iran are discomfited by the idea of a Kurdish state, it does not follow that Washington should sympathize with their distress or feel obliged to take steps to alleviate it. Syria is hardly a Western ally. Tehran has delighted in fostering instability throughout the Middle East and beyond; the possibility of its tasting some of its own poisons might even frighten it into more responsible behavior.

Clearly, from the American point of view, the real problem with Kurdish irredentism does not involve Iran or Syria but Turkey, a key American ally. And there is no gainsaying that the Kurds pose a problem for Turkey. Many Turkish Kurds have refused to be assimilated, while Ankara has only recently and hesitatingly recognized their distinct status. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), long a thorn in Ankara's side, has often operated out of Iraq (even though its leader, Abdallah Öcalan, resides in Damascus). As recently as July 1995, Turkey invaded northern Iraq to weaken the PKK's position there.

Turkey's position with regard to Iraq's own Kurds is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it has hoped to use Iraqi Kurdish groups to undermine the PKK—and with some success. On the other hand, it fears that a strong Kurdish entity in Iraq would rally Turkish Kurds against Ankara.[4] Such fears are not frivolous; Turkish anxiety regarding a Kurdish state deserves careful consideration. Turkey has long been a staunch ally of the West, and it serves as a bridge between the Muslim and Western worlds. It is also an important model of successful political reform and economic development in the Muslim world. Moreover, Turkish goodwill is essential for the prosperity of any successor states in Iraq.

Yet Turkish concern over possible major Iraqi Kurdish support for the PKK ignores the best weapon Ankara has against foreign-backed insurgency: host government accountability. Currently, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey can all use Kurdish organizations to undermine one another. Attempts to retaliate, such as Iran's and Turkey's incursions into Iraq to punish the KDPI and PKK respectively, have limited impact since Baghdad does not care whether the Kurds suffer or not, while the Kurds remain committed to their cause. A permanent, internationally recognized Kurdish government in northern Iraq, on the other hand, would have a strong incentive to discourage aggression or subversion from its territory since it would be an obvious—and vulnerable—target of retaliation.

Furthermore, Turkey could seize on the Kurdish issue to extend its influence on the region. Turkey has the largest Kurdish population of all the Middle East states, and Turkish Kurds are the most culturally modern and economically developed. Thus, the Turkish government could gain great influence within the Kurdish populations of its neighbors through its own Kurdish population. Admittedly, such a shift in Turkish policy would take time, and it may never come about. But the reality of a Kurdish state as a neighbor may lead Ankara to reconsider its position—and it would be wise to do so.

WE NOW COME to the third of our four fears: that a Shi'a state in southern Iraq would alarm the Gulf states with substantial Shi'a populations, and also work as a kind of force multiplier for Iranian pressure against Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is indeed anxious about the possibility of a Shi'a state emerging from southern Iraq, in part due to the fact that its Shi'a

[4]The logic is laid out in detail in Ofra Bengio, "The Challenge to the Territorial Integrity of Iraq", *Survival* (Summer 1995), p. 83.

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population, though small (about 5 percent), is concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province. In the past, Saudi Shi'a have demonstrated against the regime, and Bahrain, which has a Shi'a majority, witnessed riots and demonstrations by Shi'a against the Sunni ruling family both last year and this. Kuwait, which is 30 percent Shi'a, is also wary of a Shi'a state on its northern border.

But the true Shi'a threat to the Arab Gulf is internal to these countries, not external. All the Gulf states exclude the Shi'a from decision-making and are often openly disdainful of their religious culture. The Saudi regime's Wahhabi version of Islam is deeply hostile toward Shi'ism, which it considers idolatrous. The sources of discontent in Bahrain are regime corruption and systematic neglect of Shi'a grievances.[5] And, more to the point, even Iran at the height of its revolutionary fervor was not able to organize these Arab Shi'a communities and use them for its own purposes. During the Iran-Iraq War some Iranian revolutionaries believed that faith would trump ethnicity, and expected the Shi'a to rise against the Sunni Arabs in Baghdad. They did not do so. There is little reason to think they would follow a new Iraqi Shi'a state—even though it would be Arab and not Persian—any more willingly.



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Finally, the fourth fear: administration officials are squeamish about redrawing boundaries created after the First World War in such an artificially constructed part of the world. Secession is not recognized as a right under international law, and policymakers worry that encouraging it in one case might be a formula for generic instability in the Middle East and elsewhere. After all, it is not easy to explain why the Kurds deserve a state while other minorities in Africa, South Asia, and even Europe do not.

Although the issue of borders and sovereignty raises legitimate questions, the case for the Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a is compelling. The serious and sustained human rights violations make it so. There is no hard evidence that successful secessionist movements inspire emulation elsewhere, and elevating territorial integrity to a principle in the name of preventing unrest can have the perverse effect of perpetuating a violent state in order to prevent the widespread violence usually associated with secession. As the West's recognition of the breakaway states in the former Yugoslavia suggests, sometimes partition is the only solution to the collision of sectarian hatreds.

The Myth of Shi'a Unity

AS WE HAVE noted, many policymakers in the West fear that a Shi'a entity in southern Iraq would become Tehran's puppet. Without doubt, Tehran remains hostile to the West and intent on dominating the Persian Gulf, so it does not lack for motive to manipulate an Arab Shi'a entity on the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders. U.S. leaders worry that a Shi'a state in southern Iraq would provide Iran with greater access to the region and raise the potential for the spread of radical Islam, and this worry provides the main rationale for maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity.

On the surface, the possibility of an Iraqi Shi'a state being dominated by Tehran appears strong. Shi'a in southern Iraq and Iran are linked by many ties. Najaf and Karbala have long been religious centers for both Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a, and clerical networks extend over the border. Iraqi Shi'a opposition groups, such as the Dawa party and the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, have received support from, and a haven in, Iran.

There are four ways in which Iran might dominate a new Shi'a state: through ideological affinity; by military conquest; by subversion; or by providing a model for government. None of these is convincing.

First, ideological affinity is unlikely to lead Tehran and an Iraqi Shi'a state to work together.[6] Iran is today in ideological disarray

[5]There is disagreement on this point. Sam Zakhem, a former U.S. ambassador to Bahrain, argues that Iran is behind much of the unrest in Bahrain ("Bahrain: Identify the Enemy", *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 1995). But the demonstrations appear to be about issues such as employment, corruption, and representation (Peter Waldman, "Restive Sheikdom", *Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 1995). Although the majority of Bahrain's population is Shi'a, only 10 percent of it is of Iranian origin. In 1981, Iran backed a Shi'a attempt to overthrow Bahrain's ruling Al-Khalifa family.

[6]More broadly, a general lesson of the twentieth century is that certain types of ideological movements—particularly those calling for a centralized movement with a single leadership—are more likely to lead to conflict among members than integration. Just as Stalin failed to control communists in China or Yugoslavia, so Iran has failed to capture the political allegiance of foreign Shi'a. Other tales from the history of the modern Middle East also confirm this trend. The Ba'ath movement, which calls for united Arab leadership, has long been split between whether this leadership should sit in Damascus or Baghdad. Similarly, while Gamal Nasser's pan-Arabism inspired millions of Arabs, its practical impact was more quarrels and greater divisiveness among Arab leaders. Some U.S. policymakers for years feared an Arab bloc united against the West and its regional allies, but in fact a superficially common ideology divided rather than united these potential threats. See Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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and the tenets of the revolution ring hollow both at home and abroad. The strain of political Islam found in Iran, particularly the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (*velayat-e faqih*), assumes that one leader should guide Shi'a politically. This sounds like a recipe for unity, but in reality it is a source of division, for it both raises and begs the question of who is to lead. Background is instructive.

Ayatollah Khomeini's religious doctrine, which united supreme religious and political authority for the first time in modern Shi'a thought, is widely unpopular among most learned Shi'a, and it is rapidly losing support now that Khomeini is dead. Almost all the grand ayatollahs living in 1981 either openly rejected Khomeini and his doctrine or maintained a discreet distance from his ideology. Ayatollah Al-Khu'i, who was the leader of most Iraqi Shi'a, never supported Khomeini's doctrine. Khomeini horrified many religious Muslims when he affirmed that revolutionary logic and the laws of the Islamic state take precedence over *shari'a*, Islamic law. The success of this doctrine depended on the charisma of Khomeini, and without his leadership his disciples are left with an insoluble paradox: their doctrine calls for leadership by the most learned, but the most learned reject the doctrine. This paradox is sharpened by the split emerging in Iran's religious leadership over this issue.[7] Today no single grand ayatollah holds pride of place in Iran. The Iranian government has proclaimed the intellectually second-rate Ayatollah Khamenei as the leading source of emulation (*marja-e taqlid*) for Shi'a, but no major religious leader supports Khamenei's pretensions. Dismissed even in Iran, Khamenei is especially suspect among Shi'a elsewhere.

Moreover, Shi'ism in Iraq does not function as a basis for identity in the way that it does in Iran. Most of Iraq's Shi'a population descended from Arabian Sunni tribes but converted in the nineteenth century as they settled in Iraq. This recent conversion, and their location on the "frontier" of the Shi'a world, has given the Iraqi Shi'a a distinct identity and they follow a more popular version of Shi'ism. Iraqi Shi'a do not naturally look to Tehran. Even during Khomeini's charismatic leadership, Iraqi Shi'a fought against Iran, ignoring his calls to rise up during the Iran-Iraq War. Though the war was increasingly unpopular in Iraq, military defections were rare even in the Shi'a areas. Indeed, the Iran-Iraq War generated further divisions between the two communities. If given their own state, there is no reason to suppose that Iraqi Shi'a would suddenly change their minds and seek Tehran's guidance, especially given Iran's national chauvinism and sense of superiority over its less learned and less historically-distinguished Arab Shi'a co-religionists. Shi'a equality in theory is not realized in practice even in Iran itself. For example, Olivier Roy notes that it is as difficult for a Persian-speaking Shi'a from Afghanistan to marry an Iranian as it is for a Frenchman to do so.[8]

As well as all this, many of the reasons that have caused Shi'a in the Arab world to turn to political Islam would disappear if the Shi'a had their own state. The Shi'a in Iraq have embraced political Islam largely because the system has excluded them from power and shunned their communal role and identity. With their own state, Shi'a elites would have outlets for their ambitions, and the Shi'a would have a state and symbols with which they could more readily identify. A likely result of a separate Iraqi Shi'a state would be the eventual emergence of Najaf and Karbala as rival theological centers to Tehran and Qom. Saddam Hussein's efforts to keep the Shi'a passive led him to murder and repress their leadership, culminating in

[7]See Mohsen Milani, "The Transformation of the *Velayat-e Faqih* Institution: From Khomeini to Khamenei", *The Muslim World* (July-October 1992), pp. 175-190.

[8]Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 176.

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his 1980 execution of the highly respected Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. Freed from repression, Najaf and Karbala would flourish again and would serve to weaken Iran's current ideological monopoly and to "balance" Iran's ideological appeal more effectively than any military measures.

In any case, a military threat is limited as long as the United States remains committed to resisting hegemony in the Persian Gulf. On a yearly basis, Iran spends about 3 percent of what the United States spends on defense, a fact that makes America's relative meekness in dealing with Iran hard to understand. Since Desert Storm, Washington has signed access agreements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); it has also greatly expanded its prepositioning in Saudi Arabia. The Pentagon's creation of the Fifth Fleet, based in the Persian Gulf, is a clear sign of the U.S. military commitment to the region.

Iran is demonstrably nervous regarding border instability and its economic crisis has forced it to reduce defense spending and procurement. Its ground forces are poorly trained and incapable of modern combined-arms operations, and its leadership is unprofessional. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards' armored divisions employ, on average, only a few dozen tanks, and Iran's ground forces could not sustain even limited offensive action against any of its neighbors.[9] The Iranian people are bitter about the long war with Iraq and might actively oppose a renewed attempt to capture Iraqi territory.

Arguments based on Iran's alleged military might also tend to ignore the post-Desert Storm buildup of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). Although U.S. Gulf allies have a military track record that is far from stellar, in terms of tanks and air power they are roughly a match for Tehran, which hardly demonstrated strategic or tactical brilliance in its long war with Iraq during the 1980s. Furthermore, Iran would have to penetrate the Gulf states' improved air defense system, which includes E-3A AWACS and a sophisticated ground radar network.

Iran knows that American military superiority in the region limits its options. As Iran's former Defense Minister Akbar Torkan noted in an interview, "Can our air force . . . take on the Americans, or our navy take on the American navy? . . . The way to go about dealing with such a threat requires a different solution entirely."[10] Is that solution to be found in subversion? On the evidence available, not likely. Despite its rhetoric, Tehran has been cautious regarding southern Iraq. It did little to aid Iraqi Shi'a in March 1991 in their rebellion against the Iraqi state. As Shaul Bakhash notes, ". . . given the powerful emotions aroused in Iran by the killing of Shiites and the attack of Saddam's troops on Shiite shrines, what is striking is how little rather than how much Iran did."[11]

Since Khomeini died, Iran has been particularly cautious regarding border instability. In the Caucasus, for example, it has generally favored Christian Armenia over Shi'a Azerbaijan, in part because of the latter's irredentist pretensions. Iran is also playing up its Persian nature in order to expand ties to Persian-speaking Tajiks and counter pan-Turkish sentiment in Central Asia. As Roy notes, these maneuvers spell the end of ideology: Iran is acting as a regional power as in the time of the Shah.[12]

Finally, should they become independent, Iran is not likely to serve Iraqi Shi'a as a model for government given its own problems of corruption and economic stagnation. The

[9]Michael Eisenstadt, "Déjà Vu All Over Again? An Assessment of Iran's Military Buildup", in Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), pp. 93-151.

[10]As quoted in Eisenstadt, p. 103.

[11]Shaul Bakhash, "Alternative Futures for Iran: Implications for Regional Security", in Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), p. 90.

[12]Roy, p. 184.

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Iranian economy is in shambles, with inflation and unemployment at high levels. Riots have swept many large Iranian cities, including Tehran, in the past few years.[13] For material reasons alone, Iran's political and economic systems are unlikely to be sources of emulation.

Thus, the Iranian menace, when analyzed objectively, is not a strong reason to oppose the break-up of Iraq.

Why an Iraqi Break-up is Desirable

NOT ONLY is the disintegration of Iraq not dangerous, it is actually desirable for both strategic and humanitarian reasons. It would bring to an end a despotic Iraqi state, improve the U.S. political position in the region, curb a major threat to the oil-rich Gulf states and to Israel, provide the Kurds with their own state, and weaken a hostile regime in Iran.

It is hard to find a regime more inimical to the United States than Iraq today (unless it is its Iranian neighbor). Ba'athi Iraq has long been a source of radicalism and turmoil in the Middle East, and it remains implacably opposed to the U.S. presence in the region. A Kurdish successor state, however, would rely on the United States for survival. Despite numerous Western betrayals of the Kurdish cause, the Kurds remain surprisingly friendly toward the United States. The attitudes of the successor Sunni and Shi'a states is less certain, but it would be difficult for them to be more opposed to the United States than is the current regime.

A divided Iraq would be less of a threat to the Gulf states and to Israel. The successor states' population would be similar to or smaller than that of Saudi Arabia, allowing the Kingdom to counter any aggression on its own more easily. The new regimes also would be eager for aid to restart their economies, giving them an incentive to seek the support of the wealthy Gulf states. Moreover, the new states would have more important security concerns—one another—and would not readily set out to acquire new enemies. Israel would also benefit for similar reasons. Moreover, Israel and the Kurds would be natural allies if a radical Arab nationalist state emerged in the region. Indeed, Kurdish leaders began establishing contacts with Israel in the 1960s.

A Kurdish state could be an effective lever for moving Iran toward responsible behavior. Iranian Kurds have repeatedly resisted central government authority, and a Kurdish rebellion against the clerical regime was not finally quelled until 1983. In the past, Baghdad has supported Iranian Kurds in an effort to destabilize the Iranian regime. A new Kurdish state, protected by the United States from Iranian retribution, would be an ideal base from which to continue such efforts.

If the strategic case for the Iraqi break-up is compelling, the humanitarian case is overwhelming. The Iraqi people deserve relief from the brutal Ba'athi regime, which today is reduced to rule by overt terror. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds were massacred by the regime during the 1970s and 1980s, and Shi'a leaders and followers were often tortured, killed, and exiled. The fall of the Ba'athi regime would also end the nightmare of sanctions. Although sanctions are ratcheting up popular pressure against the regime, it is the Iraqi poor who suffer the most; they lack adequate food, medicine, and fuel while regime officials make fortunes on the black market.

The Kurds, the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own state, have long sought self-rule. Indeed, following the First World War, in the never-implemented Treaty of Sèvres the Western powers granted the Kurds their own state. Kurdish language and culture are distinct from that of Iraqi Arabs, and decades of brutal repression have

[13] Some food prices in Iran have soared by as much as 4,000 percent and such inflation has touched off massive unrest and riots in Tehran, Mashad, and Qazvin.

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only hardened their separate identity. Moreover, the Kurds have lately done better at democracy than all their neighbors, save Turkey; the allied-overseen elections of May 1992 led to the election of a legitimate government in Kurdistan that has wide popular support.

Iraq: The Next Yugoslavia?

WHAT WOULD BE the result if the United States supported partition in the event of an Iraqi collapse? Critics of partition warn that a divided Iraq would quickly resemble Yugoslavia as a place where the horrors of long, drawn-out ethnic and religious wars make for blood-red news footage. And it is true that the disintegration of Iraq might be attended by bloodletting. But the unhappy truth is that Iraq can already be compared with the former Yugoslavia in many ways. In the Anfal Operations in 1988, the Ba'ath resettled or deported well over one million Kurds and murdered between 150,000 and 200,000. After Desert Storm, over 1.5 million Kurds fled to either Turkey or Iran. Similarly, thousands of Shi'a were killed following Desert Storm and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee.[14]

Freed from Baghdad's yoke, a Kurdish successor state would not try to recreate "greater Iraq." The Kurds were largely excluded from the Ottoman administration, military, and other elite institutions, giving them little common identity with their Arab Sunni neighbors. It would be naive to maintain that the Kurds would not fight for "mixed" areas where both Sunnis and Kurds live—indeed, they are already doing so—but they have no desire to rule areas that are unquestionably Arab in demography. Drawing new boundaries based on existing population distributions, and backed up initially by the U.S. Air Force, certainly holds out more promise than does the status quo, which will lead almost inevitably to more violence and insecurity—but without really solving anything. American support should be conditional on a Kurdish agreement to renounce irredentist ambitions and abjure attempts to change local borders by force.

The Shi'a are more likely candidates to want to dominate the former Iraq. Many Shi'a have migrated from the south to Baghdad, and the Shi'a as a numerical majority might believe that they could control the center in a fair system. Yet by being given much of southern Iraq, the Shi'a would already control a significant part of Iraq's oil reserves, and their ambitions for leadership would be limited, at least partly, by the creation of their own state, coupled with their initial military weakness vis-à-vis their neighbors. Again, promises of aid and military support could be coupled with the insistence that they too renounce irredentist claims.

A Sunni rump state might harbor aggressive intentions against its new neighbors, a concern likely to keep all three states energized for some time. At worst, however, such a Sunni state would have a government similar to the current Ba'ath one—repressive and expansionist—but less well placed to indulge its bad habits. It would rule over far fewer people, command fewer resources, and otherwise be less of a threat to both its own citizens and those of its neighbors.

Americans would be much happier if the successor states were democratic ones that respected human rights. But it should be conceded that such an outcome is unlikely since not one of these groups involved—Shi'a, Kurd, or Sunni—has a solid history of democracy on which to draw, and the leading Shi'a and Kurdish organizations that now exist are hardly boy scout troops. Yet we must distinguish between gradations of imperfection. Clearly, a popular tribal figure committed to his people and not bent on expansionism is preferable to a murderous and ambitious thug in Baghdad. Kurdish leaders such as Massoud Barzani

[14]David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1996), pp. 357-9, 373.

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and Jalal Talabani are not the moral equivalents of the U.S. Founding Fathers, yet they are moral superiors to Saddam Hussein or Ali Hasan al-Majid, the "Butcher of Kurdistan", who oversaw the systematic devastation of Kurdish areas following the Iran-Iraq War. The likely results of partition sketched out above hardly amount to perfection. But they would be a vast improvement on existing conditions, and that is the most that one can reasonably expect in human affairs—especially in the affairs of the Middle East.

In 1933, Iraq's first ruler, King Faisal I, imported from the Hejaz by the British government, said of his forlorn country:

> In Iraq . . . there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal . . . connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever.[15]

Not only was Faisal right in 1933, but his words were still a pretty good description of the situation in 1953, 1973, and 1993. If Iraq survives as a unitary state, in all likelihood nothing much will have changed for the better by 2023. Sometimes it is possible to know when a social experiment has failed. Iraq has failed—and it is time to let its long-suffering peoples get on with their lives. □

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[15]Faisal quoted by Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 28.

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The Short March

China's Road to Democracy

Henry S. Rowen

WHEN WILL CHINA become a democracy? The answer is around the year 2015. Some might think such a prediction foolhardy but it is based on developments on several fronts, ones inadequately reported in the American media. There are, indeed, unmistakable signs of important positive changes in China. These changes are undoubtedly related to China's steady and impressive economic growth, which in turn fits the pattern of the way in which freedom has grown in Asia and elsewhere in the world.

Bad But Getting Better

ACCORDING TO the latest survey of political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House, China's freedom rating is, in effect, zero.[1] At first glance it is easy to see why. The country remains a one-party state under the rule of the Communist Party; the Justice Ministry admits to having 2,700 "counter-revolutionaries" in prison (many of them actually political dissidents and labor and human rights activists); officials admit to over 2,000 summary executions in 1994; people are often detained for long periods without trial; and many people, especially peasants, are ill-treated by local authorities.

On the other hand, things have improved. China has come far since the disastrous Great Leap Forward of the 1950s, and the lunatic Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s. Higher incomes have given people more personal space, agents of the state have less control over citizens' lives, and the typical Chinese is freer to move about the country. The coercive one-child policy is being flouted in the countryside, causing authorities to adopt economic incentives in an effort to gain compliance.

The progress that has been made, and the prospect for more of the same, can be considered under three headings: the growth of grassroots democracy; the struggle toward a rule of law; and the liberalizing of the mass media.

Grassroots Democracy

REFORMS IN VILLAGE elections came out of the disasters of collectivized agriculture. Faced with starvation in the late 1970s, peasants in Anhui province disbanded local communes and

Henry S. Rowen is professor emeritus of public management at the Graduate School of Business, and senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of several colleagues, especially to Minxin Pei of Princeton University.

[1] *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1995-6* (New York: Freedom House, 1996).

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returned to family plots. Thus began a process of de-collectivization and transition to a market economy, which is now far advanced.[2]

The dissolution of the commune system left in place no institution capable of addressing infrastructure needs, schooling, or any of the other functions of local government. In Guangxi province, villagers responded by organizing committees to maintain social order, mediate disputes, and manage public utilities and welfare. The political vacuum created by de-collectivization led to the amendment of the Chinese constitution in 1982 to provide for village government. A crucial decision concerned the role of the Communist Party in the new arrangement. Was the Party to appoint village officials? Were provincial and town officials to appoint them? Instead of adopting either of these arrangements, in 1987 the central government decided that they would be chosen by elections, and these began in 1988. The political crackdown after the Tiananmen massacre immediately raised questions about the future of this institution, but it has survived.

Village government now consists of a Village Committee functioning as the executive, and a Representative Assembly as a form of legislature. By the early 1990s, 90 percent of village committees had been elected, but the process has been ragged. Elections were unfamiliar phenomena and procedures were understandably irregular. Many people did not take them seriously, as past elections had been only a formality. At first most presumed that upper levels of the government and Party would rig the outcomes, and in fact local Party cadres have continued to resist relinquishing their privileges, and non-Party members have often been subjected to various forms of discrimination. Some representative assemblies dominated by members of the old establishment still hold that Party membership is the main qualification for candidacy. Foreign observers have witnessed instances of probable ballot fraud, and it is safe to assume that in elections without such observers the incidence of fraud is higher. Although the law provides for a secret ballot, provisions for privacy in voting are inadequate.

Despite all these drawbacks, substantial progress has been made. Fujian province is perhaps the most advanced in this process, with four rounds of elections behind it. (It has the advantage of being on the coast and benefits from contact with the Taiwanese.) In 1993, the Fujian People's Congress passed an election law, the first provincial legislature to do so. Among other things it changed the basis of voting from one vote per household to one vote per person. In the 1991 elections, 49 percent of the winners were non-Party members; however, in 1995, the *Washington Post* reported that although 40 percent of the candidates who won were not members of the Communist Party, half of them joined later.

Observers of the 1994 elections in Fujian reported, not surprisingly, that Party members were worried about their diminishing control of the various village economies, and expressed these concerns through active lobbying efforts. But these were not always successful in preventing competition. It is up to local officials to decide if an election will be competitive, as distinct from voters facing a "choice" of only one candidate. When there is no competition the only recourse for those who object is abstention. If a significant

[2]Material in this section draws on the "Study on the Election of Villagers' Committees in Rural China" (December 1, 1993) and the "Report on Villagers' Representative Assemblies in China" (December 1994), both by the China Rural Villagers Self-Government Research Group, China Research Society of Basic Level Government; on the "Election Observation Report of the People's Republic of China" by the International Republican Institute (a private U.S. nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting democratic institutions), May 1995; and on *Far East Economic Review*, June 23, 1994.

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number do abstain the election is perceived as a failure, and this constitutes a form of pressure for future competition.

In Nanping City in Fujian province, more than thirty peasants from Tiantou village wrote an open letter to election organizers claiming that, "In the past few years, the work style and morality of the village officials have become intolerable and the situation is really serious." They proposed the election of one Chen Jinman and four other lesser local luminaries to the village committee. When the five nominees posted a three-year work plan at the gate of the village committee office, some officials complained that this was going too fast toward democracy. Nonetheless, the nominees' management plan was advertised, a competitive election was held, and the five were elected.

For all the defects of the electoral process, the principle of selecting village leaders by competitive election rather than appointment from above is established, as is the principle of fixed terms of office. Local government is becoming more transparent, and information on village affairs, including finances and officials' salaries, is being posted in public. More elections are being contested. "Class struggle" is no longer employed in dealing with political and social conflicts, nor are those who stand against Party members automatically denounced as "enemies of the people."

It is likely that this process will continue, with election procedures steadily becoming more comprehensive, standardized, and transparent. Growing numbers of peasants are learning about legal procedures, and may be expected to use the law to protect their rights. The Communist Party will face more competition from businessmen, clan organizations, and others expressing a variety of interests. What was begun at the grassroots has already started to influence behavior higher up in the system, too. Recently, several provincial deputy governors who were not on the official slate have been appointed, and they have been accepted by Beijing; and some prominent members of the Party, scheduled for election to the National People's Congress, have lost.

A Rule of Law

THE RULE OF LAW was never established in modern China, and under Communist rule law has been until recently a political and administrative instrument of the Party dictatorship.[3]

As late as 1980 there were only three thousand lawyers in a country of over one billion people. Since then there has been more than a twentyfold increase in the number of legal professionals, and Chinese courts now hear over three million cases a year. But this is still seen to be inadequate: In June 1992 President Jiang Zemin said that China needs 300,000 lawyers, and the current goal is to have 150,000 by the year 2000. That about equals the combined number of lawyers in Germany, France, Benelux, and Denmark—though China has nine times as many people.

This expansion comes in response to a growing demand for the rule of law. Specifically, the Chinese people are demanding that the government observe its own stat-

[3]This section is based on "China's Legal Reforms", in a special issue of *The China Quarterly* (March 1995). In particular, the contributions of Stanley Lubman, "Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law"; William Alford, "Tasseled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers"; Pittman B. Potter, "Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control"; Donald Clarke and James Feinerman, "Antagonistic Contradictions: Criminal Law and Human Rights in China"; Donald Clarke, "The Execution of Civil Judgments in China"; and Anthony R. Dicks, "Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform."

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ed rules. Values consistent with Western ideals of equality, justice, and legality—as well as with ancient Chinese ideals—are being expressed at all levels of society, and are finding their way into legislation.

Chinese officials are explicit in acknowledging that China needs a more developed legal system, because a market economy must be governed by law. Foreign firms in particular require consistency and transparency in the laws to which they must adhere, and these are often lacking. In Shanghai, a principal center of foreign business activity,

> There is no distinction between official policy and officials' references. . . . Lawyers report that when they contact the tax bureau to ask about changes in the law . . . they are advised to consult the bureau's consulting company (for a substantial fee). . . . In the absence of laws, there are rules and then clarifications. And because these often appear contradictory to confused foreign businessmen, it seems that there are no rules at all, just the arbitrary interpretation or whim of the official asked.[4]

There is good reason to question China's ability to sustain rapid growth in the absence of stable and fairly enforced rules that foreign investors find acceptable. (This applies less, however, to overseas Chinese, who have a comparative advantage in a game without formal rules, because of their contacts and skill in personal dealings.)

The growing weakness of the state also elicits demands for law and order. This is evident in the general frustration with massive corruption at all levels: illegal businesses run by government agencies, the theft of government assets, and evasion of price controls and taxes. At the same time, the weakening power of the state makes it more difficult to achieve an effective judicial system.

Among the many shortcomings of the legal system, Anthony Dicks asserts that the most fundamental is the fact that "the Communist Party is outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts", despite a 1982 constitution that says that "the political parties . . . must abide by the Constitution and the law", and that "no organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the law."

There are several other serious problems, including slack enforcement of decisions in civil proceedings. In practice, enterprises run by the military are not penalized and large and medium sized state owned enterprises are often protected by local officials, which amounts to being outside the law. Nor are courts themselves exempt from the endemic corruption; lawyers bribe judges, who often make it known to those appearing before them that they are interested in stepping down soon from the bench to enter private practice.

The criminal process is the least reformed of all, and it still serves functions established by a totalitarian regime. Pre-trial detention often exceeds the statutory three months, and arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture continue. Police can impose low-level punishments for minor offenses and may also sentence offenders to "labor re-education" of up to three years for offenses that are defined loosely and in moralistic language.

However, in Beijing, the National People's Congress is rewriting the criminal laws to state that defendants shall not be presumed guilty, that they shall have lawyers, and that the police shall no longer be able to hold them without charge. Doubtless, for some time to come these new laws will often be observed in the breach, but their passage is an indicator of the growing demand for democratic procedures.

The level of competency and professionalism of lawyers in China is low. According to Alford and Lubman, few lawyers (and even fewer members of the judiciary) have university law degrees, and many of those who do studied law for a centrally planned economy,

[4] *Far East Economic Review*, June 23, 1994, p. 55; quoted by Potter.

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much of which has been superseded. They are better suited to be state legal workers than autonomous lawyers. There is not yet a widely shared understanding of the distinction between public and private interests, or of how these are to be reconciled. Tripling the number of lawyers by the year 2000 will not by itself solve these problems.

For all these many shortcomings, notes Alford, Chinese lawyers in some instances "are now able to represent in an unprecedentedly vigorous manner clients whose interests may not be wholly synonymous with the state's." Arguably, the Supreme People's Court has begun to make law through its interpretations and decisions, a role that is contrary to communist dogma, which allows no place for an independent institution. This process seems likely to continue.

Among academics, and increasingly in the public security bureaucracy, there are calls for change—at least for rationalization, if not for liberalization. According to Lubman, "as institutions of the Party-state erode, legal rules and institutions, however incomplete and tentative by Western standards, may grow more able to exercise the functions of Western private law in the emerging sectors of the economy outside the economic plan."

Another indication of a shift from an ad hoc to a rule-based system is a recent change in China's tax system. In 1994, separate national and local taxes and tax services were established. Such a separation, it is important to note, is an essential feature of a federal system of government—fiscal federalism—as distinct from one that is merely administratively decentralized.[5] While the latter can be easily reversed, fiscal federalism is more likely to endure, becoming de facto constitutional. Within the American constitutional structure, fiscal federalism has been the source of enormous economic and political benefits. It is, of course, far too early to predict similar benefits for China from an initiative that is still in its infancy, but it is another bit of evidence for the emergence of a system based on rules.

The demands of a market economy require such rules, as well as transparency and fairness—all attributes directly at odds with a Leninist ruling party. A choice must be made and it is evident that, slowly and irregularly, the market path is being chosen.

Media Self-Liberalization

AS DESCRIBED by Minxin Pei, the liberalization of the Chinese economy after 1979 had the unintended, and to the regime unwelcome, effect of leading to the self-liberalization of the mass media.[6] This came about through the combined effects of market forces, foreign influences, and changes in technology. Together with a more active and critical Chinese intelligentsia, these factors have produced a remarkable increase in freedom of information. The process was led by book publishing and was followed by journals and newspapers. The electronic media lagged, evincing little liberalization in the 1980s, but it too is following the general trend in the 1990s. The net effect of all this has been significant. For example, a history of the Cultural Revolution was published despite government efforts to ban it; a book attacking the Chinese character (*The Ugly Chinese*) became a bestseller; stories about official corruption began appearing; and works opposing the Three Gorges Dam and favoring deeper respect for the rule of law were published.

The shift to the market was the major cause of this Chinese glasnost. The market increased the channels of production and distribution of materials because there was money to be made by entrepreneurs; at the same time, the government was losing

[5]Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast, "China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style", Hoover Institution, 1995.

[6]Minxin Pei, *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).

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money in its many state-owned publications and outlets. As it cut back on state subsidies for publication, many journals and newspapers were forced into the market. In 1984 the government permitted collective private publishing houses (in effect partnerships) to function. This soon led entrepreneurs to adopt many of the functions of the former state publishing houses: finding authors, translators, paper, and printers. In Xinhua's bookstores in 1979, the huge state media empire held 95 percent of the market; by 1988, its share had shrunk to one-third. In Beijing in 1992 there were about two thousand kiosks, and for many of them, profits came largely from the sale of illicit publications.

The newspaper business has evinced a similar trend: non-Party papers have gained market share at the expense of Party publications. According to Pei, 1,008 newspapers were founded between 1980 and 1985, only 103 of which were Party controlled.[7] As Party papers lost market share they reduced their propaganda content in order to compete. Nonetheless, hampered as they still were by censorship, circulation and advertising decreased.

Initially, the government was better able to manage the electronic and film media. This was partly because the costs of entry were much higher than for print media. But the market eventually made its power known. The government's censored materials were unpopular and falling demand led to mounting losses. Unprofitable government operations were spun off to private operators. Government stations such as Dongfang TV in Shanghai introduced live coverage of breaking stories, talk shows, call-in programs, 24-hour broadcasting, and celebrity interviews of liberal intellectuals whom the hardliners had silenced after 1989. Callers complained about the quality of government services, putting pressure on them to improve. Taken together, these developments have made censorship increasingly impractical. Hence something very basic has changed: The state is losing control of information.

The film business went through a similar evolution. Dreary and unpopular state productions resulted in revenue losses. Already in the 1980s, the government allowed foreign films and TV programs to enter China and in 1992 it ended the state monopoly on film distribution. The result: more private activity, leading to greater competition, which in turn has led to greater variety and higher quality.

The Chinese government's decision to seek foreign investment in order to acquire advanced technology and expertise reinforced these domestic changes. This meant admitting many more foreign businessmen, sponsoring more technological and business exchanges, and creating more electronic links to the rest of the world. Western newspapers found their way to major tourist hotels (and beyond) and access to CNN was approved in the mid-1980s.

Both were cut off after the Tiananmen massacre and restrictions on foreign investment in media were imposed—all to little effect on the flow of information. Working against the regime's efforts to maintain control were growing incomes combined with advances in technology. Televisions, radios, cassette players, and VCRs proliferated widely. In 1985, the government allowed local TV stations and educational and research institutions to set up their own satellite ground stations; by 1990 more than sixteen thousand had been established, creating a system too large for the authorities to monitor effectively. In the 1990s Chinese manufacturers began to make home satellite dishes. The national authorities decreed prohibition but failed to enforce it; by the early 1990s an estimated 4.5 million were operational. Broadcasts from Hong Kong greatly increased their penetration of the market in south China, to the discomfiture of the censors in Beijing. Also, by 1991 more than eighty thousand firms, institutions, and government units were equipped with fax machines, with a projected market increase of ten thousand a year through the decade.

[7]Pei, p. 161.

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The Chinese government has not pursued a consistent policy line on freedom of information. Between 1978 and 1993 there were waves of liberalization with intervening periods of repression. These oscillations have resulted from shifts among factions in Beijing, developments in the market, and in response to some unpleasant events. Even the crackdown after the Tiananmen massacre did not prevent further liberalization in late 1992, after Deng's visit to south China. The message is clear: Once a totalitarian regime ventures down the path of market reforms, it loses control of its information organs. In China this process was hastened by the gradual loss of control over many other aspects of political life.

Clearly, there is a widening zone of tolerance within which journalists and editors operate. Because those in the media have a financial stake in not being shut down, they stay clear of the (ill-defined) far edge of the zone; in short, there is a good deal of self-censorship and government monitoring. Unsurprisingly, too, a great deal of what is published freely is commercial in character—instructions on how to get rich, for example—and politically unthreatening. What Ramon Myers of the Hoover Institution calls the "ideological marketplace" of politics is still outside the zone of tolerance. Dissidents who oppose the government do not have access to the media because they are considered by editors to be too hot to handle, and they must resort to distributing leaflets and to hunger strikes. But with the exception of some journalists accused of selling state secrets to Hong Kong, there have been no criminal proceedings against journalists for several years.

There will continue to be waves of progress and regression, no doubt, but the underlying tide is raising the overall level of freedom of information. This, taken together with the strengthened rule of law and democracy at the grassroots, shows clearly that the long march away from the totalitarian character of the Communist Party is well underway.[8]

China is No Different

THESE CHANGES at the grassroots in China are similar to those that took place in Taiwan at a comparable stage of development. China's per capita GDP is now about $2,500. When Taiwan reached that level in the early 1970s, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) was firmly in charge but changing its ways, much as the Chinese Communist Party is today. Local elections had been held every three years after 1950; over time local bosses had become more responsive to the popular mood, and non-KMT individuals had become active in local politics. In 1973, Taiwan's Freedom House democracy score was 25 (on a scale of 0 to 100). Then its political liberalization began to increase significantly (as is happening in China today)—although at first no organized opposition was allowed (again, as in China). The first open, free election for parliament occurred in 1992, and in March of this year Taiwan held its first presidential election—also deemed free and fair.

The path of political liberalization in South Korea was different but the end point was similar. After the coup that brought Park Chung Hee to power in 1961, elections were held but results were determined by

[8]A Lexis/Nexis search of coverage on these topics—and of human rights abuses—in five major U.S. publications (the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*) for the period January 1991 through June 1996 shows, on the one hand, 356 stories on abuses of various kinds, and, on the other, three on local elections, sixteen on efforts to introduce a rule of law, and ten on the liberalizing of the mass media; in short, an overall ratio of twelve to one. How can one explain such scant coverage of such important developments? Aside from the propensity of the press to print bad news, one explanation is that the Tiananmen Square massacre imprinted on the minds of American editors that Beijing is unrelentingly repressive.

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the ruling party. The country's 1974 freedom rating was 33. Political change came rapidly during the mid-1980s and by 1995 its rating had jumped to 84. South Korea was becoming increasingly wealthy as these changes were taking place.

The political evolution of Taiwan and South Korea are but two examples of a wider phenomenon. The worldwide norm, first clearly established by Seymour Martin Lipset, is "the richer the country the freer" (the exception being those enriched through oil, such as Saudi Arabia and Brunei).[9] The curve marked Worldwide Freedom-Income Regression in the figure below shows the relationship between per capita income and Freedom House's 1995 ratings for all countries, indicating an average. The correlation is not perfect in East Asia or anywhere else; Singapore, for example, has a low freedom rating for its income level and the Philippines a high one. But the overall fit is good and it shows that the wealth-democracy connection is not a European artifact. This bears on the assertion by various Asian authorities and intellectuals, mostly in Singapore and Malaysia, that Asian democracy is different from its Western cousin. Perhaps it is in some ways, but the reality is that, although the East Asian income-freedom pattern shown in the figure is a bit lower than the worldwide average, this region is like others in that the wealthier a country, the more (Western-style) freedoms its people enjoy.

The prospects for Chinese liberalization thus rest, above all, on continued rapid economic progress. Since 1979, China has grown annually at over 5 percent per capita (at international prices).[10] If it continues on this trajectory—by no means a certainty—China's per capita GDP will be between $7,000 and $8,000 (in 1995 dollars) by the year 2015. This figure is very significant. Several scholars have suggested that the transition to stable democracy correlates with mean incomes between $5,000 and $6,000, and becomes impregnable at the



Sources: Freedom House, World Bank, and the author's estimates.

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$7,000 level.[11] There is a compelling logic behind the statistical relationship. Growing wealth is accompanied by increased education, the building of business and government institutions with some autonomy, and the formation of attitudes that enable democratic governments to survive when they have a chance at power. Spain, Portugal, Chile, and Argentina, in addition to Taiwan and South Korea, all made the transition to democracy while they were within this income range.

No one can know precisely how democracy in China will evolve, but its record over the past fifteen years and the experience of other countries in East Asia suggest more competition in local and provincial politics, ultimately reaching the National Congress—although organized political opposition on the national level might be banned for a long time. Freedom of information will expand further and the rule of law will become ever stronger. This process is unlikely to be smooth and there may well be setbacks, as in the regime's reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. To the extent that China's current leaders anticipate a political evolution, as they must if they are realistic, they probably prefer the Singapore model, although Taiwan's seems more in keeping with the Chinese character—and the political history of Taiwan is well known to elites across the strait.

What could go wrong? Although there is a consensus on Deng Xiaoping's dictum, "To get rich is glorious", sustained rapid growth is not assured. Lagging growth in the poor interior provinces might impede political evolution of the country, and an ongoing conflict with Taiwan could become an obstacle. Or, after all, China might just be different—but in light of the evidence reported above, that is not the way to bet.

This is the Deal

THE KEY INFERENCE for everyone is patience: Only twenty-odd years separate us from 2015, and the advent of Chinese democracy promises abatement of several current problems. For the people of Taiwan, to be a province of a prospering China—or perhaps a member of a Chinese confederation—in which governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are popularly elected and the rights of their citizens are protected by law, should be a far more attractive prospect than joining today's China. But the period between now and 2015 (or whatever the precise year) will be volatile, because Beijing will not give up on the goal of unification. And it will become militarily more powerful as time passes. Taiwan needs to keep its powder dry and behave prudently.

For the United States there are two main implications. The first is that it is a good thing that the Chinese become rich, for it will benefit the American economy in the process. The second, and more important, reason is that a richer China will become more democratic. This will not necessarily make it easier to deal with, but experience has shown that democracies are less dangerous interlocutors for other democracies than are dictatorships. Washington should therefore stop holding trade relations hostage to an array of current political disputes. The United States should instead make most-favored nation status for China permanent, and impose no extra obstacles to its admission to the World Trade Organization. Our economic interests need to be pressed on the many trade issues in contention, but it is

[9]Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[10]In using international prices, all goods and services produced in a country are valued in the same currency, usually dollars, and not in local currencies.

[11]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* (January 1996).

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much better to address them in the WTO forum than in the current, highly politicized bilateral tit-for-tat manner in which we have been engaged in recent years.

If trade sanctions are ruled out-of-bounds in dealing with non-trade matters, how are we to dissuade China from exporting weapons and delivery systems capable of mass destruction? This is a question the Clinton administration has failed adequately to address, and it is a failure that is likely to encourage similar transfers in the future. One answer lies in our taking actions in the security domain rather than in economics. There is much in the way of arms for defense that we have not provided to Taiwan or to other countries in the region that worry about China that we might supply.

The second main policy implication for us is to defend strongly Taiwan's de facto independence. We have an interest in a peaceful East Asia, and we share more values with a democratic Taiwan today than we did with the authoritarian one of days gone by. If Beijing resumes military pressures against the island, we should not only supply more advanced arms to Taiwan but make it clear to China that it will confront American military power if it crosses our red line. We need also to make it clear to Taipei that a condition of our support is that it abjure de jure independence, for that would escalate the confrontation with Beijing, something that we and the Taiwanese should both want to avoid. This merely restates long-standing American policy that there is only one China but that we resist any attempt to unify by force. The difference now is that political evolution in China can be expected to ease the problem.

It follows from this analysis that we should not assume that China will inevitably become a threat to U.S. interests. We have a common interest with China in seeing its people prosper, in peace, in dealing with environmental problems, and in coping with the dangers associated with the spread of weapons capable of mass destruction. This common agenda would be better advanced if China were a member of the various organizations that make the rules on such matters. Nonetheless, American criticism of China's human rights violations should and will continue, but it should not be linked to trade issues. Our criticisms will have increasing resonance inside a China with a better educated and informed population that has access to greatly improved telecommunications, one that is growing freer year by year.

Put another way, the deal—better left tacit than made explicit—is this: Beijing bets on the many benefits of getting rich, including military power and peaceful reconciliation with Taipei. Taipei bets that a democratic China will emerge and holds off declaring itself independent. Washington bets that a rich China will become democratic and that the Taiwan issue will be peacefully settled in the context of a moderated Chinese foreign policy.

Americans sustained the Cold War with the Soviet Union for forty-five years until victory came. The prospect of a twenty-year (more or less) effort to help the Chinese people to become free—while helping Taiwan to retain its freedoms—is a much less daunting prospect. There may be trouble with China during its passage to democracy—or even after—but the odds should go down as it becomes more prosperous. We should do nothing to interfere with that process. □

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Trade Blocked

Bernard K. Gordon

IN DECEMBER 1994, just before Mexico's financial collapse, Bill Clinton convened the "Summit of the Americas" in Miami. It was attended by the leaders of all thirty-four Western hemisphere nations—except Castro, who was not invited—and it ended with a call to establish a "Free Trade Area of the Americas" by the year 2005. As a down payment, Mr. Clinton said NAFTA would soon be expanded to include Chile—repeating an offer made by George Bush in 1992, who in 1990 had introduced the idea of a Western hemisphere free trade area, "stretching from the port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego."[1]

Chile was receptive to the NAFTA invitation for both economic and political reasons. Membership would have meant not only guaranteed access to markets for its wine and fruit exports, but symbolic U.S. approval for its post-Pinochet democracy as well. The United States also had good reasons to welcome Chile: Its economic reforms, including wholesale privatizations, nearly-total tariff reductions, and receptivity to foreign investment have made it a model for the rest of Latin America. Thus, despite its small population and market, Chile would have been an easy NAFTA partner for the United States, so much so that had it been brought into the deal along with Mexico, the whole NAFTA idea might have smelled a lot better than it does now.

But in the wake of the Mexican collapse, President Clinton could not make good on his 1994 commitment. He needed Congress to extend its "fast track" legislation to Chile—the law that provided for NAFTA's passage in the first place—and by 1995, Senator Dole was leery of anything that smacked of new trade deals. With the coming presidential election in mind, Dole shelved the fast track vote until after November 1996. When he did that he dashed more than Chile's hopes; he also ended, at least temporarily, all talk of expanding NAFTA. The president may have been quietly thankful, given the heat he took from organized labor over NAFTA, but the rest of us might well use the delay to take a second hard look at the whole concept of regional free trade areas.

One reason to do so is that despite the legislative respite, the administration's trade plans for the hemisphere have not changed. Under U.S. sponsorship, the Miami agenda now has its own momentum. Two follow-up meetings already have been held: one in Denver last June, when the region's trade and other ministers met; and another this past March, when they convened again in Cartagena, Colombia. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to Brazil in March 1996, he not only reaffirmed the administration's commitment to hemispheric free trade in less than a decade, but called for a second, post-election summit next year.

Bernard K. Gordon is professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire, and is currently teaching at the International University of Japan. He is completing a book on regional trade blocs.

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The broader reason, however, to re-examine the regional concept is that it is fundamentally incompatible with America's economic and security interests. A foreign economic policy that emphasizes regionalism—and especially that stresses Latin America—will have at least three negative consequences: it will leave the United States with the crumbs at the global economic dinner table; it will drive East Asia's dynamic economies into tighter relations from which only Japan can emerge dominant; and it will almost certainly resurrect a world based on competitive blocs. As Jagdish Bhagwati has concluded in a devastating critique of regionalism from an economic perspective, regionally based "free trade arrangements, aside from being preferential trading arrangements . . . are a particularly damaging institutional arrangement to legitimate in the world trading system."[2]

It did not always seem that way. Back in 1985, when hopes seemed dismal for ever seeing a satisfactory end to the GATT Uruguay Round, regional trade deals sounded good to many Americans. President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors termed them an acceptable "second best", and talks about a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area then moved into high gear. First, a little-noted deal with Israel was signed; then the arrangement with Canada was completed; and after that President Clinton inherited the Bush plans for Mexico that became NAFTA. But that was then; today, after three decades of talking about "regionalism" and with ten years of U.S. prodding behind us, regional economic blocs are actually beginning to take shape. The United States ought not to like what it is now seeing.

The Only Global Exporter

REGIONAL TRADING blocs are emerging despite the completion of the GATT Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a package that gave the United States most but not all of what it wanted. Now the task, as with the recent talks on a global telecommunications regime, should be to complete the WTO agenda on a global rather than a regional basis. The United States has an enormous stake in that outcome, which becomes clear if we look at recent patterns of U.S. worldwide exports. It is those exports—rather than income gained from foreign investment—that account for most of America's trade-related jobs. Depending on industry and location, a standard rule of thumb is that between 23,000-25,000 jobs are created for each additional billion dollars worth of merchandise exports.

In 1993, America's merchandise exports totaled $465 billion, and 79 percent went to three regions: the Pacific, Western Europe, and North America (Canada and Mexico). By

THE PATTERN OF U.S. EXPORTS IN 1995

TOTAL = $584 billion



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1994, U.S. exports had grown to $520 billion, and the three-region share had risen to 84 percent. In 1995, America's exports rose another 12 percent—to $584 billion—and as the diagram on the previous page shows, the three regions again took 84 percent.

The message of this illustration is that the United States is a uniquely global exporter. The Pacific region has become—very slightly—its largest market, and under current conditions will grow further, but the main point is that the United States continues to hold a massive and roughly equal export presence in all three major world economic regions. As your broker might say, no other major exporting nation is so well diversified. Neither Germany nor Japan, the world's second and third largest exporting nations, respectively, has anything like America's globally balanced export distribution, and that unique role explains the high U.S. stake in the world's multilateral trading system.

In Japan there is a clear two-way spread: Americans buy 30 percent of Japan's exports and Asians take 40 percent of Japan's exports.[3] Japan considers itself "omnidirectional", but its exports to the rest of the world count for much less than those to Asia and America; the EU represents less than 15 percent of Japan's exports, and the entire (non-U.S.) Western hemisphere, including Canada and Mexico, takes only 6 percent.

German exports are even more geographically concentrated, in this instance in just one region. As the diagram below shows, nearly three quarters of Germany's exports are bought by other Europeans; its EU partners in Western Europe alone account for 50 percent. In contrast, all of Asia and the Pacific represents just 11 percent of German exports, and the United States takes only 8 percent.

These figures underline the point that America is a uniquely tripolar exporter, with about a third of its exports to Pacific Asia, another third to Canada and Mexico, and a quarter to Western Europe. While that *should* mean that Washington would not want to do anything to detract from its global role—least of all in the Pacific—America's policies and rhetoric have been sending a different signal. As reflected in Clinton's call for a Western hemisphere free trade area, Washington's message is that it cares less about global exports than it used to, and that it would be satisfied instead to hunker down in its own backyard. As Henry Kissinger has put it, "A Western hemisphere-wide free trade system . . . would give the Americas a commanding role no matter what happens."[4]

It is particularly hard to justify a Western hemisphere free trade area as a U.S. policy goal because only Canada and Mexico and *not* the entire "Western hemisphere" as such constitute

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America's major markets in this hemisphere, as they have for the last century. (Until 1958, Cuba was the only other significant U.S. export market nearby.) Indeed, the markets of all the nations of South and Central America combined represent only 9 percent of U.S. exports.

This may surprise those who believe that South and Central America are the "natural market" for the United States—the Carmen Miranda school of world trade politics—but it is true just the same. In South America, the largest and best known economies are those of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, but from the perspective of U.S. exporters they are all small markets. This becomes apparent when one compares the three countries' *combined* U.S. imports with those of just one small Asian or European country. In 1995, the combined population of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (209 million people) bought $19 billion from the United States, while South Korea, with a population of 46 million, accounted for $25 billion. Singapore and Holland—both with small populations—ranked just behind with $15 billion and $17 billion, respectively.

NAFTA and TAFTA

THESE FIGURES DO more than underscore the small role played by South and Central America in U.S. exports. They help explain why Europeans and Asians have begun to react to America's stress on the Western hemisphere with raised eyebrows, and in some cases with worried talk about how best to respond. In Europe, for example, where there has long been anxiety about America's alleged "over-emphasis" on Asia, the Miami summit revived talk of creating "special" EU-US trade ties. Britain's Prime Minister John Major and Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind took the lead, and their calls were echoed by EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan. The issue was then brought into sharp focus by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who in April 1995 offered a concrete and cleverly packaged proposal. Responding to U.S. plans both to expand NAFTA and intensify Pacific region cooperation through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative, Kinkel noted that "there is no trans-Atlantic equivalent to this", and then urged specific action: "After the successful completion of the Uruguay Round the creation of a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) should be seriously envisaged."[5]

The foreign minister's proposal, aided by the easily remembered "TAFTA" label, succeeded in placing the issue on the agenda in both Europe and the United States. In early June 1995, Secretary of State Christopher spoke in Madrid on "Charting a Trans-Atlantic Agenda for the 21st Century." Borrowing a phrase popularized by Newt Gingrich, he said the Atlantic Alliance could not be maintained "by nostalgia alone"—it needed an economic dimension. Though anxious to avoid another NAFTA-type bruising in Congress, Christopher gave TAFTA his support, putting it squarely in the context of Clinton's Western hemisphere and Asian goals:

> A hallmark of the Clinton presidency is its focus on global economic growth. . . . His efforts include leading the way to the Miami agreement . . . on a free trade area in the Americas by the year 2005 [and] APEC's decision to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010. . . . Our vision for the economic relationship between Europe and the United States must be no less ambitious. The long term objective is the integration of the economies of North America and Europe, consistent with the principles of the WTO.[6]

The qualifiers in that speech ("long term objective . . . consistent with the principles of the WTO") are important, but the more basic point is that trans-Atlantic "free trade" has emerged as an issue likely to be debated seriously. Europe's skeptics include France and, for very different reasons, the existent economic institutions of the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The French say TAFTA will be impossible to implement because of Europe's "special problems" in agriculture, textiles, and services, while Renato Ruggiero,

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the new WTO director, warns that any new regional economic group will undermine the newly established global rules. As the Dutch state secretary for economic affairs put it, TAFTA would mean that "trade relations will be governed by the right of the strongest rather than by multilateral rules of the game."[7]

But several of Britain's leaders strongly favor the German initiative, though it needs to be said that European supporters and critics alike see it as an issue not only of domestic economics and politics, but also in terms of how it might affect their standing with America—all the more reason why Washington should be wary. French opposition stems from the usual protectionist reasons; those Germans who favor it hope that more direct economic relations with the United States might speed the structural reforms their economy so badly needs; while Britain's support reflects the hope that closer U.S. ties can save them from Brussels and EMU. Indeed, Foreign Minister Rifkind has repeatedly backed the TAFTA proposal, and in May 1996 Margaret Thatcher returned to a theme she had pressed as prime minister. In a speech devoted primarily to strengthening and expanding NATO, Lady Thatcher put TAFTA precisely in that political and security context:

> The most practical way forward . . . is to merge the North American Free Trade Area with the European Union, including the countries of Central, and perhaps in time, Eastern Europe. A Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area would be able to push effectively toward global trade liberalization. It would prevent trans-Atlantic trade wars from jeopardizing wider trans-Atlantic links. It would bring our Atlantic civilization closer together.[8]

American discussion of TAFTA has just begun, and supporters of the proposal have so far shaped the debate. The reasons are clear. A segment of American thinking clearly has become uncomfortable with the "Pacific tilt" in U.S. trade policy, and believes that, on balance, economic exchanges with Asia have damaged America. Clyde Prestowitz, for example, whose labor-supported Economic Strategy Institute has produced the main U.S. rationale for TAFTA, points to Pacific-region trade deficits as evidence that U.S. exports there are not as large as they seem. The ESI report, *Shrinking the Atlantic*, argues that because the United States has uniquely close historic, cultural, and political ties to Europe, now is the time to "start the United States and Europe down the path toward an economic parallel to NATO."[9] This is of course another way of saying that Asia is somehow too "different" to do business with fairly or successfully, whereas the United States and Europe, with common cultural roots, share similar approaches in economics and politics.[10] From there it is no leap at all to believe, with Mrs. Thatcher, that those common roots must inevitably bind the United States to Europe.

The Carmen Miranda School

THE "NATURAL MARKET" view of American trade policy is no less critical of the supposed "Pacific tilt" in American policy, but this school argues that the United States must give its emphasis to the Western hemisphere rather than Europe. Leaving aside that in today's world "natural markets" no longer exist—least of all for an economy as large and diversified as America's—it is no coincidence that Western hemisphere supporters in the United States also insist that dealings with Asia have damaged America. Both groups share, in other words, a disposition to base their case for closer U.S. economic ties with Europe or Latin America less on the objective assets of those regions than on the supposed demerits of trading with Asia.

The catalogue of their complaints is as familiar as it is outdated, and the complaints are often simply wrong. Western concerns about Asia's economic "difference" have centered on Japan for more than a hundred years, and in a richly documented study Gary Saxonhouse shows that the West simply has not been able to accept Japan as legitimate:

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First, Japanese competition was illegitimate because it was based on labor cheaper in cost than labor in its trading partners. When labor was no longer cheap, competition was unfair because capital was cheaper in Japan. [Then] it was argued, Japan's dumping abroad was done at the expense of its exploited labor. Later it was argued Japan had to dump because by giving its labor force job security it was treating it rather too well. First it was argued that Japan's tariffs were high and its quotas numerous. When tariffs and quotas were largely harmonized with practices in the other advanced industrialized economies, it was then argued that it was Japan's unique economic institutions and their attendant informal barriers that were really keeping foreign products out. Finally, even as Japan's informal barriers were melting under continued structural change in the Japanese economy, demands came to be made for guaranteed market shares for foreign products in Japan. . . . Throughout the long history of these complaints, Japan's trading partners have rarely been prepared to concede that Japan's participation in the international economic system is legitimate.[11]

None of this has made much of an impression on those reared in the Carmen Miranda school. When they compare Latin America and Asia as markets for U.S. exports, the comparison is typically made in zero-sum terms: Asia is seen as distant, largely closed, and not quite fair; Latin America as proximate, open, and receptive. In 1993, for example, John F. Purcell, the "developing nations" adviser to New York's Salomon Bros., concluded rather remarkably that it is mainly Latin Americans who buy U.S. goods: "Everybody's worried about the economy. Where is the place that we, the United States, export, and from which we could get the most jobs? It's not Japan or Europe. It's Latin America. . . ."[12] Similarly, a recent book on U.S. trade and investment in Latin America states as fact that East Asians buy little from the United States. It argues that while Mexicans spend their dollars on American products, Asians use theirs only to buy Treasury bills:

While developing countries in Asia tend to use their trade revenues from the United States to purchase government bonds, thereby supporting the U.S. trade deficit, Mexicans use their export receipts from the United States to buy U.S.-made goods and services.[13]

Even as prominent a scholar as Sidney Weintraub, in his advocacy of NAFTA, claimed that trade with Mexico is good for America, but trade with Asia is not:

There is an advantage for the United States to have imports, if they come at all, come from Mexico rather than from some other country, say, an Asian tiger. The reason is that most of Mexico's foreign exchange earnings turn right around and are spent in the United States. Most imports into Asian countries come from non-U.S. sources, such as Japan.[14]

There is no logical or evidential basis for such a statement. Of course "most imports"—in almost all countries—"come from non-U.S. sources." How could it be otherwise unless the United States dominated all world trade? Nor is it true that most Asian countries import primarily from Japan. The reality is that Asia's extraordinarily valuable import markets are very diversified, and no one source dominates. Even in Korea and Taiwan, despite Japan's proximity and colonial-era ties to both, U.S. and Japanese exports are nearly equal at 23 percent and 28 percent respectively. And in the ASEAN nations—where Japan has been heavily present from the time it began paying reparations in the 1950s—the United States has long held a rock-steady 15 percent share. In South America, allegedly America's "natural market", the import shares of the United States and the EU are roughly equal, at 27 percent and 23 percent, respectively. In Europe, which Americans tend to think of as the other "traditional" market, the American share is much smaller. In 1994, it held just 7 percent of Germany's market, and, as the following chart illustrates, that is also the pat-

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tern for the entire EU. In Asia, in other words, despite Japan's prominence and many American complaints, the United States is no shrinking violet.

The Asian Counter-Threat

IT IS IN ASIA, however, that the most disturbing reactions to Washington's talk of new economic ties with Latin America, as well as the newer issue of U.S.-European "free trade", have occurred. The focal point of the Asian response is a proposed "East Asia Economic Caucus" (EAEC), an idea that originated ostensibly with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, and that he has been pressing for several years. The EAEC is for Asians only: It would include China and Japan, but exclude the United States, and is decidedly *not* the kind of Asian regionalism the United States wants to see materialize.[15]

Yet in response to the current drift of American trade policies, it is precisely the kind of proposal likely to gain support. Mahathir defends his EAEC idea by saying that the United States is not genuinely a Pacific nation, and cites as proof Washington's support for NAFTA and its planned extension to South America. That the proposed EAEC has an even more base, and seemingly racist, coloration is suggested by its other non-members: the only other Pacific economies excluded are Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—this despite Malaysia's long-standing defense arrangements with the first two.

While it has been fashionable in the United States to discount his EAEC proposal, Mahathir is having some success. In March 1996, a first-ever Europe-Asia trade meeting convened in Bangkok. Known as "ASEM", it brought together Europe's trade ministers with their counterparts and other leaders from East Asia. The Asian contingent at ASEM precisely reflected Mahathir's ideas: China and Japan were represented, along with all the ASEAN countries, but the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were excluded.

Even more troubling are the warning signs from Japan. Ryutaro Hashimoto, Japan's new prime minister, has spoken specifically about Japan's likely response to American plans to expand NAFTA. In his book *Vision of Japan*, Hashimoto reports on a 1991 meeting he had with Henry Kissinger that bore directly on the EAEC issue. He told Kissinger that "if America ever forgets it is a Pacific nation, we will be obliged to change the nature of the relationship." When Kissinger asked whether this meant that Japan would support Malaysia's EAEC proposal should the United States seek to expand



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NAFTA into Central and South America, Hashimoto wrote that he answered, "Precisely":

> As a member of the cabinet I myself don't endorse Mahathir's plan. At the same time, though, if America expands NAFTA, blockading itself within the North and South American continents, and shows a stronger inclination toward forming a protectionist economic bloc than at present, we will be forced to focus on Japan as an Asia-Pacific nation and this will inevitably change the nature of the Japan-U.S. relationship. . . . I hope you won't push us that far.[16]

Warnings rarely come more clear than that, and now that Hashimoto is prime minister the admonitions he expressed to Kissinger need even more to be kept in mind. Hashimoto has long been regarded as a "nationalist" in the Japanese context, and became prime minister directly in the wake of his mid-1995 confrontation with former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. The issue then was Japan's auto imports, and Hashimoto cleverly turned an intended photo opportunity—the American's gift of a *Kendo* sword—into a shot in which Kantor appeared to be holding the sword against Hashimoto's throat. Most Japanese and many Americans believe that Hashimoto's resistance to the United States was a key factor in his elevation to prime minister.

He has, moreover, been a prominent sponsor of the veterans' groups that have difficulty coming to grips with Japan's World War II record and that worship annually at the Yasukuni memorial—both a Shinto shrine and a right-wing icon. Indeed, Hashimoto is president of the Association of Bereaved Families, the largest of those groups. Likewise, Hashimoto's sympathies are with the "Asian" school that has long characterized Japanese thinking. Its roots go back several generations, when leading Japanese first began to complain that their country was seen as an outsider in American (and British) thinking. That perspective fueled Japan's self-image as the "leader of Asia", and resonated strongly with the Japanese at the time; it was not merely a propaganda tool used by Japan's prewar military.[17] Today, that strand of thinking focuses on "Japan as an Asia-Pacific nation"—a theme that reflects a powerfully re-emerging sense of Japan's "Asian identity." The Japanese scholar Noda Noboru has put this into its political context by calling it the "Dangerous Rise of Asianism", and by pointing out that in Japan, "pro-Asian sympathies tend to go hand in hand with anti-American sentiments."[18]

Of course, concern with Japan's Asian identity has its skeptics at home. They include opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa, who believes that Japan's close ties to the United States are absolutely central for Japan's security, and for Asia's peace and stability. Nevertheless, Japan's "Asian identity" can be drawn on by Japanese and Asians already resentful over what they see as America's hectoring on trade conflicts and human rights differences, while that same America supports "free trade areas" that must—if Bhagwati, Krueger, and other trade economists are correct—inevitably discriminate against Asians.

American policy today, in other words, confronts once again the law of unintended consequences: Economic regionalism, which once seemed an acceptable and even a good idea, must now reckon with the strong likelihood that its fulfillment will bring to fruition a world America never wanted. A Western hemisphere trading bloc, like blocs in the other world regions, is simply irreconcilable with the global political and trading interests of the United States. It is not too late to avoid this folly, and avoid it we should. □

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[1]George Bush, announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, June 27, 1990, in Public Papers of the Presidents, 1990, Book 1, p. 875.

[2]In Jagdish Bhagwati and Ann O. Krueger, *The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Arrangements* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1995), p. 14.

[3]Based on 1994 export data in *Direction of Trade Statistics*, International Monetary Fund, 1995.

[4]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 832.

[5]Speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, April 19, 1995. Kinkel's speeches in the United States were little noted in the American press, but were well-reported in Germany (see the "Bonn Bulletin", April 24, 1995, in FBIS-Europe, May 4, 1995).

[6]Department of State *Dispatch*, June 5, 1995. Unlike its views on Latin America or Asia, organized labor—focusing on pay and job benefits more than job security—likes what it sees in Europe and is likely to support a TAFTA proposal.

[7]*Economische Zaken*, December 1995, in FBIS-Europe, December 12, 1995. Examples of the OECD and WTO statements may be culled from the German press in FBIS-Europe, May 13, 1996, and in *Financial Times*, June 3, 1996.

[8]Margaret Thatcher, "The West After the Cold War", *Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 1996.

[9]Clyde Prestowitz and Robin Gaster, *Shrinking the Atlantic: Europe and the American Economy* (Washington, DC: Economic Strategy Institute, 1994), p. 6.

[10]The cultural historian Masakazu Yamazki has argued that Asia is not "different" but is instead merely experiencing modernization—a profoundly Western phenomenon [See "Asia, A Civilization in the Making", *Foreign Affairs* (July-August, 1996), pp. 106-18]. A cottage industry of social scientists has been seized with the question of whether Asian states, led by Japan, have created a new form of capitalism. "Capitalist developmental state" is the fashionable answer, but observers of the French *dirigiste* economy—with its many state-owned enterprises, strong and stable bureaucratic elite, and government-led planning—might be pardoned for thinking it a distinction without a difference.

[11]Gary R. Saxonhouse, "A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations Against Japan", in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., *Fair Trade and Harmonization*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 473.

[12]*New York Times*, March 21, 1993.

[13]Chris C. Carvounis and Brinda Z. Carvounis, *United States Trade and Investment in Latin America* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1992), p. 78.

[14]Sidney Weintraub, "Free Trade in North America: Has its Time Come?", *World Economy*, March 1, 1991, p. 62. Weintraub is dean at the LBJ School at the University of Texas and holds the Simon chair in political economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

[15]When James Baker was secretary of state he was infuriated by the proposal and by Mahathir's support for it. He attempted to derail the EAEC in talks with Korea and Japan, but without success. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 28, 1991, pp. 26-7.

[16]In "Two Agendas for Reforming Japan", *Japan Echo* (Spring 1994), pp. 30-1.

[17]In 1918, for example, twenty years before he became prime minister, Prince Konoe wrote bitterly against the global dominance of Britain and America, who pretended to speak for all humanity about peaceful principles in world politics while they practiced their racist anti-Asian policies at home. See Konoe's 1918 article, "Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America", reprinted in *Japan Echo* (Spring 1995), pp. 12-14.

[18]Noda Noboru, "Kiken na Ajia shugi no taito", in *This is Yomiuri* (January 1995), reprinted in *Japan Echo* (Spring 1995), pp. 6-11.

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The Downside of the Cutting Edge

Richard Betts

THE AMERICAN military loves organizational tradition at the same time that it hungers for technological progress. Notwithstanding the stereotype of hidebound Colonel Blimps refusing to recognize revolutionary changes—army officers clinging to horse cavalry for decades after the invention of tanks, pooh-poohing the combat potential of aircraft in the face of Billy Mitchell's sinking of the *Ostfriesland*, and all the rest—military leadership is usually enthusiastic about technological innovation, as long as it is an add-on for which they do not have to give up other cherished equipment and doctrine.

This conservative progressivism, let us call it, is often quite sensible. It is always hard to know in peacetime how combinations of new weapons and tactics will work short of the test of combat. As with a single species in a complex ecology, interdependence and competition make it impossible to predict the effects of altering one element of the combat equation on the net result of strategic and tactical interactions. War winnows out false promises as well as hallowed but obsolete old premises. It took the experiences of the London Blitz and the Allied bombing of Germany to dispel pre-war exaggerations of the apocalyptic potential of strategic bombing, and it took the first six months of engagement in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor to confirm the revolutionary significance of aircraft carriers for naval warfare.

Recognizing the meaning of military evidence, however, does not always occur even this quickly—or, in some cases, at all. This is because the lessons of war are often mixed, and cognitive dissonance can suppress learning. The American military worked at counterinsurgency for several years in Vietnam until the escalation of 1965 conventionalized the war. Then, despite seven years of large-scale combat effort—which proved strategically futile despite tactical successes in specific engagements—the end of the war solidified a consensus among professional officers that U.S. strategy had not been conventional enough. The lesson they learned was not that the military's plans and capabilities had been maladapted to circumstances, but that civilian policymakers had irresponsibly refused to unleash those capabilities and give even freer rein to the high firepower requirements that the strategy demanded.

Even were there no barriers to learning, the advent of nuclear weapons has made it less likely that a major war among great powers will last long enough for learning processes to unfold and be assimilated into doctrine. This is not because immediate use of weapons of mass destruction is inevitable, but because such weapons offer an alternative to stalemate or defeat in conventional combat. The carnage of the First and Second

Richard Betts is professor of political science and director of the international security program at Columbia University, and author of *Military Readiness* (Brookings, 1995).

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World Wars was prolonged because the stronger combatants could not win quickly and the weaker ones had no way to scare the stronger into backing off. Nuclear weapons give either side an option to try one of these other ways out. If both sides fear unlimited war above all else, they may instead choose to end the war by negotiation. If neither is willing to concede or compromise, however, the side that is weaker in conventional military capability has the greater incentive to up the ante, because the stronger can still hope to win at the conventional level.

Of course, there is no doubt that it is better to have technological superiority in conventional military power than not to have it. The side that has the capability for a quick outright victory may prevent war in the first place by deterring or coercing the enemy. But if war breaks out nevertheless, successful application of a decided technical advantage in the conventional sphere may only make the loser desperate, perhaps hysterical, and more likely to use unconventional weapons. Such a prospect highlights the risk of miscalculating the fit between technology and strategy in peacetime. That risk is not great at the moment because the United States faces no first-class adversary in the post-Cold War world. The risk will increase if, or when, a hostile great power emerges to challenge U.S. interests.

ALL THESE ISSUES are evoked by what may be a developing revolution in military affairs—the "RMA" as it is known in Pentagon acronymese. There is much debate among professionals about whether a true revolution, as opposed to evolving incremental improvements, is underway, but there is no question that something significant is afoot.[1] There is also no question that, on balance, an RMA should offer an important net advantage to the U.S. military. Other great powers might manage to stay close behind in a technological race, but they are unlikely to catch up. One reason is that the size, professionalization, and recent experience of the U.S. military are uniquely conducive to maximizing the synergy of fusing information systems, weaponry, organization, and doctrine that is the key to a real RMA.

It is important not to let secondary problems divert attention from the benefits of an RMA. But it is also important to consider potential drawbacks because they are seldom noted; it is, after all, counterintuitive to think that superior military effectiveness could have any negative implications. While the value of an RMA outweighs its possible drawbacks, we must watch out for the latter if our aim is to effectively integrate military means with political ends—which should be the main purpose of any rational strategy.

Strategic Expectations

The Gulf War experience has already encouraged many laymen to think that an RMA occurred some time ago, that it manifested itself in the combat of 1991, and that it promises to make future conventional wars quick, easy, and low cost. The only visual images of combat conveyed to the public during the six-week war were of laser-guided bombs making pinpoint hits. The easy triumph of U.S. technology has encouraged the belief that war can be bloodless, and the resolution, in some quarters, that only bloodless wars should be fought.

Military professionals are more aware of the limitations of U.S. performance in that war, and of how improbable it is that we will again be able to fight a war on operational terms set so completely by our own side. It is laymen in political leadership, however, who will make the decisions about where and

[1] See, for example, Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions", and A.J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse", *The National Interest* (Fall 1994); and Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next", *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1993).

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when to fight again. It is also they, having seen in 1991 what *appeared* to be an easy victory that did not require as much redundant power as was actually deployed to the Gulf, who will determine defense budget levels. Publicity about the further progress of an RMA will do nothing to suppress overconfidence, and thus risks abetting a dangerous combination of greater nonchalance about going to war, and weaker commitment to maintaining hefty forces before we do so.

Strategic Complacency

An RMA may not necessarily sharpen the judgment of military professionals, either. Faith in an RMA could reinforce the military penchant for defining missions and capabilities in terms of large-scale conventional warfare. The legacy of the Second World War in Europe instilled a commitment to large-unit operations and reliance on heavy firepower in the U.S. Army—what Andrew Krepinevich has dubbed "the Army Concept"—that the service as an institution insisted on applying in Vietnam, despite its limited relevance and ample counterproductive effects.[2] Similarly, military professionals could come to see a mature RMA as validating the Gulf War as a model for all wars.

The danger is that if the RMA becomes the Army, Navy, and Air Force "Concept" of the early twenty-first century, it could blind us to problems that are not susceptible to high-tech solutions. This might keep the United States out of foreign entanglements by hamstringing civilians who want to intervene in messy unconventional or semi-conventional conflicts—and that is good or bad depending on the case and one's point of view. But if the military is called upon nevertheless to act in such conflicts, an institutionalized commitment to high-tech operations may prove unsuitable to the task. We may then face unpleasant choices: failure and withdrawal (following precedents of intervention in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia); brutal conventional overkill (recalling Tacitus' line, "We made a desert and called it peace"); or ad hoc experimentation under fire (which risks failure at higher cost and friction in civil-military relations even if it succeeds).

When success engenders orthodoxy, as an impressive RMA could do, it brings insensitivity to the essence of strategy—its *interactive* nature—and promotes the Fallacy of the Last Move, the notion that solving a particular problem settles for good the circumstances that gave rise to it. Adversaries who cannot keep up with our methods and machines are at liberty to develop asymmetrical solutions, such as novel defensive countermeasures to precision targeting. And some enemies, such as the North Vietnamese, are bound to prove better in the future at low-tech counters to American technological prowess than did the Iraqis.

Strategic Instability

The biggest danger in the future is not the sort of military challenges posed by medium-sized powers such as Iraq or North Korea. Rather it is the prospect of confrontation with a hostile great power such as a rich and muscular China, or a recovered and revanchist Russia. Conflicts with them over Taiwan or the new states of the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine or Lithuania, could be more volatile than the disputes that catalyzed Cold War crises. It took fifteen years of dangerous maneuvers, probes, and crises over Korea, Berlin, and Cuba before the Cold War competition became routinized and relatively stable. Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Taiwan are far more substantial stakes than Berlin, Cuba, or the Korea of 1950. In the developing phase of a new Cold War, these grounds of conflict could make disastrous miscalculation and the resort to force more plausible than before.

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[2]See Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

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If it comes to combat between the United States and a great power, a decisive American advantage at the conventional level of warfare (as represented in a developed RMA) would thrust the choice between defeat and escalation onto the adversary. This was precisely the position in which NATO believed itself trapped by the Soviet Union through most of the Cold War, and which prompted the doctrine of nuclear first-use that was the source of so much hand-wringing and friction among strategists, and between Washington and allied capitals.

The fact that NATO flexible response doctrine was never called to the test, and that we won the Cold War while resting on it, might make it seem that such a doctrine presents no threat to stability, or even helps to secure it. If the doctrine was effective against Moscow, however, does the United States wish to have the tables turned on itself—to be subjected to and deterred by such a doctrine? Or, if we would not be deterred by threats of escalation, does that mean that the doctrine is incredible (as many during the Cold War thought)? Or might it mean that in assuming it to be incredible, and then proceeding to wage a conventional war without restraining civilian "interference", we would miscalculate and invite an adversary to actually implement such threats?

Such questions bedeviled both policymakers and analysts throughout the Cold War, and the fundamental disagreements were never resolved. A similar uncertainty would inevitably exist in a future where the tables were turned and would make pressing the U.S. conventional advantage risky. Thus an RMA is less of a sure solution to major strategic problems than it seems to many today. Indeed, it may make a nuclear exchange more likely, not less, notwithstanding the fact that, in this context, weapons of mass destruction would represent the adversary's *primitive* technological counter to U.S. high-tech conventional superiority. Would it be in the U.S. interest to give such an adversary—especially one fighting over stakes intrinsically more important to it than to the United States (such as Russia regarding Ukraine, or China vis-à-vis Taiwan)—an incentive to consider nuclear or biological escalation as the only alternative to losing? As Eliot Cohen rightly notes, "The revolution in military affairs may bring a kind of tactical clarity to the battlefield, but at the price of strategic obscurity."[3]

IT IS UNCLEAR how much of a revolution in military operational potential is really underway. Still less clear is what it all may mean, and we have not yet progressed very far beyond narrow, mostly technical considerations. Nearly all the discussion is about operational and tactical implications—as if the strategic implications must simply be those writ very large. A real RMA is good for the United States, but not in an unalloyed way. Potential unanticipated effects—on domestic political support for war and military expenditures, and on the possibilities of miscalculation and escalation in future conflicts both small and large—need to be considered by strategists as well as those responsible for overseeing the technical development of the RMA. After all, even the best tools are of little use to a craftsman with a blurred blueprint. □

[3]Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996), p. 53.

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The Cowboy Patriot

Richard Grenier

"*THE GREEN BERETS* is a film so unspeakable, so stupid, so rotten and false . . . that it passes through being fun, through being funny, through being camp, through everything and becomes an invitation to grieve, not for our soldiers in Vietnam or for Vietnam (the film could not be more false or do a greater disservice to either of them) but for what has happened to the fantasy-making apparatus. . . . Simplicities of the right, simplicities of the left, but this one is beyond the possible. It is vile and insane."

Thus wrote the film critic of the *New York Times* about *The Green Berets*, the movie John Wayne produced, co-directed, and starred in, about Viet Cong murderousness and American heroism in Vietnam. The film, released in June 1968, some months after the Tet Offensive, was one of the year's blockbuster movies at American box offices. In retrospect, it serves rather neatly, in conjunction with reviews in the *New York Times* and other high-toned publications, to illustrate the period's sharp split between elite and mass opinion on the Vietnam War.

Wayne, somewhat amused by the critical press reception accorded to *The Green Berets*, commented that the *New York Times*' critic was "foaming at the mouth" and "going into convulsions." "She and other critics", he said in *Playboy*, "won't believe the dirty sons of bitches are raping, torturing guerillas. I've been to Vietnam, and I've talked to the men there, and I don't have the slightest doubt about the correctness of what we are doing." He went further, "Anyway, it's my country, right or wrong, and pure as driven snow. Americans are the heroes of *The Green Berets*."

The picture and the Vietnam War mark a curious high point in Wayne's career. Never was he so hated by Hollywood's political Left-liberals, who decades after he began his career in 1926 had come to dominate the film industry. And rarely was he so idolized by the mass American public. As a result of his undeniable popularity, perhaps, the film industry's attitude toward him took on a certain ambivalence. The very year after he had outraged the sensitive spirits of Hollywood with *The Green Berets*, he made *True Grit*, a movie in which he plays an aging U.S. federal marshall who helps a 14-year-old girl track down her father's killer. To general astonishment, one year after his very name had been poison in its halls, the Motion Picture Academy of Arts and Sciences gave its award for best actor of 1969 to John Wayne. To the outside world, which perchance thinks the Academy Awards are made on the basis of artistic merit, this might not seem so surprising. But for those who realize the role played by political polemics, personal relations, and other extraneous elements in such decisions, it was curious. Perhaps Hollywood didn't hate John Wayne as much as it had pretended, or even as much as it thought it did. Perhaps in some uncanny way there was still something about him that held them in thrall. Of course, in *True Grit* he was, without vanity, playing an overweight man with an eyepatch, and being kind to children in a sentimental movie has never lost you friends in Hollywood. But the affair remains something of a mystery even today,

Richard Grenier is a columnist with the *Washington Times*.

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and one can't get rid of the idea that somehow the film industry elite was making amends for past differences with what was after all an American icon.

And an American icon he was and would remain almost two decades after his death. Last year, with Wayne dead sixteen years, the Harris Poll showed him to be still America's most popular film star, more popular than Clint Eastwood, number two, and number three, Mel Gibson. More popular also than, in order, Denzel Washington, Kevin Costner, Tom Hanks, Sylvester Stallone, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Robert de Niro—all, you will notice, still alive. Gary Wills, writing in a recent issue of the *New Yorker*, seemingly stunned by the durability of Wayne's mystique, declared him unquestionably "the leading star of all time." Critic Eric Bentley went even further, calling Wayne "the most important American of our time." He was a hero to Ronald Reagan, who once made a pilgrimage to Wayne's birthplace in tiny Winterset, Iowa, and told visitors to the White House that "Wayne understood what the American spirit is all about." The present chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, taught himself English as an immigrant by watching John Wayne movies. And Wayne has extraordinary appeal abroad as well.

Wayne's fame transcended America. When Nikita Khrushchev, then first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, visited the United States in 1959, once finished with the officialdom of Washington he demanded to meet one American: John Wayne. A great fan, Khrushchev had seen all Wayne's films in the Kremlin. When Emperor Hirohito of Japan visited the United States in 1975, he wanted to see two things: Disneyland and John Wayne. He, too, was an avid fan. When Jimmy Carter, then president of the United States, met John Wayne he shuffled about in embarrassment like a schoolboy. Wayne was his boyhood idol, the man he wanted to be when he grew up. And it was Carter, in fact, who gave the most moving testimonial at Wayne's death. Knowing full well Wayne's ultra-conservative politics, and opposed to him as he was on issue after issue, he nonetheless proclaimed that Wayne reflected "the best of our national character." "In an age of few heroes", Carter said, "he was the genuine article."

Now, Wayne did do a number of brave things. In the earliest days, long before it came into fashion, he fought Hollywood communists tooth and nail as president of the Motion Picture Alliance, teaming up for the task with the president of the Screen Actors' Guild, his buddy, Ronald Reagan. The enterprise was not without risk. It is now long forgotten, but in those days Hollywood communists were often successful in enforcing their own sub-rosa blacklist. The year before he did *The Green Berets*, out of sheer patriotism Wayne made *The Alamo* with his own money and, to his surprise, lost millions; the American people apparently did not quite share his awe of courageous death, preferring instead courageous life and a happy ending.

The bravest thing Wayne ever did—in the real world—was to reveal in 1964 that he'd had a cancerous lung removed, and had licked "the Big C." Wayne did this at a time when cancer was never mentioned in public because of the fear it inspired. Even in death people were invariably reported to have died of "a long illness." Wayne was the first public figure to defiantly reveal that he'd had cancer, and he did it, he said, "to give some poor devil out there hope."

YET PRESIDENT Carter's description of Wayne as a "genuine" hero was an odd tribute to a man who, essentially, had spent his professional life pretending to be other people. Wayne's career was a monument spanning fifty years; but he was, after all, not a hero but an actor who played heroes. Despite all the martial types he depicted—cowboys, sheriffs, military men, seafarers, pilots, hunters—he had done little that was physically dangerous since his football scholarship at the University of Southern California was withdrawn when he damaged a shoulder body-surfing. And, although he was only thirty-four at the time of Pearl Harbor, he never served in his country's armed forces in the Second World War, a fact of which—it is true—he was deeply ashamed (and director John Ford never let him forget that he should be). His draft board, which classified him "1B", was perfectly willing to go along, believing that Wayne would contribute more to the war effort by making patriotic movies than by trudging through mud carrying a rifle. Wayne finally gave in

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to his own misgivings and voluntarily changed his classification to "lA"—fit for service—but that was only a month before Hiroshima. Clark Gable, Jimmy Stewart, Tyrone Power, and many other Hollywood stars served. Stewart flew twenty combat missions over Germany with the Army Air Corps. Even Dashiell Hammett, forty-eight and *tubercular*, volunteered and was sent to the Pacific. John Wayne stayed home and made movies.

Still, Wayne had a remarkable presence, both on the screen and in life. There was something truly mysterious in how he was able to exert his magnetism on people whose life experiences were as widely different as those of Jimmy Carter, Nikita Khrushchev, and Emperor Hirohito. He had the added ability to convince millions of foreigners, in addition to Khrushchev and Hirohito, that he was quintessentially American. Dozens of other Hollywood stars were, of course, American, but foreigners seemed to feel, somehow, that John Wayne was the mother lode. Like no other actor before or since, he was America personified. In his cowboy movies he personified America as its power expanded through the western frontier and in later historical periods he personified America as a world power, resisting in turn Nazi and Soviet evils. He somehow fit the stereotype of the "real" American, and, furthermore, the brave American. His name has even spread in the U.S. military, where expressions such as "Don't John-Wayne it!" and "He John-Wayned it" have come into current usage.

This was all slightly strange in that John Wayne never confused himself with the American hero figures he played on the screen. On one occasion he told me that he knew perfectly well that acting was "illusion", and admitted ruefully that "this Wayne thing was as deliberate a projection as you'll ever see." (His real name was Marion Morrison.) "I practiced in front of a mirror", he laughed. And yet he had one profound personal character trait whose rarity he didn't seem to realize, but which came across on the screen and might have been responsible in part for his immense popularity. I once spent a long afternoon with Wayne in his dressing room and it was like an informal reception. People came, people went. Everyone was welcome, whether Wayne knew them or not.

Other film stars who played with Wayne, who was known to everyone from his childhood days as "Duke", have described the extraordinary ease and friendliness he displayed with people he didn't even know. Most film stars and other celebrities greatly enjoy being worshipped by the multitudes, but when a member of these multitudes seeks a closer individual relationship, he faces the inevitable rebuff: "Don't get close!" The star has a private life, after all, that he doesn't intend to have invaded by yahoos. Wayne manifested absolutely none of this. You could invade him as much as you liked. On a movie location in the Southwest Wayne would occasionally disappear, and his fellow cast members would eventually find him having a beer in a tavern with some truck driver. He was more gregarious and democratically sociable than any movie star ever seen in Hollywood, and I sense that this democratic feeling of his, probably unbeknownst to him, somehow communicated itself to the vast movie public.

The quickest way of adumbrating John Wayne's politics is to list the political figures he supported and admired: Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, Spiro Agnew, Douglas MacArthur—but also Harry Truman (whom he called the "tie salesman") because of his resistance to communism in Korea. Wayne felt no guilt whatsoever over injustices done to blacks or Indians in earlier historical periods. He hadn't committed those injustices. He didn't like whining. He'd give a black or an Indian a fair shake—that was it. Once when on a movie location in Mexico he noticed that while actors, director, and key members of the crew—Americans all—were lodged in warm motel rooms, the Mexican crew was spending the night by a campfire in the cold desert. So he hustled together hot coffee, sandwiches, and several bottles of tequila and spent the night singing and drinking by the bonfire with the Mexicans.

In his private life, too, Wayne was extraordinarily kind-hearted, "the softest touch in Hollywood", constantly sending off helpful sums of money by check to people he didn't even know. He had no business sense himself, and so it was doubly unfortunate that two of his business managers, one of them a son-in-law, were so incompetent that they almost bankrupted him. Curiously, all three of his wives were Latin-American, the first from one

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of the upper-class, pre-Mexican War California families that call themselves "Spanish-American", the second a Mexican, the third a Peruvian. Chata, the Mexican, was wild and a heavy drinker, but he remained on good terms with the other two, by whom he had a total of seven children. Most notable, I suppose, was his nearly three-year love affair with Marlene Dietrich, who was, he confessed, "the best lay I ever had."

Like the typical Californian, as the folklore has it, he was born in Iowa, coming to Glendale, California at the age of seven with his family, headed by his father, an unsuccessful pharmacist. Perhaps spurred by his family's economic failure, Wayne (still Marion Morrison at the time) was a remarkably hard worker, a trait he kept throughout his life at whatever trade he worked. In high school he was an excellent student, class president, president of the debating society, and of course he played football. At USC he waited on tables at the fraternity of which he was actually a member. When his football scholarship lapsed because of his surfing injury, he got a job as a grip at the Fox Film Corporation, where the famous director Raoul Walsh "liked the way he moved" lifting furniture on a set, and offered him a role in what was to be a long string of Westerns. Wayne soon shifted his studio to Monogram and then Republic Pictures out on so-called Poverty Row, where they turned out a movie in a week. But from Ford's *Stagecoach* in 1939, with Claire Trevor, Andy Devine, Thomas Mitchell, and John Carradine, he became a first-magnitude star.

Wayne was very picky about the kind of roles he would play: never mean, never petty, never cowardly, rarely even cautious. He so much adored playing heroes that it was sometimes said of him in Hollywood that he was just a "big kid." And truth be told, there was something juvenile about his extreme patriotism as well, which was of an ardor rarely encountered in the second half of the twentieth century. He could stand before the Republican National Convention in 1968 and say he was "grateful for every day of life I have spent in the United States of America." But where he parted company with many reasonable citizens and people of an independent turn of mind was that he could not bear to have his country or any appreciable part of it portrayed in an unflattering light anywhere, at any time, by anybody. He placed simple uncomplimentary descriptions, regardless of purpose, on virtually the same level as subversion. He accused Carl Foreman and Robert Rossen of doing things deeply "detrimental to our way of life" by respectively writing the screenplay for *High Noon* (1951) and directing *All the King's Men* (1949). Presumably, he felt the same way toward Robert Penn Warren for writing the novel on which the latter was based.

To take only *High Noon* as an example: "In that picture", recounted Wayne, "four guys come into town to gun down the sheriff." The sheriff, who knows they're coming, seeks help but is refused everywhere. "So Cooper goes out alone", said Wayne. "It's the most un-American thing I've ever seen in my whole life! The last thing in the picture is ole Coop putting the United States Marshall's badge under his foot and stepping on it! I'll never regret having helped run Foreman out of this country!"

Wayne had an intense dislike for certain words: "socialist", "liberal", even "masses." "When Eddy Dmytryk used the word 'masses' I knew he was a Commie", he said, and yet, child-like, he pleaded with Dmytryk after he was released from prison: "Jesus Christ, Eddy, why did you do it? [meaning why join the Communist Party] Weren't you making a good living? And what's the bitch about America?" For four key years during the Joseph McCarthy period, he was president of the famous anti-communist Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals. Yet when the actor Larry Parks (briefly a huge star in 1946 with *The Jolson Story*) admitted to having once been a member of the Communist Party, Wayne said it was "courageous" of Parks to admit it, and hoped it wouldn't hurt his career. Hedda Hopper, the reigning gossip columnist of the period, addressing a mass meeting of the Alliance as its vice president, declared that Larry Parks would certainly not be forgiven, adding later in private, "Duke is a little dumb about these things."

As recorded by Randy Roberts' and James S. Olson's workmanlike new biography, *John Wayne American*, Wayne "resented being characterized as an extremist. He considered himself a mainstream

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conservative Republican, a principled, anti-government, classical conservative" (whose basic politics would hardly attract attention in the age of Newt Gingrich). As it was, he fit fairly easily into the Eisenhower era. He had a strong personal distaste for the Kennedys because of their "lace-curtain arrogance and unctuous liberalism." Liberated from the need to work because of their "daddy's money", they were self-serving snobs, he believed.

Not that Wayne was anti-Catholic. Many of his closest friends, including director John Ford (born Sean Feeney), were ardent Catholics. Wayne's three wives were all Catholics. He raised his seven children Catholic and sent them to Catholic schools, to which he gave credit for them all "turning out well." Not a Jane Fonda in the bunch. Wayne jokingly called himself a Presbyterian and a "cardiac Catholic." But it turned out not to be a joke at all; lying on his death bed he was received into the Catholic Church and, before dying, received its last rites.

ACTUALLY IT WAS only in the 1960s, with the youth rebellion and the Vietnam War, that John Wayne's politics came to stand out. "Nobody's enjoying this war", he said in 1967, "but it happens to be damned necessary. . . . Ever since the revolution of 1917, the Communists haven't compromised once in the family of nations. They're out to destroy us, and logic tells me that this [resisting communism in Vietnam] is the right course. Besides, we gave our word." In 1971, Wayne said, "I honestly believe that there's as much need for us to help the Vietnamese as there was to help the Jews in Germany. . . . At some point we have to stop Communism." He thrilled to Israel's victories on the field of battle, and was of course immensely popular with the Hollywood old guard of Jewish Republicans.

Wayne once wrote to President Johnson that it is "extremely important that not only the people of the United States but those all over the world should know why it is necessary for us to be in Vietnam." To the surprise of many, however, he supported the new Panama Canal treaties of 1977, after which, for the first time in his life, he received hate mail from the American right wing. Although it seems he could hardly be more American, Wayne was unquestionably drawn to the feudal and virile aspects of Hispanic culture. Once, when asked to write his own epitaph, he replied in Spanish: *Feo, fuerte, y formal*, translating it himself: "He was ugly, strong, and had dignity."

For the last decade or so of his life, partly because the mass American public had never differed with him much on his issues, Wayne became that comparatively new phenomenon of American society: the *ex*-movie star as permanent culture hero. In the pre-television movie world there was very little nostalgia for older stars once they no longer ruled at the box office. A fashionable word of that earlier period was "has-been." Richard Lamparski, author of the *Whatever Became of . . . ?* series, says that in those days old stars "were treated very much like lepers were treated in Calcutta." But the last wave of performers to attain stardom before television demolished the old movie world was accorded, if not eternal life, virtual life tenure in celebrity. Who was to displace them? Motion pictures swiftly became the "class act" of the theatrical professions (replacing Broadway), but played to only some 5 percent of the audience the cinema had had before television. Television itself, which inherited the mass audience, had embarrassingly little prestige, even among the people who worked for it. And so, partly because his old movies continued to play on television, Wayne continued his extraordinary reign.

John Wayne was remarkably consistent in his views while fashionable circles in his country went first in one direction and then another. Famed far and wide for his patriotism, in domestic affairs he was from first to last an anti-big government liberal in the classical sense. Through the 1950s his views attracted relatively little attention and almost no animosity, perhaps because of his transparent good-heartedness. And once the more strident counter-cultural attitudes of the 1960s and early 1970s had passed through the nation's system, any antagonism there might have been against Wayne quite withered. John Wayne himself, meanwhile, had not changed his ideas in the slightest. He died the year before his friend, Ronald Reagan, with whom he had so much in common, was elected president of the United States. □

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Home and Abroad

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Jeffrey Madrick, *The End of Affluence* (New York: Random House, 1995), 175 pp., $22.00.

Robert J. Samuelson, *The Good Life and Its Discontents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 293 pp., $25.00.

Odd though it now appears, less than a decade ago Americans were debating whether the United States was a declining power in world politics. Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* reached the national bestseller list. Geo-economics was alleged to be replacing geopolitics, and Japan was cast ominously as a rising giant. At the time of the Group of Seven Summit in Houston in 1990, some observers portrayed Japan and a reunited Germany as rising superpowers.

Such predictions look less impressive today. At mid-decade the German and Japanese economies languish in the doldrums: Japan has low unemployment but very little growth, while Germany has only modest growth and high unemployment. In recent years the U.S. economy has experienced 2 1/2 percent annual growth, low unemployment, low inflation, and impressive productivity gains in manufacturing that have restored the country's competitiveness in key industries.

Even more to the point, and as some observers noted during the earlier "declinism" debate, the United States is the only country that scores well in all the components of national power: military, economic, and soft power (cultural and ideological attraction). Germany and Japan are largely unidimensional powers with limited portfolios of instruments. Moreover, the decline of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the counterbalances to American military and soft power. Since power is relational, the poor performance of others has the effect of enhancing American power. Some commentators began referring to the 1990s as an era of American hegemony in a unipolar world. Such descriptions are misleading, however, because they fail to portray the growing complexity of domains of power.

At the military level, it is true that power is unipolar and likely to stay that way well into the next century; this is because of America's edge in harnessing the information revolution to military capabilities. Outmoded measures of military force misled many to overestimate the importance of Iraq's tanks in 1990, and many misread the significance of China's three-million man army today. America's greatest military advantage lies in its ability to collect, integrate, and disseminate information about complex events occurring in wide geographic areas in real time. Such dominant battlespace knowledge provides us with an unparalleled capacity for both tactical surprise and the identification of targets for attack with precision force. Although the basic technologies—satellites, high speed computers, sensors, software—that underlie this military advantage will be increasingly available in commercial markets, the United States is likely to keep its military lead because: (1) it is rich; (2) it is unlikely to stop innovating; and (3) a country's possession of pieces of hardware is far less important than its capacity to integrate the pieces into a system of systems. China's military power, for example, will increase with rapid economic growth, but

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it will be a long time before it reaches the current American level—and by then America's military capabilities will have surged still further ahead.

Military force is important as a final arbiter of disagreements, and no state can afford to ignore it. Like oxygen, military security can be taken for granted only until it is missing, and then its absence dominates all else. But there are domains of world politics where military force is difficult or too costly to apply directly, and this gives rise to alternative distributions of power. While the global military system is unipolar, the global economy is multipolar with the United States, Europe, and Japan currently accounting for nearly two-thirds of world production, and China likely to join them early in the next century. Similarly, in the domain of transnational relations that cross borders outside government control—ranging from currency flows to terrorists to carbon dioxide—there is a broad diffusion of power. Thus we have the paradox of American unipolarity without hegemony—or more accurately, a unipolar military distribution of power that poorly predicts outcomes in other domains of power.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT that one must consider Jeffrey Madrick's *The End of Affluence* and Robert Samuelson's *The Good Life and its Discontents*. While the American economy is doing well compared to other rich countries, it is languishing in comparison to its own past performance. Since 1973, the rate of economic growth has slowed, and as Madrick quotes Herbert Stein, "the difference between 2 percent and 3 percent growth is not 1 percent; it is 50 percent." Had the economy grown 1 percent faster, America would have produced an additional $12 trillion in goods and services over the past two decades. That could have wiped out the federal budget deficit and reduced the current national debt by half, to $4 trillion. It would also have meant higher incomes. As Samuelson reports, in the 1950s and 1960s Americans became accustomed to real family incomes rising about 37 percent per decade, but that dropped to about 6 percent in the 1980s. He also notes that most Americans live far better today than they did twenty years ago. There are new products, more channels of communication, and 30,000 products stocked in the typical supermarket compared to 7,000 in the 1970s. But just as Tolstoy's rich man with a thorn in his bed of roses suffers as much as the barefoot peasant in the snow, so citizens of the richest nation suffer discontent because their expectations have been set so high. In Samuelson's words, "our present pessimism is a direct reaction to the excessive optimism of the early postwar decades. . . . Americans are now richer and freer than at any time in history. . . . Yet, we fixate on societal flaws. . . . Our faith in the superiority and power of the American economy has faded."

Does this mood of domestic dissatisfaction affect America's global power? Since power is relational, what matters internationally is not America's performance in comparison to its own past, but how it is doing in relation to other countries. And in this regard, as we have seen, the United States is doing better than ever since the end of the Cold War. The slowdown of economic growth since 1973 has affected every advanced industrial country, and the American information edge is so great that even the rapidly growing countries of East Asia will be unable to challenge American power for a long time to come.

A dismissal of the question in these terms, however, would be too sanguine. While it might be an accurate portrayal of capabilities, it ignores the subtle ways in which domestic politics can affect intentions or the willingness of Americans to use their power. Here are four such ways.

First, the current economic discontent can give rise to protectionism. As Samuelson notes, the current anxiety about increased lay-offs is far greater than the actual increase in lay-offs, yet it is the perception that is the relevant fact politically. Moreover, the "democratization of domestic insecurity" as lay-offs affect the middle class gives rise to a politics of the anxious middle. In such circumstances, political entrepreneurs are tempted to blame foreign scape-

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goats such as low wage workers in Mexico or East Asia for their problems. Despite the fact that with only about a tenth of the American economy involved in international trade, and three quarters of that trade being with other high wage countries, the workers of East Asia cannot possibly have caused a large part of the wage slowdown, the political pressures for protectionism can still grow. And a protectionist, inward-focused United States is less likely to be influential abroad.

A second, related connection is the belief that the United States cannot afford to invest in foreign affairs. In an era of deficit reduction, it is tempting to devalue the claims of foreigners first. American economic and military aid has been severely cut and by far the larger part goes to just two countries: Israel and Egypt. The State Department budget is cut and embassies and consulates are closed, while arrears in payments to international organizations mount. Congress cuts the budget of the U.S. Information Agency and the Voice of America even though they are crucial instruments of American power in an information age. (Those who say that information should be left solely to market forces should contemplate Rupert Murdoch's dropping of BBC News from his satellites, after China complained about its coverage.) The military budget, which has declined steadily for a decade, has revived somewhat in congressional favor after the 1994 elections, but as we saw earlier, there are domains of power in the international system that are difficult to affect with military power. And total spending on foreign affairs—defense, diplomacy, aid—is now about 4 percent of the GNP, a decrease of one-third since the end of the Cold War.

A third effect is more indirect. The relative economic slowdown may well be contributing to the decline of trust in government, as both Madrick and Samuelson suggest, and that loss of confidence may in turn reduce governmental effectiveness and constrain American foreign policy. Expectations are higher than the economy can satisfy, and government is held accountable for the shortfall. As Samuelson puts it, "by expecting our leaders and institutions to do the impossible, we overburden them and hamper them in doing the possible." The politics of exaggerated expectations leads to scapegoating and decline of trust in institutions. Trust in the federal government has declined from three-quarters of the public polled in 1970 to less than a quarter today.

A certain distrust of government is healthy. After all, the United States was founded on distrust of government in London and the Jeffersonian tradition remains as strong as the Hamiltonian in our philosophy. But healthy distrust differs from cynicism and paranoia. At some level, low trust is likely to become cumulative and causal through repetition. That in turn inhibits the flow of good people into government careers (including the Foreign Service) and reduces the willingness of the public to provide resources, which in turn further reduces the effectiveness of government. Others around the world notice when America seems unable to function as a great power is expected to function. Whatever its causes, the spectacle of repeated shutdowns of the federal government in 1995-6 did not enhance American influence abroad.

The final and most fundamental connection between perceptions of American economic decline and its power internationally concerns preserving the kind of nation that is at the heart of America's soft power appeal in an information age. Slow growth and negative politics undercut this resource. In recent years, this most valuable foreign policy asset has been endangered by foreign perceptions of American domestic life as one riven by crime, violence, drug abuse, racial tension, family erosion, fiscal irresponsibility, political gridlock, and negative politics. America is not alone in having such problems; some are worse in other countries. But soft power, the cultural and ideological appeal that makes many—though clearly not all—others *want* to follow our lead, depends upon our being a beacon, not on our limping along with the rest. A healthy democracy at home, made accessible around the world through modern communications, is essential to the long-run future of American power. In this sense, more than ever, America's domestic and foreign policies are intertwined.

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WHAT ARE THE prospects for escaping from our current domestic discontents? Since there is no single cause, there is not likely to be a single solution. But to the extent that Madrick and Samuelson are correct about the importance of the economic slowdown, there may be an unexpected glimmer of optimism. Both identify the culprit as the decline of productivity, particularly in the service component of the economy. In the early postwar years, productivity grew at about 3 percent per year; since the 1970s it has averaged about 1 percent. (While measurement of productivity in services is a factor, it does not account for the whole problem.)

No one knows for sure why productivity has declined, but one possibility is that we have not yet made the social changes necessary to allow us to enjoy the full benefits of the information revolution. At the turn of the last century, during the second industrial revolution, electricity did not have a strong effect on productivity for several decades after its introduction. Early applications were electrification of existing vertical water-driven mills. Only when Henry Ford and others used electricity to reorganize factories into long horizontal mass production lines did the large gains in productivity arise. By analogy, the current investments in computers and information technology are still in the "water mills stage." If so, the early part of the next century may see a punctuated equilibrium in our economic evolution. By a similar analogy, our political system may evolve into a new bipartisan progressive era similar to that which accompanied the economic transformation of the second industrial revolution.

At this point, it is too early to tell whether these optimistic analogies will describe the future, or whether the only healthy response to our current domestic economic discontents will be to lower expectations. Perhaps books like *The End of Affluence* and *The Good Life and Its Discontents* will help stimulate us to solve our problems rather than be demobilized by them. □

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and author of *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Books, 1990). From 1993-5 he served as chairman of the National Intelligence Council and assistant secretary of defense for international security.

Things Fall Apart

William McNeill

Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996), 476 pp., $27.50.

INTREPID TRAVELER as he is, Robert D. Kaplan wrote his latest book, *The Ends of the Earth*, to report on an "unsentimental journey" through parts of West Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. His plan was to "see the present in terms of the future", thus folding "international studies into a travelogue." Ominous forebodings of nasty things to come haunted him throughout his trip, but he also came to recognize "that all my 'answers' might eventually be proven wrong." Perhaps so, but along the way he has interesting things to say about what it is like to travel by public conveyances and rub shoulders with ordinary, common people in some of the earth's poorest and most stressful human environments.

Kaplan sets the tone of the book in its very first words, as he reports on West

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Africa: "'The thieves are very violent here. . . .' warned the Liberian woman in fine, lilting English. Night had fallen. My protectress gripped my arm, then walked me to the hotel. . . . The little feet of a baby, wrapped snugly around her back, bobbed at her sides." The woman had fled from violence in her homeland to the comparative safety of the Ivory Coast, where, Kaplan informs us, no less than three-quarters of the capital city's inhabitants and half of the entire country's population have come from beyond the country's frontiers.

The flow of peoples across political borders is, indeed, one of Kaplan's principal themes, matched by his emphasis on the decay of the state as the real authority over actual human communities. "It was in Sierra Leone", he says, "that I first considered the possibility that just as states and their governments were meaning less and less, the distinctions between states and armies, armies and civilians, and armies and criminal gangs were also weakening." After all, as a diplomat informed him, "The police have no gas for their vehicles. The government of Sierra Leone has no writ after dark."

WHEN KAPLAN begins his journey, he is inclined to believe that geography and culture explain most of what he sees. For example, he attributes the extreme violence prevailing in Liberia (which he could not visit for political reasons) to "the wettest, densest forest in tropical Africa" and the disruption of its "forest culture: a land of spirits" brought on by population growth, migration to coastal cities, and "erosion of customs and values." Insofar as traditional values do hang on, they obstruct the economic changes needed to keep up with population growth. "It is dangerous to save anything", one of his informants remarks, "because everything must immediately be shared. The African social system works to level everybody down to the same standard. It is a system that works against ambition." Kaplan concludes, despairingly, that West Africa is reverting to violent and chaotic localism. "Instead of reconstituted tribal kingdoms modeled on the past", he writes, "what was emerging were neo-primitive shanty domains."

In North Africa, by contrast, as an anonymous West African politician explains to him, "Islam provides a social anchor of education and indoctrination." But when Kaplan visits the Islamic lands of Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Pakistan he finds that politicized Islam is also prone to destabilize existing states and governments, even when, as in Iran and Pakistan, Muslim religious identity and commitment are official, part of the panoply of the state. In all these countries, he concludes, "Islamic extremism is the psychological defense mechanism of urbanized peasants threatened with the loss of tradition." This gives much needed meaning to private life, and in Turkey Kaplan finds that "Islam filled the gap evacuated by a political establishment that could not keep up with the changes overtaking a society in the midst of upheaval." As a result, "the ideals of community and self-help were being reinvented by newly settled migrants" whose search for a better life had once again made Istanbul into the largest city of Europe.

In Egypt, officially persecuted Islamic extremists attract widespread support for the same reason: they focus on the grassroots community level. But neither they nor Hosni Mubarak's oppressive government can cope with environmental problems created by the rapidly growing population and unsustainable new methods of irrigation. These methods were introduced when basin irrigation, which had kept Egypt's fields fertile for millennia, was abandoned after the Aswan High Dam was finished in 1970. The new style of irrigation uses special channels to distribute Nile water over a much enlarged area. But instead of draining surplus water off onto adjacent fields, as before, smaller amounts of the life-giving water are now allowed to sink in and evaporate, leaving salt behind. In addi-

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tion, the silt that used to fertilize Egypt's fields each year is now piling up behind the Aswan Dam. Chemicals can substitute, but add a new cost to agriculture. The result, according to Kaplan, is a ticking time bomb. "Almost all of Egypt's irrigated land is now on the verge of being 'salt affected.' As much as 10 percent of Egypt's agricultural production may be lost each year to deteriorating soil fertility."

The political augury Kaplan derives from his encounters with Egyptians is almost as dismal as his forecast for West Africa. "A political era marked by scarcer resources, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world's fastest growing religion." The choice for Egypt is to replace "a dying socialist kleptocracy" either with immediate and violent political fragmentation (as in West Africa), or with an intensified Islamic despotism, since real democracy in Egypt "could lead to chaos." Yet Kaplan does not think such a despotism would find "answers to humanity's struggle with the environment", and when that becomes clear such a government "would die slowly. . . . The Nile Valley is geographically friendly to a cohesive state. But a few decades of semi-anarchy would not be unprecedented in Egypt's long history; nor would a tyranny far, far worse than that of the late twentieth-century Nasserist pharaohs."

When he gets to Anatolia, Iran, former-Soviet Turkestan, and Chinese Turkestan (or Sinkiang), Kaplan encounters a different and more hope-filled, yet no less turbulent, part of the Islamic world. More than half of his book, in fact, is devoted to the complex cultural and economic encounters now underway among Turks, Iranians, Russians, and Chinese, with Armenians, Kurds, Afghans, and the diverse peoples of the Caucasus region thrown in for good measure. He knows a lot more about this part of the world than he does about the other lands he visits, and he brings an impressive historical understanding to bear on the variegated scenes that pass before his eyes.

As always, Kaplan tries to detect the solidarities that unite, and the hostilities that divide, the populations he visits. He regards existing state boundaries as evanescent and artificial because vanished empires and ancient cultural patterns influence human reality more pervasively than today's administrative accidents. For example, he views the rich and complex ethnic tapestry of these lands as the outcome of a millennial struggle between Iran and Turan. Beginning as a simple conflict between farmers and nomads, repeated migrations and conquests have now created ugly, overgrown cities, where ethnically diverse migrants from the countryside try, with scant success, to maintain village solidarities in urban contexts. This unstable ethnic mix confronts growing water shortages and the rapid salinization of irrigated fields, especially in the river basins that flow into the Aral Sea. In addition, vast oil reserves around and under the Caspian Sea contribute an inflammatory element to the geopolitics of the region. Russia, Iran, and Turkey each has a plan for constructing a pipeline through its territory so as to control the delivery of Caspian oil to world markets, and American oil companies have recently started negotiations for access to these oil fields as well.

As always, Kaplan is alert to signs of governmental breakdown. For example, the revolutionary regime Khomeini instituted in 1979 "is far more flexible and chaotic than the Iran of the Pahlevis", with the result, he says, that

> the borders . . . between Iran and former Soviet Turkmenistan in the northeast and between Iran and Afghanistan in the east are porous and bristling with trade and the movement of peoples. Persia thus expands as its central government weakens and Turkic races renew their historic infiltration of the Iranian plateau.

As the Islamic revolution slowly wears itself out in Iran, Kaplan suggests that the emergence of "a murky world of deals and mutual favors where written laws had yet to be invented" may foreshadow "the implosion of

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political Islam and the rise of the Islamic bazaar state." Overall, Kaplan believes that "Turkic culture (secular and based on languages adopting a Latin script) is battling Iranian culture (religiously militant as defined by the Tehran clergy, and wed to an Arabic script) across Central Asia and the Caucasus." But there is another trend as well, for Turks are also "identifying themselves increasingly as Moslems, betrayed by a West that for several years did so little to help besieged Moslems in Bosnia and which attacks Turkish Moslems in the streets of Germany."

When he crosses the Chinese border into Sinkiang, Kaplan encounters unmistakable signs of a far more powerful, centralized state than he has met before. But he remains unconvinced even of China's political stability, pointing to population pressures and the all too familiar phenomenon of disastrous salting of fertile soil on newly-irrigated land. Moreover, "Though Turkic and other minorities account for roughly 6 percent of China's population, they occupy over half of China's land area." Or at least they did until very recently, for as he also points out, "The real demographic story in Sinkiang was the Chinese, whose numbers had grown from about 240,000 in 1948 to 5.4 million in 1986." Urumqi, the capital, is a bustling city with a million inhabitants, four-fifths of whom were Chinese newcomers. Its "department stores with crowded shelves, reminiscent of 1950s America, and hard-angled skyscrapers" rose from "a baked desert plateau in Chinese Turkestan, without enough ground water to sustain the growing population." Despite such outward signs of recent success for the Chinese, Kaplan suggests that "Regional warlord-business elite alliances could reshape China as they have in the past. At the same time, the breakup of the Soviet Union has led . . . the two parts of Turkestan [to] begin to unify, de facto." And, after noting a Canadian geographer's prediction that Turkestan and China will not remain the same on the map, he concludes his reflection by asserting, "It is in Central Asia, I suggest, that the political eruptions emanating from Iran, China and the Indian subcontinent will usually spill over."

To map the relevant "political eruptions" of the future, Kaplan travels down a precipitous, newly-opened road over the Pamirs connecting China with Pakistan. On arriving in the Indus River plains he finds Pakistan to be "a decomposing polity based more on criminal activities than on effective government." All the familiar factors—rapid population growth, intensive irrigation and resultant salting, together with complex ethnic frictions—make for chaos.

> The finely cut 'map-maker' borders between the ex-Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are gradually being replaced by a Turkic world, a Persianized world, a Pathan world, and a Punjabi world meeting and shading into one another. Afghanistan is becoming a memory and Pakistan could yet devolve into what the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* called the 'lesser frontier states'. . . . What we are increasingly seeing in Central Asia is the weakening of conventional states and relative strengthening of what geographers and ethnographers call 'ecoregions' or 'bioregions': specific landscapes . . . which for centuries have nurtured specific ethnic groups. Simply stated: Whatever can be managed at the local level will be.

Kaplan comes to the same conclusion about India. Here, however, he finds a ray of hope during a visit to a small southern valley where local leaders acting on the principle that "ecological renewal is essential to cultural renewal" had reforested a desolate, overgrazed landscape, created a school for village children, and converted the Rishi Valley into "a big organic farm carrying out a 'post-Green Revolution' revolution by reinvesting money raised by sale of its own produce." The achievement was the work of followers of an Indian sage, Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986), whose ideas about human responsibil-

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ity for cherishing the earth inspired a handful of refugees from Madras to establish a school for children from upper class urban families in the valley where Krishnamurti was born. This in turn became the base for reorganizing the landscape when initial small-scale practical successes with reforestation and water management helped the school's leaders win active cooperation from local villagers. On the strength of this demonstration of how to overcome environmental degradation, Kaplan concludes that "wealth creation is more a matter of culture than of politics."

When he finally gets to Cambodia, Kaplan is suddenly baffled:

> I had assumed that the random crime and social chaos of West Africa was the result of an already fragile cultural base . . . coming further undone as a consequence of rapid population growth and urbanization. But here I was in the heart of Buddhist-Confucian Southeast Asia, in a land where the written script was one thousand two hundred years old, and every surrounding country was in some stage of impressive economic growth. Yet Cambodia was eerily similar to Sierra Leone: with random crime, mosquito-borne disease, a government army that was more like a mob, and a countryside that was ungovernable because of guerrilla insurgents.

His laboriously achieved insight that cultural heritage was the main determinant of local capability for creating wealth thus came a cropper. Rather engagingly, he confesses, "The effect of culture was more a mystery to me near the end of my planetary journey than at its beginning."

Accordingly, it seems, Kaplan concludes with a muted trumpet call. What is happening in the countries he visited must concern all Americans. "I thought of America everywhere I looked. We cannot escape from a more populous, interconnected world of crumbling borders. . . . But I would be unfaithful to my experience if I thought we had a general solution to these problems. *We are not in control.* . . . Foreign aid will make less and less difference in coming decades. . . . People will either solve or alleviate their problems at the local level, as in Rishi Valley, or they won't." He sums up what he had learned by remarking on the very last page: "No one can foresee the precise direction of history, and no nation or people is safe from its wrath."

I HEARTILY AGREE that we do not control what is going on in the world. Unforeseen consequences of our own actions, not to speak of those of nature, dominate human lives, and have always done so. What is new today is our increased power to alter natural processes, upsetting older balances globally as well as locally. Largely because of our enhanced power over nature, drastic change—political, cultural, ecological, and epidemiological—is rapid, irresistible, and quite definitely out of control. Kaplan makes vivid for his readers how harshly current changes can impinge on some poor and crowded parts of the earth.

On the other hand, Kaplan does not persuade me that local self-help of the kind he stumbled upon in the Rishi Valley is a cure for what ails the world. Even if new, gentler ways of treating the landscape satisfy the local inhabitants as thoroughly as Kaplan says, jealous or greedy outsiders can quickly destroy what decades of hard work have accomplished. Lasting solutions require a political regime that can prevent destructive violence, yet Kaplan sees nothing but political breakdown wherever he looks.

It seems to me one could argue the opposite, that the need for effective government actually increases in a turbulent world. Brutal violence can indeed destroy whole populations, and has often done so in times past. But political chaos of the sort that now prevails in Liberia cannot long be borne. Violence always runs its course, and effective government resumes, presumably—if modern communications have not been wiped out—in a manner even more powerful than before.

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In general, in unstable situations the weaknesses of centralized authority that Kaplan emphasizes so much are soon countered by an intensified need for security, and it is not clear how the actual balance will tip, even in the worst governed states he has visited. Uninhibited local violence is simply too costly for anyone to want. Such a regime is therefore unlikely to last very long. After all, struggles among local gangs can rapidly turn into an effective monopoly of violence when one gang prevails. And as long as the existing state framework retains even a shadowy legitimacy, it sets a boundary for local tyrannies that is difficult to cross, for the apparatus of international peacekeeping frowns on cross-border aggression far more effectively than on internal fighting.

States, even tatterdemalion ones, are a lot tougher—and more necessary—than Kaplan thinks they are. His emphasis on population growth, runaway urbanization, and cultural and ecological disruption is worth pondering. But his account of the places he has visited and of the people he has met along the way offer a more heartening glimpse of human resilience under the duress of drastic change than he likes to admit. □

William H. McNeill is emeritus professor of history, University of Chicago.

Through the Garbage Can, Darkly

Eric Jones

David Williams, *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 334 pp., $59.95.

THERE IS A HOLE the size of Japan in this book. Japan ghosts in only as the home of uniquely brilliant economic management that gives it "an almost golden patina", exposing by its glow the ineffectiveness of Western, especially American, policy. Yet social scientists are condemned as "keen to ignore or denigrate Japan's achievements" and their intellectual blindness is David Williams' target. His black list stretches to include philosophers, literary critics, and even a scientist (the continued "baleful influence" of Sir Isaac Newton). This, then, is a work of criticism ranging over the more fashionable social sciences and humanities, assessing and mostly rejecting them as unsuitable for elucidating the Japanese political system and berating their exponents for ignoring that system in any case.

Williams, who is senior research fellow in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, bases his book on lectures he gave at Oxford during the 1990-91 academic year. His dazzling text suggests there is no one Williams has not read, except mainstream economists, and almost no one, read or unread, whose work he does not dislike. Very few escape the sword. Prominent among those who do are Edward Said, George Steiner, Richard Rorty, and Chalmers Johnson. Even the last two, they will perhaps be glad to hear, may have some clay where their feet should be.

The excoriating is clever, objections astutely anticipated and adroitly rolled over, a striking phrase on every page. The author's scope is a little miracle. His judgments are absolutist: Western writers are blamed if they do not deal with Japan, and blamed for getting it wrong if they do. They are held guilty of being disingenuous, craven, imperious, intolerant, dogmatic, Eurocentric and, it goes without saying, anti-Japanese. They are virtually looked

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over, in Kingsley Amis' phrase, for signs of "passive racial violence." They culpably overlook the fact that the rise of Japan was a signal development in the long *durée* of human history, creating a political economy not merely beyond the dreams of Western social science but destructive of all its pretensions, requiring, in truth, a new Japano-centric social science of its own. Not that the specifications of this wonder are ever set out. An "open" political science is mapped only by denouncing the putatively closed one we now possess.

Let us move nearer. The author writes,

> I have sought to do nothing more than send up a flare to illuminate the whole horizon of epistemological and ontological difficulty facing those who animate the disciplined study of Japanese and East Asian politics in Europe, North America and Australia today. I have concentrated my critical fire on the ways that the methodologies and paradigms that prevail in textual classicism, positivism, empiricism, Orientalism, linguistic theory and post-structuralism all *appear*, from the vantage of political science and Japanese studies, to deny the canonic achievements of modern East Asians. Nowhere have I sought to deliver a decisive blow. Rather the intention has been only to stimulate awareness of the *Grundprobleme*. . . .

The Lord, or to stay with the spirit of this barrage, the *Herrgott*, knows what detonation Williams would accept as final.

To continue in his words:

> Scientific status is being denied to political scientists *despite* the fact that they are busy discovering new facts. . . . Advocates of social scientific prediction, economic positivism, behaviouralism and rational choice, and some schools of quantitative research methods all suffer from empirical bad faith . . . they threaten to deny jobs and research funding to some of the best-known names in the Western political scientific study of Japan and their students.

It would be laborious to refer to the relentless detail of Williams' indictment, which disappointingly documents no scandals of tenure refused or the like. He is intent on more abstract questions about the relative status of economics and area studies. Being neither a practitioner of mainstream economics nor a student of any single country, I hope I can view this tussle at a remove.

The source of the West's refusal to acknowledge Japanese (or, in a revealing shift, East Asian) achievement is positivism, "pernicious" and "procrustean." Exactly what this is never becomes clear: the search for regularities and scientific laws of the kind that led to telephones or antibiotics? What, then, is Williams' alternative? Maybe the pluralism of what is termed (he says inelegantly, but I say, with Freud, that there are no accidents) the "garbage-can theory." The language of garbage-can theory, we are told, is not about "anything very specific" but addresses all contingencies, amasses each and every fact in the hope it has the power to kill an idea. Its efficiency appears elusive.

Williams' ideological inclination may be revealed by a remark he makes that another writer's "social liberalism and commitment to egalitarianism provided her with an indispensable dose of critical clarity." I suspect he may be putting a gloss on this writer's position, but on the face of it the statement is perilously like saying that Lysenko's commitment to the Soviet people gave him an indispensable dose of scientific acumen. Williams' overall methodological preference seems to lean toward implying that anyone who tries to establish interpersonal knowledge—the kind that is shared and can be replicated by the next thinker—is seeking permanent validity for his ideas. Ignore whether or not anyone actually believes this—indeed set aside debate about the existence of objective truth. Merely consider the instrumental advantages in any sphere of having agreed rules. Take prescriptive grammar. The practical utility of English grammar is not compromised by its ultimate arbitrariness. The rules are conventions without which the descent to chaos begins. We have no need to grapple with abstractions about positivism to know that it

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makes sense to try to talk intelligibly to one another. This does not mean that we are claiming finality for our accounts of the world.

The archetypal positivist ruin is economics, the type of economics that can be traced back to Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. This is Williams' message, not mine. His opinion of the tunnel vision of economists does have something to it. There are bound to be limits to the applicability of economics to political science, as there are to economic history; economics is readily pushed too far.[1] Nor do I doubt that there is also something in his insinuation that networks of quantifiers are appointing their clones to university posts. Robert Frank has discussed the sociopathology of professional economics at length, reporting among other unappealing facts that economists earn more than comparable academics but give less to charity.[2] We do not know whether certain personality types are attracted to the discipline or whether the training inculcates such attitudes. Maybe both. But what, if anything, this has to do with despising the Japanese is imponderable.

The crime of economists, so we are told, is that their positivism has infiltrated political science. Their habit of piling up theory, uncaring of the will o' the wisp contingencies of life, has been passed on like a virus. The further charge is that they spurn Japan, withholding recognition from its genesis and achievement. Professional economists do tend to leave the origins of the East Asian Miracle to historians of political economy; it is surely proper that they concentrate on the modern macroeconomy. As Ernest Gellner said, things favoring the start of economic growth and things maintaining this may not be the same. Once learned, "single-end rationality may not be quite such a difficult accomplishment", but—restricted accomplishment though it be—how economies work is what economists claim to study.[3] None is duty-bound to single out the Japanese economy.

If economists thought that studying Japanese culture and institutions really would advance theory (and their reputations) they would move in on Japanese studies in droves. We can deduce this from the fact that they commonly "free-ride" on other scholars, for instance historians. The reason is that economists take their strength to lie in explanation rather than in the grind of descriptive work. Their choice of other topics says however not one whit about hostility to the Japanese. Should you conclude that because I have not mentioned the Scott Polar Base in this review, I hate penguins?

Williams reiterates endlessly that Japan is the most important political system in the world, deserving of a separate science, and that the proof lies in its successful economic management. This amounts to a strong opinion that the Japanese recession of the 1990s has been cyclical rather than structural. The occasional reference to East Asia as a whole introduces at least one further problem that is avoided: how could industry policy have accounted for economic growth in Hong Kong?

If Japan is the ghost in Williams' machine, economics is thus the ghoul. According to him, things would have been all right if Western economists had studied Friedrich List, as the Japanese do, or once did. List is certainly interesting. He was no simple-minded protectionist. I accept that it is sadly incurious of modern Western economists—to tar them with one brush—that List no longer rates a mention in the syllabus. But no effort is made in this book to determine what is supposed to flow from List, or whether industry policy must beat the free market, let alone how long a giant experiment of that kind should be let run. We are given no means of gauging the real impact List has, or once had, on Japanese policy formation. Furthermore, there is too little structure in *The*

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[1] E.L. Jones, "Economics in the History Mirror", *Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1990), pp. 157-172.

[2] Robert H. Frank, *Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for Status* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), and *Passions Within Reasons: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).

[3] Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History* (London: Collins Harvill, 1988), p. 75.

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National System of Political Economy (1841) for this to have been developed into a rich, separate stream of economic theory. List was no Smith or Ricardo, he was an interesting advocate of one sort of policy. Whether he contributed much more than a rationalization of what policy-makers in Japan anyhow proposed to do still awaits demonstration. As to Williams' grander claims, it must be insisted that nothing in this book shows that Japan is so different as to need its own social science. Why (for instance) should we read claims about Japanese snow being suitable only for home-produced skis, or Japanese guts being capable of digesting only home-grown rice, as anything but arrant glosses on protectionism?

Beyond any doubt there is group-think in mainstream economics. The power of price theory—the theory of markets and how prices are formed—can go to the head. Second-year graduate students can become drunk by pressing what is, in lay terms, the law of supply-and-demand up against its limits. They are only trying to practice their craft. Anything may be translated into the economists' calculus, but how much should be is a matter of judgment. All disciplines have to decide where to draw the line between intellectual conservatism and intellectual novelty. Yes, some economists do remain intolerant of alternative visions of the world beyond their graduate school years. In any field the second-raters are commonly formalists. However, attempts to extend the maximizing calculus into untraditional realms are not improper. If such efforts work, so be it; they are set up as refutable. Despite subservience to intellectual fashions and an occasional constriction in the professional maze, there is usually a way out. Let me cite an instance: Calculations that East Asian growth derives largely from the accumulation of resources rather than advances in productivity were hard to publish at first, but nevertheless they did get into print and formed the basis of Krugman's famous paper on the "Myth of Asia's Miracle."[4]

Economists have thought about the rise of East Asia. A minority claims to find the secret in neo-Confucian culture. Most disagree. They find enough of the variance explicable in terms of ordinary processes, however oddly Japanese protectionism may bend them. Certainly economists are often glib about culture, belonging to the "cultural nullity" school.[5] They tend either to ignore culture entirely or to claim that, while it exists, economics offers sufficient explanation: *ex hypothesi*, material considerations must dominate—with a lag. Yet any admission of a lag raises suspicions that something we could call culture is operating. On the other hand, there seems no cultural effect grand or lasting enough to lead one to abandon macroeconomics in its favor.

Williams prefers area studies. What this means is the study of the language, culture, institutions, and politics of another land, an approach that permits inter-country comparisons, though only binary ones. To explain East Asian regional change as a whole we also need, as Gordon Tullock has urged, "people who are able to deal with many countries, not one [or two]. They will not be able to speak, let us say, eighteen languages and hence must use other techniques."[6] Globalization increases the need for these other techniques. Or put the way the sinologist Pierre Ryckmans did, China experts should first be expert.

Is it vital, in order to identify with another culture, to go to its seat and steep oneself in its peculiarities? Arthur Waley never went to China; he is widely regarded as the prime translator of Chinese poetry. Stephen Crane wrote *The Red Badge of Courage* without fighting in the Civil War; veterans who read it insisted they had served with him. After David Garnett wrote *The Grasshoppers Come*, the locust specialist Uvarov asked for his Outer

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[4]Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1994), p. 70 note 5, and p. 72.

[5]E.L. Jones, "Culture and its Relationship to Economic Change", *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (June 1996), pp. 269-285.

[6]Gordon Tullock, letter on "Rational Choice and Asian Studies", *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), p. 99.

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Mongolian field notes; Garnett had relied on Uvarov's own monograph. Gautier financed his first visit to Greece with the advance he had received for writing a guidebook to that country. Johann Strauss the Younger could not waltz.

No one is suggesting that analytical techniques are perfect substitutes for local lore. The most impressive scholars I have ever met have been area specialists. Yet claims of the exceptionalism of this country or that do not take us far. They are always true, up to a point. A charge laid by economists against area studies in their cultural, linguistic form—which scorns anyone who is not a Margaret Mead, stumping in on her stick and talking about "my people"—is that its practitioners have not invariably acquired, or in cases like Williams', have set their faces against acquiring, the other social science techniques to which Tullock alludes. Some of them do not appear to see that models are intentionally tentative and testable constructs. Another charge might be that the students of single countries tend to belong to the "cultural fixity" school, prone to overlook how economic change reacts back on culture and alters it. The point is that local lore is not a perfect substitute for analytical techniques. Broader requirements in graduate school curricula could surely cross-fertilize economics and area studies.

Anyone can lay about him, as I have done in reacting against Williams' invective. But the search for knowledge does not require us only to criticize, much less to smite the Amalekites hip and thigh. A constructive approach would be similar to the one Robert Frank adopts in economics, noting the lapses but going on to incorporate fresh considerations in a systematic way. To switch the metaphor, economists and people in area studies are not Montagues and Capulets. There is no further point in calling down a plague on either or both their houses. Rather, they should be re-introduced to one another. □

Eric Jones is professorial associate at the Melbourne Business School, Australia.

Seeing Red

Joshua Muravchik

John E. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 214 pp., $24.95.

Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996), 266 pp., $29.95.

Richard Gid Powers, *Not Without Honor: The History of American Anti-Communism* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 554 pp., $30.

FROM THE 1960s through the 1980s, the strongest taboo in American political discourse was the subject of Soviet influence within the United States. The only way an American could be labeled a communist in the prestige press, it seemed, was to be the nominee of the Communist Party USA for president of the United States. To be nominated for vice president was insufficient: Gus Hall, the party's perennial presidential candidate, was identified as such; but Angela Davis, several times his running mate, was ordinarily identified only as a "black activist."

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The main reason for this taboo was the searing legacy of McCarthyism. McCarthy's modus operandi was to toss off serious accusations of disloyalty and treason with a disgracefully cavalier regard for accuracy. He seized center stage with sallies against communists in the State Department—an arm of the federal government that had in fact harbored communists. But how many, or who they were, or whether they were still employed at Foggy Bottom were details McCarthy could never get straight. Nor did he deign to distinguish between communists, fellow travelers, dupes, naifs, or critics of Joe McCarthy—all were smeared with the same brush.

McCarthy's name attaches not just to his own antics but to an era of obsession with subversion. No lives were taken as a result of this obsession, nor did many go to jail. But some lost their jobs, still more had careers disrupted, and many suffered agonizing periods of unwarranted scrutiny in which their patriotism was impugned. Such distinguished public servants as Cord Myer and Chip Bohlen, men who served their country with devotion, have recounted in their memoirs the ordeal of having to defend themselves against vague and baseless charges. All this was enough to convince many Americans that McCarthyism itself constituted a threat to the very freedoms it claimed to defend.

What kind of threat did it pose? In popular memory, McCarthyism constituted a threat to free speech, but it is a myth that anyone was silenced, least of all McCarthy's opponents. As the critic Leslie Fiedler put it in a 1954 essay, "From one end of the country to another rings the cry, 'I am cowed! I am afraid to speak out!', and the even louder response, 'Look, he is cowed! He is afraid to speak out.'" It is true that legal constraints were applied to the Communist Party and its members. But these aimed to suppress communist subversion, not communist ideas. In 1954 the liberal paragon Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced a bill to outlaw the Communist Party on the grounds that it was "an illegal conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence and not a legitimate political party." The Senate passed Humphrey's proposal by a vote of 85 to 1, but it was soon dropped because of doubts as to whether it could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Americans ultimately turned from McCarthyism with a shudder, not because free speech had been impaired but because of the growing conviction that the obsession with subversion bred a spirit of suspicion and distrust that degraded our public life. In theory, it was possible to distinguish, as the philosopher Sydney Hook did, between heresy and conspiracy. Indeed it was not difficult to do so. But an environment of nervous vigilance was bound to bring to the fore, and indeed sustain, those like McCarthy who could not or would not make such distinctions.

In late 1954 McCarthy was censured by the Senate, and little more than two years later he was in his grave. Coincidentally, American communism collapsed at the same time. The Cold War, Korea, government persecutions, and the self-purge conducted in the ranks of organized labor beginning in the late 1940s had already badly weakened the Party. The added blows in 1956 of the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian rebellion, and, even more devastating, the revelations of Stalin's crimes in Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, proved fatal.

SO WHEN THE "end of ideology" was proclaimed in the last year of the 1950s, both communism and McCarthyism were dead in America. Communism, however, was to have a reincarnation of a kind in the 1960s. Not that the Party ever came back to life. Rather, its soul entered the body of the New Left, which swept to the fore on college campuses, and which was to have clear attitudinal and emotional links to communism.

The New Left was not pro-Soviet. Its ideology was amorphous and its style self-

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indulgent, contrasting starkly with the discipline of old Leninists. Still, the connection was there: in the New Left's conviction that America was deservedly headed for the ashheap ("a dying civilization", in the words of the trademark song, "Age of Aquarius"); in its embrace of Third World communists and its rejection of anti-communism (spelled out first in the seminal 1962 Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society); and in the fact that a substantial share of the leadership and cadre of the New Left consisted of "red diaper babies" (children of Communist Party members). Indeed, the remnant of the old communist movement found new purpose and influence by adapting its political skills and resources to the civil rights and Vietnam antiwar movements.

McCarthyism experienced no similar reincarnation, and seemed to get buried ever deeper with the passing years. Its ghost, however, was skillfully conjured in order to discredit all anti-communist sentiment. To the communists who reemerged in the 1960s and their anti-anti-communist offspring in the New Left, McCarthyism represented not a metastasized outgrowth of anti-communism that scarred innocent victims but the very essence of anti-communism. The exemplar of this way of thinking was playwright Lillian Hellman, whose 1976 work *Scoundrel Time* portrayed those investigated for subversion in the 1950s as innocent victims of witchhunts. Hellman, about whom Mary McCarthy famously said that every word she ever wrote was a lie, "including 'and' and 'the'", denied that she herself was a communist, but in fact she was a loyal hack to the end, willing part of her estate to the creation of a fund for the advancement of "the doctrines of Karl Marx."

The memory of McCarthyism also protected the remnant of the old Communist Party as it found new life in the civil rights movement. In recent years various accounts have surfaced of the FBI's surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr., and of President Kennedy's personal appeals to King to rid himself of the communist apparatchiks in his entourage. Just as the communists had risen to near dominance in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1930s by supplying experienced, disciplined, and courageous field organizers, so a relatively small number of communists contributed substantially to civil rights activism in the 1960s.

In this respect, I experienced an epiphany during an all-night vigil outside the Manhattan offices of the Justice Department in the summer of 1964, held to demand a more energetic search for three young civil rights workers who had disappeared in Mississippi (two of whom were white, northern, red-diaper babies). As the night wore on, the refrain of our freedom song turned to "race-haters and *red-baiters* ain't a gonna turn me 'round." It appeared that everyone else knew this lyric and sang it with gusto, and that I was alone in thinking that it raised an extraneous issue.

The accounts of the FBI's King surveillance provided by David Garrow, Taylor Branch, and Murray Friedman contend that the communists in the King entourage had severed their ties to the party, and that in any event the wiretaps revealed that these advisers consistently offered counsels of moderation.[1] While this may be so, it is still reasonable to doubt whether it was healthy for the evolution of black activism that the civil rights movement's formative years were so influenced by ideologues whose view of American society was antipathetic to the core. As the movement grew increasingly unwieldy, producing all kinds of extremist,

[1]Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989); David Garrow, *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983); Murray Friedman, *What Went Wrong? The Creation and Collapse of the Black-Jewish Alliance* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

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violent, and crazy factions, the communists rushed in to support many of them, most notably the Black Panthers.

It is not just in relation to black politics that one may question whether the 1960s would have been as politically noxious as they were in the absence of McCarthy's legacy. For those of us who were student activists then, the first and necessary step toward a balanced understanding of the world was to see our country in perspective. But riveted by the civil rights movement's struggle with unconscionable racism here at home, too many of us failed for too long to appreciate that other countries were guilty of rights violations much more grievous than America's—and that, unlike America, they were doing nothing to remedy the situation. But the ethos of anti-anti-communism discouraged any such exposition of the sins of America's enemies.

Gradually over the 1970s and 1980s, a series of dramatic events—the Cambodian holocaust, the plight of the Vietnamese boat people, the rise and suppression of Solidarity in Poland—made anti-communism respectable again. Now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, even the taboo against discussing domestic communists is beginning to give way. The process of bridging this gap in America's history is being spurred on by evidence emerging from Soviet archives, and from files newly released by American intelligence, fruits of the operation code-named "Venona", a partial decoding of intercepted communications between Moscow and its agents in the United States. This is rich grist for the mills of a small group of American historians—notably John Earl Haynes, Ronald Radosh, Harvey Klehr, and Richard Gid Powers—who are reopening the story of American communism and its enemies. Together, their recent books will help readers who want to cut through the myth and proscription to understand the McCarthy episode, as well as the larger story of the combat involving American communists, anti-communists, and anti-anti-communists.[2]

JOHN HAYNES, in *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, shows how the anti-communist hysteria that McCarthy stoked and exploited grew out of a bitter sense of betrayal. In the interests of our wartime alliance, Americans had suppressed their misgivings about Stalin's Soviet Union. "It is bad Christianity, bad sportsmanship, bad sense to challenge the integrity of the Soviet government", fatuously wrote the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies. "The Soviet Union has shown by its deeds in the war and by its actions before this war that its word can be trusted." Soon after the war, however, a rapid succession of events shocked Americans out of their naivete and brought the wartime alliance to an end. The subjugation of Eastern Europe, the rejection of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade, the communist victory in China, the revelation that the formula for the atomic bomb had been stolen, and North Korea's invasion of South Korea—all unfolded within five years of our victory, in alliance with the Soviets, in the Second World War. Americans realized that they were once again enmeshed in a life-or-death struggle, this time with a foe toward whom they had recently shown much warmth and generosity. Worst of all, they seemed to be losing that struggle, a perception that bolstered McCarthy's charges of conspiracy within the very heart of the U.S. government.

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[2]Last year Klehr and Haynes (together with Russian historian Fridrikh I. Firsov) brought out *The Secret World of American Communism*, the first of three volumes of richly annotated documents from Soviet archives on the American communists to be published by Yale University Press. Even a few years ago, it is likely that only an ideologically conservative publishing house would have touched such a work. But Yale chose to make it the first release of what is planned as a large series of archival compilations on all aspects of Soviet history, and it even nominated the book for a Pulitzer Prize.

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Haynes reminds us that even though reckless accusations were made in the 1950s, not all were false or made up out of whole cloth. The "Hollywood Ten", who were blacklisted for their refusal to give testimony to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), are often remembered as martyrs, but Haynes informs us that "nine were party members and the tenth a close ally." Laughlin Currie, a Treasury Department official, testified before HUAC, stoutly denying the uncorroborated accusation by Elizabeth Bentley (a repentant former Soviet agent) that he had aided the Soviets. According to Haynes, however, new documents show Currie "providing the Soviets with diplomatic intelligence and warning them that the FBI had begun to suspect [Nathan] Silvermaster", the leader of a Soviet spy ring in the Treasury Department.

Haynes also shows us that even the slanderously accused are not necessarily innocent. Owen Lattimore was famously defamed by McCarthy as "the top Russian espionage agent" in the United States, although he was not a spy at all. He did, however, deliberately serve Soviet purposes and had a penchant for duplicity. Lattimore wrote to colleagues that they should support Soviet "international policy in general but without using their slogans", and shortly before the Korean War he said that he wanted "to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it." Haynes' general conclusion is that "for all its sporadic ugliness, excesses, and silliness, the anti-communism of the 1940s and 1950s was an understandable and rational response to a real danger."

One of the many virtues of Haynes' book is the light it sheds on the interplay between the ideological battles over communism and more parochial partisan conflicts. "McCarthy did not really care if he proved that Lattimore was a spy", says Haynes, "because his objective was not Lattimore or even Soviet spies. McCarthy's chief target was the Truman administration in particular and New Deal liberalism in general; the communist issue was the means to an end." In their embarrassment, the Democrats responded by attempting to sweep under the rug the whole issue of communist subversion in the government. When this became untenable, as it soon did, the Truman administration went too far in the other direction and "implemented a broader-than-needed [security clearance] system to protect its flank from Republican criticism."

In *Not Without Honor*, Richard Gid Powers relates the extremes and the excesses of the 1950s and 1960s to a longer history of political conflict, one that began with the Bolshevik seizure of power and lasted until the Soviet collapse. The Russian Revolution of 1917 touched off spasms of chiliastic radicalism elsewhere, including the United States, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. This in turn caused a wave of repression most often remembered as the "Palmer raids", after Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer who organized the arrest and deportation of radical aliens. Here, Powers spares neither side. He reminds us that Palmer was direly provoked: his own home was bombed, one of dozens of such attacks carried out by anarchists. On the other hand, Palmer's protégé, a 24-year old Justice Department attorney named J. Edgar Hoover, proceeded indiscriminately, recklessly labeling liberals, civil libertarians, and his own critics as "parlor pinks." Hoover later learned to be much more disciplined in his accusations, but he had set a lamentable precedent. Powers does a fine job of capturing the dialectic of false charges by anticommunists and false denials by communists that continued for decades.

A fascinating illustration of the effects of mundane politics on the exotic issues of espionage and subversion is contained in Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh's riveting account of the *Amerasia* case. *Amerasia*, a small journal of Asian affairs, was a thinly disguised communist front operation. It was the successor publication to *China Today*, which had been openly communist in its allegiance. Phillip Jaffe—the editor who oversaw *China Today's* transition to *Amerasia*—was apparently not a party member, but he was a devoted fellow-traveler. In the process of denouncing the leftist journalist I.F. Stone for insufficient fealty to Moscow,

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Jaffe once declared, "I would say that the first test of a real radical is, do you trust the Soviet Union through thick and thin, regardless of what anybody says?" When Jaffe was approached with a request to spy for Moscow, his only hesitation was concerning whether the man who approached him might be a U.S. secret agent.

During the latter months of the Second World War, when *Amerasia* began publishing classified documents, the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor to the CIA) broke into its offices and found it awash in classified documents. Government surveillance of the editors and their contacts ensued and resulted in six arrests: three journalists, including Jaffe, and three government employees, including John Stewart Service, one of the State Department's most prestigious China hands. In the end, however, the arrests led to little. Jaffe and a few others paid small fines and the rest got off altogether. The grand jury refused to indict Service. Although some historians claim that this showed that the government's case was trumped up, in fact, as Klehr and Radosh demonstrate, the outcome appears to have been the result of deliberate efforts within the Justice Department and perhaps elsewhere in the Truman administration to bury the case in order to avoid partisan embarrassment. As the authors point out, "the whitewash that did occur certainly gave right-wingers a ready-made *cause célèbre* and deep suspicions about the loyalty of government employees and the willingness of the U.S. government to prosecute betrayals of its secrets." Thus was the way prepared for McCarthy's notorious speech at Wheeling, West Virginia—in which one of the few people he actually named as a communist was John Stewart Service.

IN THE END, American communism was thoroughly defeated, and despite some abuses, there was no major derogation from democratic standards. No elections were canceled, no books were banned, no innocents were railroaded to jail. McCarthy contributed nothing to the defeat of communism. Instructively, that battle was fought and won primarily in the private sector—within the labor movement and liberal organizations. As Haynes puts it:

> Communists had not become a political factor by operating under their own banner; much of their influence came from their ability to influence established institutions of political liberalism. Once outside the protection provided by mainstream labor and liberal institutions, American communists faced isolation and near annihilation.

Powers describes how "nearly every democratic group on the left that had had any dealings with the Communists . . . turned into adamant anti-Communists" because of the communists' operational duplicity and insistent hidden agenda. He also emphasizes how disillusioned communists played a significant role in the downfall of the Party: "The American Communist Party and its fronts became schools for anti-Communists." In labor circles there was also an explicitly Catholic movement that embodied the church's hostility to communism, which mirrored communism's hostility to the church. Powers and Haynes each makes the point that most Americans historically have had no use for communism but also not much interest in actively fighting it. But these three sources—the democratic Left, the former communists, and the Catholic trade unionists—did produce cadres willing to fight the communists with a matching fervor.

Perhaps the cardinal theme of twentieth-century history has been the remarkable resilience of democracy in the face of foes that held it in contempt and seemed to possess important advantages against it. In its battle with domestic subversion, American democracy has proved sturdier than either the anti-communists or the anti-McCarthyites had perhaps feared. □

Joshua Muravchik is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and author of *The Imperative of American Leadership* (AEI Press, 1996).

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One Country, Two Capitals

Peter Rutland

Solomon Volkov, *St. Petersburg: A Cultural History* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), translated by Antonia W. Buis, 578 pp., $30.00.

Timothy J. Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 912 pp., $45.00.

MOST EUROPEAN countries have a single, unequivocal capital city, the seat of political, economic, and cultural power. It is only when one moves to larger realms outside Europe—to India, China, or the United States—that one starts to see a dispersal of the functions of the capital to more than one location.

Russia, true to its Eurasian schizophrenia, fits into neither pattern. It has always had a single, all-powerful capital—but it has had *two* of them this century. There is St. Petersburg, the creation of Peter the Great, perched on the western edge of his kingdom. And there is Moscow, sitting squat-like in the center of the European half of the domain. This century has seen power swing with unambiguous force from the former to the latter. St. Petersburg has been left to rot like an ancient Mayan city: a relic of a former civilization, first that of the empire, and then that of Soviet industrialism.

Volkov's *St. Petersburg: A Cultural History*, is a loving portrait of "the Atlantis on the Neva", the "cosmogonic" city whose ability to create images and ideas far exceeded its practical capabilities. The sheer physical survival of the city is something worthy of somber celebration. Built on a swamp by tens of thousands of forced laborers, it has been repeatedly threatened by massive floods, 1824 and 1924 being the most notable occasions. The tide of human history has been no less alarming. First came the brutality of the czars, then the chaos of revolution, the Stalinist terror, the 900-day blockade imposed by the Nazis, and the Zhdanov purge of 1946.

The duality of St. Petersburg was there from the beginning—a great imperial capital, built on a swamp. The central icon of the city's fate has been Falconet's 1782 statue of Peter the Great, immortalized in Alexander Pushkin's *The Bronze Horseman*. The city was not so much a "window on the West" as a *mirror* to the West, an opportunity for displaying—to European rulers and to Russian society—a false image of Russia's status and power. It proved ultimately to be the Potemkin capital of a Potemkin empire—although for more than two hundred years, from 1762 to 1991, Europe trembled at the sound of Russia's marching armies.

St. Petersburg was the product of an essentially eighteenth-century vision of state power—that of majesty and autocracy. In the nineteenth century the imagery started to shift, in Russia as elsewhere in Europe. The czars themselves were aware that society was metamorphosing beneath them but saw no alternative to repression. In the hands of Nikolai Gogol the absurdity and precariousness of the imperial enterprise started to reveal itself, and the Slavophiles raised the banner of Moscow as the true core of the Russian state. The capital should be rooted in the heartland of its people—and not plopped down at the whim of the emperor. Dostoyevsky argued that such an "intentional city" was a violation of human culture, and thus ultimately doomed. History seems to have proved him right.

St. Petersburg is one of those handful of cities—Venice, Florence, Paris—whose identity is imprinted on its buildings, in the quality of its light, and in its magical sense of place. Rarely can a city have been so fiercely loved by its citizens—only something like the 1871 Paris Commune comes to mind when search-

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ing for comparisons to how St. Petersburg, as Leningrad, responded to the 1941-4 blockade.

Volkov provides us with the biography of this city through the vivid and intimate portrayal of pivotal figures from its intellectual milieu, such as Anna Akhmatova and Dmitri Shostakovich. The book is not a comprehensive cultural history as such, but a series of interconnected biographies, woven together into a compelling tale. Andrei Bely's symbolist novel *Petersburg* (1913) gets relatively short shrift. Even though it is recognized as a literary masterpiece, Volkov sees it as something of a diatribe against "Peter" by a Muscovite.

Volkov notes that artists and musicians were able to find a *modus vivendi* both under the autocratic rule of the czars and the totalitarian regime of the Soviets, while writers and poets inevitably fell foul of the authorities. The czars found ballet, with its military-like discipline and precision, to be a particularly appealing art form. Court musicians and painters incorporated the folk tunes of the Caucasus and images of Turkestan into their work, thereby celebrating the spread of the empire. Even into the twentieth century, music thrived because it could be experimental without being overly political—although the musicians too occasionally fell foul of Stalin.

The boom of Russian capitalism at the end of the century coincided with a resuscitation of the city's intellectual fortune during the "silver age." Diaghilev's *World of Art* magazine, Volkov notes, was funded in 1898 by the city's first auto manufacturer. But then came the First World War and the awkward renaming of the city as "Petrograd."

The Bolshevik decision in January 1918 to move the capital away from the marauding German armies, to what Osip Mandelstam called "Buddhist Moscow", proved fatal. For many of the city's upper classes and intellectuals, it was literally fatal. Many fell prey to starvation, disease, or to Cheka execution squads during the hard years between 1918 and 1921. The tone of the book shifts abruptly, from the contradiction between aspiration and reality to unrelieved despair. Alexander Blok dies of starvation in August 1921, having been denied permission to emigrate by Lenin. Fellow poet Nicolai Gumilev is shot, at the age of thirty-five, the same month. After Lenin's death in 1924, the city is renamed in his honor, and becomes, as Valentin Kateev put it, a "strange, half-dead kingdom." The city shifted from being a symbol of oppression to a symbol of suffering. Even the mini-boom brought about by the New Economic Policy failed to lift the gloom: the leading tales of that era, Ilf and Petrov's *The Twelve Chairs*, Mikhail Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita*, are set in Moscow.

The suffering of the population during the "Great Patriotic War" dealt the city a terminal blow. One-third of the inhabitants died, and as the city grew over subsequent decades it filled up with migrants. The old city was no more. In the years of Brezhnevite stagnation, the myth of St. Petersburg survived in the imagination of the remaining fragments of its intelligentsia, most of whom ended up in the West, from George Balanchine to Joseph Brodsky. Amazingly, in 1962, Brodsky's poems unearthed the spirit of Liberty, which had been kept alive by a handful of souls such as Anna Akhmatova.

ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1991, the city on the Neva regained its original name: Sankt Peterburg (taken from the Dutch pronunciation). There were high hopes that with democratization and the opening up of Russia to the world economy, St. Petersburg could again become a "window on the West." Despite its wealth of highly trained scientists and technicians, the city was saddled with a ring of huge defense industry institutes and factories, turning out obsolete, high-tech weapons for a Cold War that was now officially over. True, the Nevski prospect has regained some of its bustle and tawdry glamour. Once again it echoes to the ricochet of assassins' bullets—but this time it is bankers, and not czars, who are in their sights.

Despite the energetic efforts of democratic mayor Anatoli Sobchak, St. Petersburg has failed to become a magnet for Western business. Real political power is still to be found in Moscow, and that is where the bankers and energy barons are to be found as well. Sobchak's promotional campaign took on a desperate quality ("St. Petersburg for the 2004 Olympics!"), and seemed to be more tied to his own ego than to the fate of the city.

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While Moscow's Yuri Luzhkov was fixing potholes and rebuilding cathedrals, St. Petersburg's infrastructure continued to sink into disrepair. One of the main subway lines under the Neva, built "heroically" through a layer of silt in the Brezhnevite 1970s, had to be closed because it started to sink at an alarming rate. In June 1996, Sobchak lost his bid for re-election, and was subsequently investigated for financial mismanagement.

MOSCOW HAS HAD a very different fate this century, as is documented in Timothy Colton's exhaustively researched tome. A powerful, assertive Soviet Union rose from the ashes of the Russian Empire, and Moscow was its capital. Colton provides a thorough social and political history of the city's rise, with useful maps and illustrations. The book is a mine of information that regular visitors of Moscow will quarry with pleasure.

Its focus is on the interplay between political management and town planning. There were intellectuals in Moscow, of course, but they did not define the character and purpose of the city, and they are—justifiably in this case—not the object of Colton's study. Political power was the name of the game, and Moscow's planners were faced with the challenge of laying out a city that was the decision making focus and distributional center of a vast, dynamic empire. It becomes, indeed, a city fit for the world's second superpower. Colton does not directly discuss Moscow's relationship to the rest of Stalin's domain, but concentrates instead on the nuts and bolts of urban development and the emergent patterns of social geography. He is particularly interested in the extent to which social inequality acquired a geographical dimension.

The book, like the city it documents, is huge, a monumental history of a monumental city. Like the city, however, there is no single, overarching argument or unifying theme. The city developed according to systematic plans and goals, but with the evaporation of Stalin's vision for the city it emerged lacking a telos. In contrast to St. Petersburg, Moscow was always more practical and more focused on the accumulation of wealth and power.

That being so, it is perhaps unfortunate that Colton did not directly discuss Moscow's relationship to the rest of Stalin's domain, and to the mind of that man as well. Moscow too has its share of contradiction and illusion. After all, Stalin's skyscrapers were thrown up amidst a desperately impoverished city. But his brutal reshaping of it made it ever more the superpower capital, its pattern of concentric circles and radial highways focusing the mind's eye on the center.

Colton's narrative covers the emergence of a democratic city management since 1990, but stops just short of the arrival of the dynamic Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Since his appointment as mayor in 1992 Luzhkov has kept the city on a tight rein, limiting privatization while encouraging business, all the time making sure that the city keeps functioning. Moscow is the dominant center for banking capital, the lubricant of Russia's crazy-quilt "transitional" economy. It is the place where traders must pay homage (and ready cash) to government officials to secure import and export licenses. It is the electronic media capital of Russia—and television now seems to be the key to electoral success.

Luzhkov has his share of critics, who point out that much of Moscow's wealth has come through the exploitation of the resources of Russia's poverty-stricken interior. Moscow is a boom town in a decaying society, sitting astride the $45 billion a year flow of oil, gas, and metal exports. This situation will last only so long as the workers out in Siberia are willing to toil for months on end without receiving their pay.

Luzhkov's efforts have been appreciated by Moscow's voters: in June he won re-election with 89 percent of the vote. In a country where most politicians are held in disdain, this is a major accomplishment, and Luzhkov is frequently talked of as a possible successor to Boris Yeltsin. Russia's future, for good or ill, lies in Moscow. □

Peter Rutland is assistant director of research at the Open Media Research Institute in Prague.

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Haley Barbour, Michael Cummings, Jonathan Stevenson, Kevin Driscoll, Herb Greer, Sol Schindler, Carlos Franzetti

Gone to the Lake:

JONATHAN CLARKE (Summer 1996) criticizes the Republican Party's recent book, *Agenda for America*, for what *he* describes as its views on national defense. Clarke asserts that the "defense section . . . proposes an additional annual burden of $140 billion." This is wholly unrelated to the defense program recommended in the book. Clarke's creative figures have subsequently been relied upon by Doug Bandow in a recent *New York Times* op-ed, asserting that the "Barbour program could add up to an astounding annual increase of $140 billion."

Agenda for America never proposed a $30 billion increase in readiness expenditure. Adequate resources exist to support readiness if Operations and Maintenance funds were not diverted by the Clinton administration to finance UN operations abroad. *Agenda for America* never recommended that annual spending for weapons procurement be increased by $60 billion. The resulting figures suggested by Clarke would place procurement expenditures above their Cold War peak—another imaginary assertion. *Agenda for America* never proposed spending $80 billion for a missile defense system. The General Accounting Office has affirmed that a missile defense system for American citizens could be deployed by the year 2003 for as little as $4 billion, and as much as $13 billion.

The post-Cold War environment may produce many new threats to American security arising from the convergence of widely distributed advanced technology and new national, religious, ethnic, and ideological movements. We cannot predict how these threats will emerge, but it is prudent to have a defense policy able to cope with potential threats to the United States. It is unconstructive for opponents of this view to amass fanciful data to advance an ostrich-like view of long-term American security interests.

Haley Barbour
National Policy Forum

Clarke replies:

With his multiple responsibilities, it is understandable that the financial details have escaped Mr. Barbour's attention. However, I did not imagine the figures for readiness, weapons procurement, and missile defense. They appear respectively on pages 206, 207, and 224 of his book. Incidentally, far from criticizing the book, I praised it as "detailed and serious." The mention of real numbers is welcome. It brings home to the voters that defense against new threats will be expensive. Are they prepared to pay the price? Or do they prefer tax cuts and a balanced budget? They cannot have all three.

. . . And Ulster Will Be Right:

SIR PEREGRINE Worsthorne's essay on the Anglo-Irish Conflict (Summer 1996) argues bitterly but unpersuasively for the status quo. Why he feels free to offer the blood of loyalists, "to the last man", in acts of treason and violence is unclear. But when he uses the term Ulster to erroneously describe six counties of Ireland, he shares the common ground of the Afrikaner advocating apartheid and the Russian seeking to restore communism.

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He reaches back to 1609 to explain why loyalists were bred like cattle "to resist absorption" and demurs that "Nothing has changed" in nearly four hundred years. In his rush to justify loyalism he neglects to mention that the winds of democracy and majority rule were buffeting the British Empire and Irish Protestant leaders like Wolfe Tone were leading protests and rebellions.

He predictably overlooks the 1918 Irish General Election as key to the conflict today. Sinn Fein was the overwhelming victor then, but King George V set aside majority rule in Ireland in favor of propping up minority rule from beachhead Belfast. This could only effectively be done by severing, occupying, and fortifying (partitioning) six of the nine counties as Ulster. Such is the power of loyalist mythology that the author could not use the correct term, Northern Ireland.

In order to prevent majority rule the governing loyalist parliament at Stormont deprived the property-less Catholics of the vote until peaceful civil rights protests in the early 1970s were bludgeoned by police lawlessness. The author politely claims "the Ulster [sic] police were far from evenhanded" and argues that even if elected, those who peacefully advocated reunification "must be excluded from power." The repression that followed over the next thirty years was, in every manifestation, an attempt to fulfill this Worsthorne dictum. It began with the assassination of Protestant elected leaders like Ron Bunting, Miriam Daly, and John Turnly, who advocated an end to partition, and was followed by internment, trial without jury, imprisonment without justice, a state censorship unheard of in a Western democracy, and the more recent state-sponsored murders of five elected Sinn Fein councilors and ten of their campaign workers. All of this was done in the name of democracy but certainly to prevent its fruition.

The most curious thing about Sir Peregrine's treatise is his frequent reference to an Irish "romantic nationalism" and an Irish government . . . that is "listening to ancestral voices rather than to the voice of reason." What he means is that the Irish government should disavow the heritage that gave them freedom and democracy and instead embrace the wishes and policies of Her Majesty's Government—a hereditary monarchy that has built a tourist industry by dwelling on the glories of Empire past. It is, however, a bloody past and nowhere was it more brutal or corrupt than in Ireland. . . .

The Irish people—North and South—have had enough of British reasoning. They need even less the misanthropic advice of Sir Peregrine Worsthorne. They need and want peace. With the United States acting as a true friend of both countries, the century that saw the demise of fascism, communism, and racism will bid cheerio to loyalism.

Michael J. Cummings
Irish American Unity Conference

PEREGRINE Worsthorne's essay on Northern Ireland furnishes an unusually trenchant and nuanced historical analysis of the Ulster problem. In particular, Mr. Worsthorne illuminates a central truth that is too often forgotten. To end the Anglo-Irish war and dispose of the home rule dilemma, Westminster opted in 1920 for partition of Ireland. It did so for prudential rather than punitive reasons: Ulster's British nationalism had proven itself less amenable to compromise than Irish nationalism.

Mr. Worsthorne notes that the realpolitik has not changed much in seventy-five years. The unionist majority of Northern Ireland will not be co-opted into a United Ireland by a tiny minority who have used terrorism as their principal means of suasion. As Mr. Worsthorne admonishes, Ulster will indeed fight, notwithstanding Sinn Fein's newfound legitimacy. But for him to claim, as he does, that the continued vitality of Irish nationalism is largely "America's doing" (p. 20) stretches history.

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Since 1970, the Provisional IRA has proven repeatedly that to function effectively (that is, disruptively) it requires little provincial support (10 to 15 percent) and microscopic support in the Irish Republic (2 percent), never mind American backing. Indeed, the essence of any terrorist group is its will to force political movement without a democratic mandate or diplomatic sponsorship. Irish-Americans do harbor romantic delusions about the IRA, they do influence Washington's Irish policy, and they have provided considerable financial support through Noraid. Still, the Provos could have made do quite handily left only to their own criminal rackets, homemade bombs, and Libyan connections.

Neither is American kibitzing responsible for sustaining the Irish government's opposition to partition. Article 2 of the 1937 Irish constitution, the brainchild of Eamonn de Valera, defines the "national territory" of Ireland as the entire island; Article 3 asserts the right of the Irish government to rule Northern Ireland and implicitly obligates the Irish government to effect unification. Nonviolent northern nationalists, most of them Catholics, regard these provisions as pledges of the eventual erasure of the border, and expect Dublin to do likewise.

But given that British direct rule has redressed most Catholic grievances, asks Mr. Worsthorne, why does the Irish government take Articles 2 and 3 seriously? The answer, in a word: tradition.

To be sure, de Valera's nationalism is an "ancestral voice" that intones a sentiment with scant "contemporary rationale" (p. 22). But as the Republic becomes more secular and robust, the same could be said about unionism. The point Mr. Worsthorne neglects is that *all* disputes about sovereignty have at their center an emotional dimension that is irreducible and non-negotiable. The Irish problem is not unique in this regard. For the Irish government to maintain its territorial aspirations is a matter of national identity, not rationality. The fact that *in practice* the electorate does not want to take on the burden of another 1.5 million people has only secondary significance. Unionist resolve itself allows Irish politicians to have their aspirations and eat them too. For Washington to heed Mr. Worsthorne, and urge them to drop the goal of unification, would be just as futile as asking unionists to forget about the union.

Nonetheless, Mr. Worsthorne suggests that Dublin's support for nationalism extends beyond civil politics. Why do the Irish security forces not intern suspected IRA men, he asks, when imprisonment by their fellow Irishmen would gut their resolve? Dublin's reluctance on this score, I suspect, has little to do with any lurking reverence for armed republicanism. The more credible reason is that Irish internment would only galvanize the IRA, just as British internment did in 1971-5. Despite the "people's army" facade and the rhetoric of "national self-determination", IRA men are autocrats, not democrats. Clearly they do not much care what their fellow Irishmen think of them. That is why their armed campaign has proceeded in spite of minuscule support in the Republic.

As a unionist, I share Mr. Worsthorne's frustration that the IRA has been able to operate for twenty-five years in a mature liberal democracy, and in fact has nearly bombed its way to the conference table. But in the main, it did so without the help of either Washington or Dublin, through the sheer, diabolical efficacy of terrorism. Government leaders humor Gerry Adams because they don't want the IRA to kill people any more; it's really that simple. More optimistically, the IRA's declaration of its cease-fire in August 1994 may have indicated republican leaders' overall recognition that unionists will never allow the IRA to win a united Ireland by terror. Conor Cruise O'Brien, as always, offers the useful caveat that terrorists will be terrorists because terrorism works, and cites as evidence the IRA's bombing last February of Canary Wharf, which both ended the cease-fire and led to multi-party

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talks. Touché. But the IRA's post-Canary Wharf campaign has been conspicuously anemic, and Dublin has long conceded that Irish unification cannot occur without the consent of the Northern Irish majority. The upshot is that, consistent with Irish history as recounted by Mr. Worsthorne, both militant and moderate Irish nationalism are more malleable than Ulster nationalism after all.

Washington's peace initiative seeks, responsibly, to build on that reality. Legally, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is exclusively British business; yet on a practical level, the polarity of the parties cries out for third-party mediation. Thus, London has accepted Washington's help. That assistance began with an overtly nationalist spin, when the Clinton administration granted Gerry Adams a U.S. visa eight months before the IRA cease-fire. But after angering the British government by hosting Adams on St. Patrick's Day 1995, the White House wised up and became more evenhanded. So adjusted, Washington's current agenda is laudable: to deal with terrorists (loyalist as well as republican) in order to forge a political settlement that stops them from killing. The alternative is to court the morbid inevitability of ritual murder that plagued Northern Ireland for twenty-five wasted years.

Jonathan Stevenson
Belfast, Northern Ireland

WHILE SIR Peregrine's attempt at placing the current impasse in its historical context is indeed admirable, does he not realize that in his efforts to expose Irish nationalism's "habit of listening to ancestral voices", he merely substitutes one form of intransigence (that of Ulster Protestants) for another (that of Catholic nationalists)?

Mr. Worsthorne raises the bogies of nationalist history (Drogheda, the Famine, and Bloody Sunday) merely as foils in his larger attempt to show that nationalist activism, while perhaps understandable in the past, is now hopelessly anachronistic. In short, Sir Peregrine contends, any nationalist attempts to invoke historical events in the name of present causes are merely the misguided workings of those "enthralled to patriotic ghosts from the past."

For the Ulster unionists however, Sir Peregrine's historical analysis holds something quite different. Sir Peregrine contends that, for the embattled forces of unionism, history is a cautionary tale that guides and informs their very being to this day. Sir Peregrine makes an explicit connection between Protestants past and present, a historical connection that he expressly denies to Catholic nationalists and their "patriotic ghosts." He writes of the seventeenth-century Protestant settlers: "These [settlers], *the forefathers of today's Ulstermen*, were expressly chosen because they could be trusted never to integrate. . . . Ulster's separateness . . . is not some mysterious modern quirk or perversity. It was expressly planned. . . ."[emphasis added] So it is, according to Sir Peregrine, that history provides not only an explanation for the current intransigence of Ulster unionists ("Ulster will fight"), but also a moral sanction ("Ulster will be right"). Catholic nationalists, however, need not apply for such historical validation.

Unfortunately, I have been relieved of the responsibility of explaining, by reference to historical events, the danger of Sir Peregrine's selective use of Irish history. The recent crises on the Garvaghy Road and in Londonderry provide a stronger argument than ever I could offer. Protestants, still glorying in the victories of 1690, paraded past Catholics, still smarting from the blows of Bloody Sunday. The result was sadly predictable. Members of each side could (and often did) recount a stirring version of history, not unlike Sir Peregrine's, that unfailingly culminates in an explanation and justification of their actions, whether they be spiteful Protestant marches—with full police protection—through Catholic neighborhoods, or senseless rioting by the residents of the Garvaghy Road.

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Further, Sir Peregrine's somber assessment of the unionists' historically validated intransigence and the futility of altering it smacks of that most ignominious of actions: caving into violence or the threat of violence. He writes, "Even if a modest percentage of Ulstermen were to agree to some form of incorporation—of which there is not even the remotest chance—Ulster's many men of violence would not." I dare say that were this same rationale to be employed with regard to the IRA, Sir Peregrine and others would leap to the attack (quite rightly, I might add), decrying it as a Chamberlain-like act of appeasement, a reward for violence, and a blow to the foundations of civil society. The threat of violence must never, ever preclude an attempt to reach, by lawful means, the settlement of a dispute. The fact that those threatening violence are unionists, not nationalists, should have no bearing whatsoever on this premise.

In the end, Sir Peregrine is right to decry the selective use of history by Irish nationalists. He is also correct in his assertion that the nationalist agenda is not a matter of urgency for most Irish people who, by a vast majority, abhor their violent methods. But what is good for the nationalist goose ought likewise to be good for the unionist gander. If the nationalist's selective use of history is a chimera (and it is), then the same must also be said for the unionist. Indeed, some would contend that meaningful peace will only come to Northern Ireland when its people, so obsessed with history and the attempt to manipulate it, make common cause to seek their purpose and hope by looking forward to the future, not backward to the past. Sir Peregrine, sad to say, is still looking backward.

Kevin O'D. Driscoll
Washington, DC

SIR PEREGRINE Worsthorne's analysis of Ulster's troubles is excellent on most points. But some details of his historical background are not up to the rest of the argument.

Sir Peregrine seems to buy into the anti-Irish atrocity element of Anglo-Irish history that was confected by nationalists in the last century. In particular he cites the famous Drogheda massacre that Yeats and others have celebrated as an archetypal anti-Irish piece of cruelty. The commander who refused to surrender Drogheda and incurred the consequent massacre was English, not Irish. Drogheda was an incident in the seventeenth-century English civil war between Cromwell and the Stuart monarchy—not part of any Irish nationalist rebellion.

The British attitude to the Irish famine was not, in the mores of the time, "appallingly callous." As I pointed out in *Commentary* some years ago, such a judgment is anachronistic:

> [T]he British government was simply unable to grasp the nature and scope of the disaster. . . . When some inkling of its extremity did seep through, there was no practical sense of how to help on the necessary scale, or even that such help was possible. It would have required a vast aid operation of late 20th-century proportions—something unimaginable at the time, without a ready and deep-seated belief that these large numbers of poor, useless as a labour force, were worth a gigantic effort and expense, just because they were human beings.
>
> For us to whom compassion has become a basic political principle, that is taken for granted. It was not so [anywhere] in the mid-nineteenth century.

None of this can or is meant to whitewash British government clumsiness in the handling of Anglo-Irish affairs. This was often profound and crossed the line into harshness and stupidity many times before the present mess. But for all that the record should be kept straight. . . .

Herb Greer
Manchester, England

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Worsthorne replies:

I am grateful for all the replies which usefully qualify some of my article's assertions and correct some of its mistakes. If only all Irish disputation could be conducted with as much civility.

Ünal on Owen on Bosnia:

PROFESSOR HASAN Ünal, to whom you gave the task of reviewing David Owen's *Balkan Odyssey* (Spring 1996), is clearly on the side of the Muslims in the Bosnian conflict. Unfortunately he uses the space given him as an opportunity to attack not only the Serbs but those who do not unequivocally side with the Muslims.

He is aghast that Lord Owen writes, "There were no innocents among the political and military leaders in all three parties . . . never . . . have I had to operate in such a climate of dishonor, propaganda, and dissembling", as if indeed only Serbs and Croats were capable of making promises and not keeping them.

As an example of Muslim dissembling, Lord Owen writes of how snipers fired at Serbs from a hospital and then left before Serbian counter-fire began. Television cameras were then called in to record Serbian artillery damage to unarmed hospitals. This is an old ruse done many times before in places other than Bosnia. Lord Owen would have liked the UN to publicize this act, and others like it, not because he equated the enormity of Serbian atrocities with Muslim trickery but because he thought if the reality of the situation were known more realistic solutions could be developed.

Professor Ünal also castigates Lord Owen for daring to imply that the market bomb explosion in Sarajevo on February 5, 1994 was a Muslim undertaking. The original calculations by the French military who arrived on the scene showed that the mortar bomb came from Muslim-controlled territory, while UN observers stated there had been no firing from Serbian-controlled territory at the time of the explosion. A subsequent detailed UN investigation found that it was not possible to determine where the mortar was fired from, certainly a politic decision under the circumstances.

David Owen's book is far from perfect, as he would be the first to agree, and he may have been wrong on more than one occasion. But if you are going to allocate space for a review you should insist upon a review of the book, and not the character of the author. The plight of the Muslims in Bosnia is indeed tragic, but the kind of emotional partisanship Professor Ünal displays does not help their cause. Indeed, it makes one wonder whether Lord Owen might have been correct in some of his observations.

Sol Schindler
Bethesda, Maryland

Ünal replies:

My criticism of David Owen and others like him stems from the fact that they put the war in Bosnia down to ethnic tension, allegedly endemic in the Balkans—a flawed diagnosis that has contributed to the destruction of a well-functioning multicultural European society, for whose preservation I have certainly displayed partisanship. I stick to my guns that Owen was too eager to lend a sympathetic ear to rumors circulated by the UN personnel that the Muslims shelled their own people. UN soldiers resorted to those rumors to obviate having to act to stop aggression.

Ortega y Gasset:

I FOUND Mr. McInnes' characterization of Ortega y Gasset (Summer 1996) unfair. Obviously, seventy years later, social circumstances (and social philosophy) have changed. In 1937, Ortega began a prologue for French readers by stating:

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> This book—assuming it may be called a book—began to be published in a Madrid newspaper in 1926, and its subject is too human not to be affected by time. That is why facts have left the book behind. Much of what is anticipated in it was soon the present and is already part of the past. . . .

However, Ortega is still current when it comes to his denunciation of the "mass-man" as he who sets no value on himself as an individual but enjoys the idea—the feeling—of being "just like anybody else"; and, even worse, finds justification in that for whatever he does (or does not) do. If Ortega was an elitist, the elites that he admired were not those who think themselves superior to the rest, but those who demand more of themselves than the rest, which—as he stressed—has nothing to do with birth.

Above all, Ortega was no fascist. He may have disliked politics but, whenever necessary, he became involved. In 1931, together with Gregorio Marañon and other Spanish intellectuals, he took a stand against the ailing monarchy of Alfonso XIII. During the Spanish Republic he was a member of parliament, and politics was then a dangerous activity. When Franco won in 1939, he had to go into exile. Franco despised the philosopher and rejected him as a "liberal" and a "freemason." At the time of his death in 1955, Ortega was a symbol of cultural resistance to the mediocrity of the regime. □

Carlos A. Franzetti
Potomac, Maryland

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The European Foundation
61, Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HZ England
tel. (44) 0171 930 7319 fax: (44) 0171 930 9706
email: eurofound @eurofont.demon.co.uk

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A Thin Line

Adam Garfinkle

BENYAMIN NETANYAHU'S election as Israel's prime minister on May 29 was greeted by a great international gnashing of teeth. Dismayed hordes of experts and pundits charged that, efforts at rhetorical placation notwithstanding, the Netanyahu government would thoroughly befoul the peace process and touch off retrograde motion in every dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict in consequence.

Well maybe, maybe not. Lost amid the bewailing is a critical fact: Netanyahu's election reflects an already existing crisis, that being the anemic record of Palestinian autonomy, the experiment in limited Palestinian self-government conceived at Camp David in September 1978 and attempted after the Rabin-Arafat handshake of September 1993. On balance, autonomy has failed to deliver the goods: security and a sense of genuine Arab acceptance for Israelis; economic relief and restored honor for Palestinians. Israel's Jewish electorate reacted unmistakably to autonomy's failure, voting 55 percent for Netanyahu. From the looks of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) much reduced popularity, the Palestinian electorate would react similarly were an opportunity to do so at hand.

As a form of diplomatic art, autonomy is a good idea: The parties cannot agree to more, yet a majority in both communities is sufficiently dissatisfied with the status quo to settle for less. But if autonomy is not made to work as advertised, the peace process cannot proceed. To that end, the local parties, and the United States too, must beware of getting dizzy in the rarified air of Israeli-Palestinian final status questions, or of falling for the fool's gold of "real peace" between Israel and Syria. Old business before new.

But can Netanyahu and Arafat fix autonomy? The answer will tell us if the basic foundation of the peace process, as defined in Oslo in the summer of 1993, is sound. If this foundation withstands the pressures of the next few months and emerges stronger, we will know that it is mightier than the personalities that formed it, sturdier than the tempests of Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics that have buffeted it. We will know that Rabin's design required Netanyahu's hand to achieve success, which would raise Israeli security politics to a near poetic zenith. And if they do not fix it, we will also have learned a lot—as it is said, the hard way.

Despite three months having passed since the election, fears over the Netanyahu government's projected course have neither abated nor been vindicated. The reason is that the government has so far proved more adept at planning its administration than at actually doing anything. In most areas beyond the domestic economy, the government has gone out of its way to postpone major decisions and avoid specifics whenever possible; indeed, it has not yet developed a policy toward the PA at a level specific enough to allow even its principals to know where it is going. Meanwhile, everyone is watching for signs revealing true intent, and signs there have been—ambiguously matched to near perfection. Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon orders roads and bridges built that suggest further

Adam Garfinkle is executive editor of *The National Interest.*

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Israeli territorial digestion, but Netanyahu says Israel will redeploy the Israeli army around Hebron. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) will redeploy there, yes; but not until the terms are thoroughly renegotiated. The settlement freeze is lifted, but no new settlements are (yet) authorized. Even the spate of secret diplomacy regarding Syria and south Lebanon appears to have been designed as tactical delay, to keep the Americans deflected from the Palestinian track and to place any onus for the lack of progress between Israel and Syria squarely on Damascus.

All of this reflects the fact that the new government is experiencing on-the-job training. Its principals did not, it seems, expect to win election, and a combination of inexperience and early tenure-shock has produced to date a clumsy coalition-building process, an abundance of intra-cabinet policy conflict, and an unprecedented catfight between the prime minister's office and the foreign ministry. Obviously, it is better to temporize than to be sure but wrong; still, it makes for an unusual fluidity. No Israeli government can tread water in this fashion for long, especially one elected to make changes; fixed calendar points loom and decisions must be made. Its options are many, and its choices truly matter.

Things Might Work Out Well . . .

THERE IS a case for expecting the right choices to be made. Not every aspect of autonomy has gone wrong, whatever Likud principals predicted three years ago. The trade already made—Israel's relinquishing responsibility for the majority of the Palestinian population and the PA's assuming it—is one both parties accept. That neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli "street" relishes a return to *intifada* and counter-*intifada* is benignly sobering, as is the fact that Netanyahu well appreciates the peripheral benefits of the peace process: the economic boom it helped midwife and the growing normalization of Israel's position in the region and beyond. He has worked hard on maintaining both in visits, so far, to Washington, Amman, and Cairo.

Moreover, while Netanyahu can barely bring himself to say "Oslo", he recognizes that he cannot deliver personal security to Israelis under current circumstances without the PA. It was a fetching campaign slogan to claim that the Labor government had "subcontracted Israeli security to Yasir Arafat", but it was a double distortion. Israel could still act unilaterally when necessary, proven by the fact that the IDF segmented and subdued the West Bank this past March within thirty-six hours after a grisly spate of terror attacks; and Palestinian police and intelligence forces have become a serious if still flawed partner with Israel. So Netanyahu may not do what he said he would—send the IDF throughout the West Bank and Gaza in search of terror suspects "over the heads" of PA policemen. Israel would end up with less security and more terror, not the other way around.

Most important, Netanyahu was not elected to stiff-arm the peace process but to reduce its costs and enhance its benefits. His ministers are right to argue that they are in a better position than Labor to demand compliance from the PA. Shimon Peres, they point out, was associated so closely with the process that his demands necessarily reflected prior failures, so he was reluctant to press them until exploding buses and body parts littered the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The new government has no such problem and no such reluctance, and there are, to be sure, demands worth making. The Palestinian leadership must do more to quell terrorism, turn over captured terrorists to Israel as required by agreement, stop praising murderers and calling their acts "jihad", and respect the rules over Jerusalem. For its part, Israel is obligated to withdraw from most of Hebron, release the last security prisoners it promised to release, create a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank as agreed, and ease the closure if the PA does its part on the security side.

There is no inherent reason why patient diplomacy cannot achieve this amalgam of transactions. Even a good faith effort would be worth much; success would give the peace process the broad support it needs to approach final status

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negotiations. Since both sides are at least dimly aware of what the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship would mean, this is by no means an impossible outcome.

. . . *Or They Might Not*

WHILE THERE is a logic for expecting progress, logic does not always hold pride of place in the Levant. There is also, as ever, a prospect for calamity.

Palestinian expectations of the peace process have always been excessive, and of late Yasir Arafat, careening from misjudgment to misjudgment, has fanned these expectations with repeated proclamations of the imminence of a sovereign Palestinian state "with its capital in holy Jerusalem." Meanwhile, formal Likud positions—not on just some, but all, final status issues-in-waiting—are so unforthcoming as to engender despair among Palestinians, elite and commoner alike. The current Government Program calls for the existing territorial status quo to be frozen, for existing Jewish settlements to be expanded and new ones established, for no Palestinian sovereignty ever over anything, for not even symbolic compromise over Jerusalem, and for a freer hand for the IDF in the territories.

In short, while Israeli and Palestinian expectations of where the peace process would ultimately lead have diverged ever since the evening the Oslo accords were initialed, never have those expectations seemed as starkly contradictory as they do now. The PA's willingness to cooperate with Israel on security problems naturally depends in large part on its expectations of a satisfactory outcome, so if the peace process is expected to lead essentially nowhere, or nowhere beyond where it is already, then one has to wonder how strong Arafat's incentive is to be a full partner when doing so undermines his still shaky position amid a riven Palestinian community.

This brings us to HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Arafat's aim all along has been to co-opt his Islamist opposition rather than confront it, and as long as the peace process moved in a direction that bolstered his nationalist credentials, that strategy worked steadily in his favor—as the January 1995 election and any of several polls show. But Arafat's strategy did not work for Rabin and Peres because the cost of the Labor government's forbearance of Palestinian political adjustment was paid in the coin of Israeli trauma. Arafat acted too slyly and too slowly toward his opposition, and now he faces a process with Israel unlikely to bring him successes that he can use to solidify his tenure. The leaders of HAMAS know this and, though their organization has been much weakened, they have strong incentive to take advantage of the pall of expectation that has descended over the Palestinians in recent months. To throw a wrench into any Israeli-PA attempt to refashion their political accommodation, a new HAMAS spate of terror would aim to discredit Arafat by provoking Netanyahu to unload on the PA. A few murderous suicide bombs could easily lead to an Israeli reaction that would reduce Arafat to a political eunuch and virtual "collaborator", and that would, in turn, shatter Israeli-PA police and intelligence cooperation. The way would then be open for a terror campaign of truly gruesome proportions.

In these circumstances, Israel would have to resume the full burden of security, an undertaking that, by reversing the two year flow of authority to the Palestinians, would almost certainly spawn new terror recruits. If, at the end of such a process, the large Palestinian towns, designated as Zone A in the Oslo II agreement, were all that was left to PA control—and if terrorism is known to flee, hide, and incubate there—Israel might re-enter those "cities of refuge" even against its initial desires. And if it did, who knows how many of roughly twenty thousand armed PA policemen would try to stop them? Arafat himself, amid a burgeoning new *intifada* that he can neither staunch nor manage—and that may be fed further by Israeli settlement expansion—might exile himself from the scene lest he be buried trying to control it. HAMAS would inherit the vacuum, and the Oslo process would be dead.

The line between an acceptable outcome and a messy one in the Israeli-Palestinian peace track is very thin, and, like all lines, it takes its basic direction from the first few points drawn. How those points will be plotted depends most of all on

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the leadership qualities of the new prime minister. If Netanyahu understands the political dynamics on the Palestinian side as well as he gauges those on his own, his hand will remain steady. But if he allows himself to be pushed by the Likud's brawling "princes", he could well imperil Israeli security rather than enhance it.

No one knows what will happen, but one thing is clear: Netanyahu is a man whose career has so far posted no failures, yet whose talents have been perpetually underestimated by his opponents. Even most of those who did not vote for him must be hoping that his winning streak continues. After all that has happened, it would be tragic if Yasir Arafat finally reconciled himself to being an effective partner to Israel only to find that his new counterpart either could not or did not want to reciprocate. With any luck, this is one tragedy that will remain forever theoretical.

PEACE PROCESS anxiety was the major issue in the Israeli election, but not the only one. Israel, like America, has its culture war over aesthetics and values both, and its politicians appreciate its power—or invite failure if they do not.

The Likud is no less secular a party than Labor, but in recent decades it has drawn closer to the religious camp over questions of territorial compromise, which Likud and most of the religious parties oppose—though for different reasons. The Likud also devoted more attention to Israel's culture wars in the recent campaign than did the overconfident Labor Party, and it paid off at the polls. Labor has never bothered to cultivate the significant minority of religious Jews who favor the peace process and it associated too closely with Meretz, a stridently secular party that ran campaign ads featuring a young head-shaven, earringed *tzfoni* (i.e., a north Tel Aviv punk-rocker), saying tartly irreverent things about the Orthodox religious establishment. Thanks in part to such ads, Meretz's Knesset representation dropped from twelve to nine, and Labor suffered a negative coat-tail effect from it.

All of this was Israeli politics as usual, not illustration of the supposed lost soul of the Labor Party. Outside the country, however, some observers of *this* Jewish war have become confused about particulars. Partisan politics has been known to produce rhetorical exaggeration, and a few pro-Likud English-language articles published before the election seem to have persuaded many American observers that the entire Israeli Labor Party, swallowed whole by Israel's self-absorbed literary Left, has gone "native"—in the Biblical sense—and become veritable Canaanites. Some on the far secular side of Israel's cultural spectrum have indeed suggested despicable things aimed at driving both God and Judaism from Israeli public life. But to claim that these individuals guide Israeli culture writ large, or speak for the Labor Party, is like saying that E.L. Doctorow, Gore Vidal, and Noam Chomsky guide American culture and speak for the Democrats. This, thank God, isn't so—in either country.

Not that fears about Israel's future as a Jewish society are baseless. Some very thoughtful Israeli traditionalists worry that the typical secular Israeli will soon be indistinguishable from a gentile save for the peculiar fact that his native language happens to be Hebrew. There are problems, many stemming from Israel's growing prosperity—as similar problems arose from similar causes in ancient times, and as the Prophets were bold to declaim. But few Jews who have actually lived in Israel for more than a few weeks, who have sent their children to either secular or religious schools, and who can get around reasonably well in the language, fail to see such fears as exaggerations. Most so-called secular Israelis are not spiritually vacuous and their kids are not Hebrew-speaking mall-rats; they do, however, resent being coerced by a state religious establishment. Surely, any American even vaguely familiar with the conditions of his own country's founding can understand that.

Alas, the political battles of Israel's culture wars are not so simple. Sometimes they are more than meet the eye, sometimes less. Compared even to the puzzles of the peace process, trying to understand Israel's culture wars from afar—and in the wrong language—is roughly the political equivalent of plumbing the secrets of *kaballah* (Jewish mysticism) without a good teacher. In both cases, the uninitiated should beware facile interpretation. □

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

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